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RÉSUMÉ 
L’utilisation incessante de composants électroniques à géométrie toujours plus faible a engendré 
de nouveaux défis au fil des ans. Par exemple, des semi-conducteurs à mémoire et à 
microprocesseur plus avancés sont utilisés dans les systèmes avioniques qui présentent une 
susceptibilité importante aux phénomènes de rayonnement cosmique. L'une des principales 
implications des rayons cosmiques, observée principalement dans les satellites en orbite, est 
l'effet d'événements singuliers (SEE). Le rayonnement atmosphérique suscite plusieurs 
préoccupations concernant la sécurité et la fiabilité de l'équipement avionique, en particulier pour 
les systèmes qui impliquent des réseaux de portes programmables (FPGA). Les FPGA à base de 
cellules de mémoire statique (SRAM) présentent une solution attrayante pour mettre en œuvre 
des systèmes complexes dans le domaine de l’avionique. Les expériences de rayonnement 
réalisées sur les FPGA ont dévoilé la vulnérabilité de ces dispositifs contre un type particulier de 
SEE, à savoir, les événements singuliers de changement d’état (SEU). Un SEU est considérée 
comme le changement de l'état d'un élément bistable (c'est-à-dire, un bit-flip) dû à l'effet d'un ion, 
d'un proton ou d’un neutron énergétique. Cet effet est non destructif et peut être corrigé en 
réécrivant la partie de la SRAM affectée. 
Les changements de délai (DC) potentiels dus aux SEU affectant la mémoire de configuration de 
routage ont été récemment confirmés. Un des objectifs de cette thèse consiste à caractériser plus 
précisément les DC dans les FPGA causés par les SEU. Les DC observés expérimentalement sont 
présentés et la modélisation au niveau circuit de ces DC est proposée. Les circuits impliqués dans 
la propagation du délai sont validés en effectuant une modélisation précise des blocs internes à 
l'intérieur du FPGA et en exécutant des simulations. Les résultats montrent l’origine des DC qui 
sont en accord avec les mesures expérimentales de délais. Les modèles proposés au niveau circuit 
sont, aux meilleures de notre connaissance, le premier travail qui confirme et explique les délais 
combinatoires dans les FPGA. 
La conception d'un circuit moniteur de délai pour la détection des DC a été faite dans la 
deuxième partie de cette thèse. Ce moniteur permet de détecter un changement de délai sur les 
sections critiques du circuit et de prévenir les pannes de synchronisation engendrées par les SEU 
sans utiliser la redondance modulaire triple (TMR). Cette méthode conserve la fonctionnalité du 
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système en abaissant temporairement la fréquence d’opération pour éviter une panne de délai 
jusqu’à ce que le bit défectueux responsable ait été corrigé. 
La sensibilité aux SEU du réseau d'interconnexions programmable dans un FPGA de la famille 
Zynq-7000 est validée expérimentalement sous bombardement de  neutrons. Une méthode pour 
configurer une architecture d’oscillateurs en anneau, principalement avec des ressources de 
routage et un minimum de ressource logique, est proposée. Un contrôle total des ressources de 
routage permet de cibler les différents types d’interconnexions disponibles dans le FPGA et de 
créer des oscillateurs dont la fréquence est fixée par la longueur du routage (RO). De plus, un 
algorithme de routage à travers des matrices de commutation est présenté pour identifier 
automatiquement les points d'interconnexion programmables associés à une paire 
d’interconnections. Une configuration expérimentale pour mesurer sans équipement externe les 
DC sur les différents types de routage dans le FPGA est proposée. Les résultats expérimentaux 
montrent que la configuration permet de mesurer des DC induits par SEU aussi faible que 8 psec. 
Il est également démontré que les différents types d’interconnexion présentent différentes durées 
moyennes avant l’apparition d’un DC. 
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ABSTRACT 
The unrelenting demand for electronic components with ever diminishing feature size have 
emerged new challenges over the years. Among them, more advanced memory and 
microprocessor semiconductors are being used in avionic systems that exhibit a substantial 
susceptibility to cosmic radiation phenomena. One of the main implications of cosmic rays, 
which was primarily observed in orbiting satellites, is single-event effect (SEE). Atmospheric 
radiation causes several concerns regarding the safety and reliability of avionics equipment, 
particularly for systems that involve field programmable gate arrays (FPGA). SRAM-based 
FPGAs, as an attractive solution to implement systems in aeronautic sector, are very susceptible 
to SEEs in particular Single Event Upset (SEU). An SEU is considered as the change of the state 
of a bistable element (i.e., bit-flip) due to the effect of an energetic ion or proton. This effect is 
non-destructive and may be fixed by rewriting the affected part. 
Sensitivity evaluation of SRAM-based FPGAs to a physical impact such as potential delay 
changes (DC) has not been addressed thus far in the literature. DCs induced by SEU can affect 
the functionality of the logic circuits by disturbing the race condition on critical paths. The 
objective of this thesis is toward the characterization of DCs in SRAM-based FPGAs due to 
transient ionizing radiation. The DCs observed experimentally are presented and the circuit-level 
modeling of those DCs is proposed. Circuits involved in delay propagation are reverse-
engineered by performing precise modeling of internal blocks inside the FPGA and executing 
simulations. The results show the root cause of DCs that are in good agreement with 
experimental delay measurements. The proposed circuit level models are, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first work on modeling of combinational delays in FPGAs. 
In addition, the design of a delay monitor circuit for DC detection is investigated in the second 
part of this thesis. This monitor allowed to show experimentally cumulative DCs on interconnects 
in FPGA. To this end, by avoiding the use of triple modular redundancy (TMR), a mitigation 
technique for DCs is proposed and the system downtime is minimized. A method is also 
proposed to decrease the clock frequency after DC detection without interrupting the process. 
The susceptibility of the programmable interconnection network in a state-of-the-art Zynq-7000 
FPGA family to SEU is experimentally validated. It is known that a bit-flip induced by an SEU in 
the routing network leads to an undesired bridge between an unrouted interconnect and a live 
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interconnect. A method to configure architectures mostly with routing resources and minimal 
logic resources is proposed. A full control over routing resources enables us to employ different 
interconnections available in the FPGA in order to create routing-based ring oscillators (RO). In 
addition, a novel algorithm enabling the configuration of routing paths through switch matrices, 
which automatically identify interconnection points between a pair of interconnections is 
presented. An experimental setup to measure DCs on the routing resources of an APSoC is 
proposed. The experimental results show that the proposed setup, requiring no external 
equipment for DC measurement, is able to measure induced DCs as low as 8 psec. It is also 
shown that different interconnection types presents different mean time before DC occurrence. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
In the design of electronic systems, cosmic rays with high ionizing radiation levels are 
problematic challenges. A single charged particle can ionize thousands of electrons and create 
electronic noise and signal spikes [1]. In the case of digital circuits, this may cause failures or 
functional errors. CMOS electronic components are especially susceptible to ionizing radiations. 
This is a critical issue in the design of artificial satellites, airplanes, and mission aircrafts, since 
they contain a huge amount of electronic modules and components. In order to ensure the proper 
operation of such systems, integrated circuits (IC) manufacturers make efforts to design ICs and 
embedded systems which are more robust against cosmic rays. 
Another limitation in today’s manufacturing industry (especially the spacecraft and aircraft 
providers using FPGAs) that makes the electronic devices very susceptible to ionizing radiation 
is technology down scaling. More specifically, as the feature sizes of components reduce, their 
sensitivity to ionizing radiations increase. 
In avionic applications, as the aircraft traffic increases, new flight corridors should be defined at 
higher altitude that exposes the aircraft to more radiation. At the earth level, most of this radiation 
is absorbed by the atmosphere. However, on- board control devices are more exposed to radiation 
and hence the risk of an electronic fault is higher which could be a threat for passengers’ safety. 
The radiation usually generates single-event upset (SEU) by changing the state of a logical bit 
inside an integrated circuit and creating a soft error. Fortunately, SEUs are hardly destructive and 
may be fixed or avoided by proper circuit architectures or restoring algorithms.  
In this thesis, SEUs occurring in SRAM-based FPGAs are studied due to their wide application 
range in aircraft electronic systems. The proper operation of an aircraft and its electronic 
components functionality must be guaranteed in high altitudes against cosmic rays. Therefore, it 
is of primary importance to develop mitigation techniques to ensure the robustness of FPGAs 
against ionizing radiations in order to reduce the on-board electronics downtime. In view of this, 
in collaboration with three industrial partners, i.e., Bombardier Aerospace, MDA Corporation, 
and Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the concerns on single-event effects (SEE) implications in 
FPGA-based applications intended for aircrafts travelling at high altitudes, are investigated. 
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1.2 Background on Radiation Effects 
The presence of radiation is one of the effective elements to distinguish the space environment. 
The natural environment contains lots of electrons and protons that are trapped by planetary 
magnetic fields. Protons and a very small fraction of heavier nuclei are produced in energetic 
solar events and cosmic rays within and outside of our galaxy [2]. The cosmic rays consist of 
approximately 85% protons, 14% alpha particles, and 1% heavy ions, as well as x-ray and 
gamma-ray radiations. Although, most of these particles are filtered out by atmosphere, they still 
remain as a primarily concern for spacecrafts and the aircrafts travelling at high altitudes. This 
makes new challenges in avionic applications and space missions. When a particle beam interacts 
with materials, the secondary neutrons are created [3]. These neutrons can make a threat to SEEs 
in electronics. In addition, the protons are significant sources of creating SEEs especially in 
digital devices and embedded systems. For the charged particles, the amount of energy going into 
ionization is expressed by the stopping power or linear energy transfer (LET) function, 
commonly in units of           or as energy per unit length         in kiloelectronvolts per 
micrometer [2]. 
SEE phenomenon has primarily been observed only in orbiting satellites. However, since the 
beginning of 1980’s, by considering new flight corridors at higher altitudes, the SEE was defined 
as the main radiation concern for the avionics. SEE causes major concerns regarding the 
reliability and safety of avionic equipments, particularly for those systems that employ SRAM-
based FPGAs for control and processing purposes. One particular type of SEE, namely SEU as a 
soft-error threats the reliability of SRAM-based FPGAs in avionics. As it will be considered 
throughout this thesis, the static memory cell of the SRAM-based FPGA is very susceptible to 
SEU. One of the main implications of this susceptibility that is considered in this work is the 
delay fault that has been thus far neglected in the literature. Following this section, some 
backgrounds on radiation effects, SEE and SEU implications in digital systems, as well as other 
phenomena caused by radiation will be drawn. 
1.2.1 Radiation Effects on Electronic Devices 
Statistical analysis and precise experimental designs in manufacturing companies have shown 
that the radiation effects are often the main cause of erroneous behavior of electronic 
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components, i.e., faults. These faults could be ignored in some applications. Though, for high 
reliability applications, especially in digital designs, it is essential to assess the faults caused by 
radiation effects. Among the problems in electronic systems caused by SEEs, a type of soft 
errors, also called SEU, is considered as the main challenge in avionic systems [4]. 
Although the ICs utilized in avionic systems operate in irradiative environments, they are 
sensitive to transient faults caused by interaction of ionizing particles with the silicon substrate of 
electronic components. In general, if a particle has the capability to divide a quite atom into ions, 
it is considered as an ionizing particle [5]. 
1.2.2 Single-Event Effect (SEE) 
When a high-energy particle passes through a semiconductor, it creates an ionized track behind. 
This ionization may create a glitch in the output of the circuit or device, a bit-flip in the memory 
or a register, and a destructive latch-up and burnout in high-power transistors [6]. A bit-flip is 
defined as the change of the state of a bistable element, (e.g., a flip-flop or other memory 
elements) due to the effect of an energetic ion or proton.  In designs without latches, it is 
recommended to employ RC time constant circuits in order to slow down the circuit response 
time during an SEE occurrence. 
An SEE can be destructive or non-destructive. Destructive effects result in catastrophic device 
failure, while non-destructive effects will cause loss of data and/or control. The main implication 
of SEE is in the silicon substrate of semiconductor devices. When an ionizing particle strikes the 
silicon substrate, a nuclear reaction occurs between them caused by charge generation. The 
charge generated by single non-destructive strikes is collected and will produce a spurious 
voltage on a sensitive node of the design [2]. The charge can be deposited directly or indirectly 
into the material. For example, the neutron strikes will generate the secondary particles such as 
protons and alpha particles which are charged and may perturb the functionality of a electronic 
component of the circuit [5]. 
A single charged particle passes through an electronic component in three main successive steps, 
namely, the charge deposition by the energetic particle striking the sensitive region, transporting 
the released charge into the device, and the charge collection in the sensitive region of the device 
[7]. Figure  1-1 shows the three steps in the case of an energetic charged particle passing through 
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a reverse-biased      junction [8]. The steps of this mechanism are described in more details in 
the following. 
Charge deposition/generation : When the particle strikes the sensitive region of the inverse 
biased p-n junction, it collides with the crystal lattice of the semiconductor and penetrates to the 
substrate. Consequently, the ions are generated that transfer a large amount of energy to the 
electrons of the struck atoms and a cylindrical track of electron-hole pairs with a submicron 
radius is generated along the particle path (Figure  1-1A). 
Charge Collection and transport : When the track of electron-hole pairs is generated in the 
semiconductor substrate, the released carriers are quickly transported and then collected by 
elementary structures (e.g., p-n junctions). The charge transport is performed through two 
mechanisms : charge drift in regions with an electric field (Figure  1-1B) and charge diffusion in 
neutral zones (Figure  1-1C) [7]. The transported charges in the device induce a parasitic transient 
current (Figure  1-1D), which may induce disturbances in the device and associated circuits. If the 
parasitic current is large enough, it may also induce a permanent damage on gate insulators, such 
as single-event gate rupture (SEGR) or single-event latch-up (SEL). These phenomena are 
considered as permanent failures in electronic devices caused by cosmic rays. Depending on the 
amount of the charge transferred directly or indirectly and its location, the interaction of the 
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Figure  1-1 : Charge generation (A),  collection and transport (B), (C) phases in a reverse-biased 
junction and the resultant current pulse caused by the passage of a particle (D) [7] 
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ionizing particles with the silicon substrate of electronic devices may provoke transient or 
permanent effects to the material as the consequence of particle collision [5]. 
As mentioned earlier, SEEs could be destructive (hard error, permanent effect) or non-destructive 
(soft error, transient effect). In the following section, the SEE classification and its related 
phenomena are briefly discussed. 
1.2.3 SEE Classification 
In recent years, the use of commercial and non-assessed electronic components with smaller 
feature sizes has been increased, especially in avionic industry. In view of this and in order to 
meet the standard requirements in aviation, design engineers have found that different approaches 
are required to ensure the integrity and reliability of the electronic components used in avionic 
applications [9]. The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) committee has forced the 
avionic industries to address the key points of reliability during the avionic systems assembly. 
This committee released the first report in IEC TS 62239 [10] providing a method for electronic 
components management and introducing the main atmospheric radiation effect on avionics. The 
SEE effects on avionic electronics was classified in three groups [9], as depicted in Figure  1-2 
[11]. 
 
 Soft Error : is a non permanent type of damage, yet may be catastrophic by affecting the 
circuit functionality. A soft error may create an alteration in the status of a logic value 
stored in a memory cell, delay the signal transition, or modify the proper functionality of 
a module. The recovery of the affected part by soft error is possible through reinitializing 
the device. It is noted that single-event transient (SET) is a type of soft error leading to 
erroneous data at the output of the system affected by radiation, if not filtered properly. 
SET sometimes emerges as spikes that may propagate significantly through the circuit. 
Single-event functional interrupt (SEFI) phenomenon occurs when the radiation modifies 
a special register’s value controlling the device functionality. The temporal loss of 
intended device functionality is the consequence of SEFI’s effect in digital circuits. 
Single-event disturb (SED) affects the combinational logic and latches in a design that is 
referred to the momentary corruption of the stored data. SEU itself, defined as changing 
the state of a logical bit and creating a soft error in Section  1.1, is classified into two 
6 
 
events; single-bit upset (SBU), where the SEU flips only one bit of the memory element; 
and multiple-bit upset (MBU), where more than one bits are flipped due to the particle 
striking a shallow angle almost parallel to the silicon surface of the device [11]. 
 
 Hard Error : Hard error occurs when the functionality of the device is permanently lost 
due to SEE. Stuck bit is an example of this phenomenon that may lead to stuck-at ‘0’ or 
stuck-at ‘1’. Single-event latch-up (SEL) is another catastrophic situation that leads to 
high current flowing during the latch-up and therefore a hard error. Single-event snapback 
(SESB) leads to local heating of the device and is mostly observed in n-channel 
MOSFETs and silicon-on-insulator (SOI) transistors operating under high-current 
condition. Single-event burnout (SEB) is also another example of hard error that occurs in 
power MOSFETs and high voltage devices. Single-event gate rupture (SEGR) 
phenomenon occurs when a heavy ion strikes the gate region of the MOS transistor while 
the gate is biased with a high voltage. Local overheating and eventually destruction of the 
gate region may occur as a consequence of local breakdown caused by SEGR in MOS 
devices. Single-event dielectric rupture (SEDR) is similar to SEGR and lead to failure in 
memory and anti-fuse FPGAs.  
SEE
Soft Errors Hard Errors
SET SEU SEFI SED SEL SESB SEB SEGR SEDR SHE
SBU MBU
 
Figure  1-2 : SEE classification [11] 
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Single hard error (SHE) occurs when an energetic heavy ion strikes the gate of the MOS device 
and permanently affects the electrical parameters of the device [11]. IEC has provided the 
following considerations for the avionic systems regarding the SEE issue : 
 The radiation environment for avionic applications must be confirmed. 
 Reliability level of system development must be identified. 
 Design of the primarily electronic equipment for SEE must be assessed as : 
 Identify the sensitivity of electronic components to SEE, 
 SEE rates for sensitive parts must be quantified, 
 Verify that the reliability level requirements for system development are met concerning 
SEE. 
 Perform corrections when necessary. 
This thesis focuses mostly on SEU effects, mainly the SBU, in SRAM-based FPGAs creating 
delay faults that may disturb the functionality of the implemented circuit. In the following 
section, a brief introduction regarding the SEU phenomenon is presented. 
1.2.4 Single-Event Upset (SEU) 
SEU is considered as the change of the state of a bistable element, (e.g., a flip-flop or other 
memory elements) due to the effect of an energetic ion or proton. This effect is non-destructive 
and may be fixed by rewriting the affected part. The change of the state in the element due to the 
upset is known as a bit-flip and may occur in many electronic devices [2]. 
Static random access memory (SRAM) and dynamic random access memory (DRAM) are two 
types of digital memories that are susceptible to SEU. SRAM structures require the continuous 
power supply in order to maintain the stored bit. An SEU in SRAM modules may easily change 
the state of the stored bit and generate erroneous data. Since the reshuffling of the SRAM 
memory modules leads to data loss, a mitigation technique is necessary to keep these memory 
modules unchanged against SEU. DRAM structure includes some cells that represent data via 
charge storage in a capacitor. The cells should regularly be refreshed in order to maintain the 
stored information. An ion strike readily upsets the DRAMs and causes the cell storage error or 
bit line error. 
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It is known that very small featured size memory circuits may have MBUs due to ion strikes. 
This usually occurs when the ion track is close to both bits or the angle of incidence is close to 
being parallel with the die. It is noted that MBUs are more probable when reducing the size of 
fabrication technology. In this case, the sensitive nodes of the circuit are closer to each other and 
also the amount of critical charge         required for creating an upset is smaller. The critical 
charge is the minimum amount of charge collected by a circuit due to SEU in order to change the 
state of the circuit. Figure  1-3 depicts MBU, SET and SEU in the combinational and sequential 
logics associated with ICs [5]. The other types of destructive SEEs are presented in the following 
section. 
1.2.5 Other Destructive Phenomena 
SETs are transient voltages at a node in an IC caused by passing a charged particle through the 
device. Most SETs do not affect the device operation. However, there are several types of SET 
that can cause catastrophic situations or corrupt data in digital circuits [2]. The phenomenon 
called SEFI was introduced in 1996 for the first time in EIA/JEDEC standard [12], [13]. A SEFI 
is a type of SEE that leads to a temporary non- functionality or even an interruption in the normal 
operation of a circuit. SEFIs are most probably caused by a particle strike, and are not always 
harmful [2], yet may produce data, control, or functional-interrupt errors [14]. Thus, a complex 
recovery mechanism is necessary in order to maintain the circuit in its normal operating state. 
Stuck bits are another type of permanent failure caused when a bistable element is stuck in one of 
its two possible states, i.e., stuck-at ‘0’ or stuck-at ‘1’ [15]. 
CMOS ICs inherently contain parasitic bipolar junction transistors (BJT) created by CMOS 
structures, which form the n-channel and p-channel transistors (Figure  1-4) [16], [17]. The 
collector of each parasitic bipolar transistor forms the base of another parasitic device connected 
in a positive feedback loop. This circuit is equivalent to a four-layer diode device known as a 
silicon-controlled rectifier (SCR) [17]. It is noted that under normal operation, no current flows 
through the parasitic base regions. Due to the charge collected from a single-particle energy 
deposition, if a small amount of current is injected into a base region, the positive feedback may 
increase the current quickly. It is noted that the current continues to flow within the IC’s power 
supply pins, i.e., SEL. In this case, a latched chip may permanently be damaged. It is known that 
SEB phenomenon [18] is similar to SEL. However, it is triggered by heavy ions travelling 
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through the MOSFET [6], [19] and leads to a catastrophic device failure [2]. SEB is a high-
current situation in a parasitic n-p-n bipolar structure similar to latch-up. 
SEGR phenomenon [20] is generated when the incident particle forms a conduction path in the 
gate oxide of a MOS transistor resulting in device damages. SEDR may occur when a charge 
builds up in dielectric region around the gate of a power MOSFET. 
0
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Figure  1-3 : SEU and MBU in the sequential logic and SET in the combinational logic [5] 
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Figure  1-4 : Bulk CMOS inverter architecture cross-section showing the parasitic bipolar SCR 
structure susceptible to SEL [16], [17] 
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In the following section, an introduction to the Xilinx Virtex-5 SRAM-based FPGA which is the 
core of the experiments and findings in this thesis mainly in  CHAPTER 3 and  CHAPTER 4 is 
presented. 
1.3 Xilinx Virtex-5 SRAM-Based FPGA 
FPGAs are semiconductor devices that are based around an array of configurable logic blocks 
(CLB) connected via a hierarchy of configurable interconnects [21]. FPGAs have become the 
preferred common solution to implement digital systems targeting different applications [17]. 
SRAM-based FPGA comprises some I/O blocks (IOB), memory modules, logic blocks and 
routing resources controlled by SRAM cells, called configuration bits [21]. It is noted that the 
main focus of  CHAPTER 3 is on the Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs. In addition, these FPGAs have 
been employed by our industrial partners in avionic systems. In view of this, the structure of 
these devices is now presented.  
Virtex-5 FPGA is fabricated based on the 65nm copper technology and contains an array of 
CLBs that are surrounded by IOBs located on the four sides of the FPGA die. CLBs are building 
blocks that contain logic elements for implementing gates, flip flops, etc. The communication 
between the implemented internal circuits with the external world is realized by IOBs. Also, the 
36-Kbit BRAMs/FIFOs provide the facility of data storage in synchronous or asynchronous 
modes. Moreover, the digital signal processor (DSP), phase-locked-loop (PLL), and digital clock 
manager (DCM) are available user-accessible cores inside the FPGA [22]. Figure  1-5 shows the 
matrix architecture of Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. The XC5VLX50T package provided on the 
Genesys
TM
 Digilent board contains 28,800 slice registers and look-up tables (LUT), 480 IOBs, 32 
buffers, and 6 PLLs/DCMs [23]. 
1.3.1   Virtex-5 CLB Overview 
CLBs in Virtex-5 are some logic resources available in the FPGA fabric for implementing the 
sequential and combinational logic circuits. In order to access to general routing matrix, each 
CLB element is coupled with a switch matrix (SM), also called switch box (SB) [24]. The slice 
structure in Virtex-5 was organized differently as compared to the previous products, e.g., Virtex-
4 and downward. In this fabric, each slice comprises of four LUTs and four flip-flops [23]. 
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Figure  1-5 : Matrix architecture of Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA [25], [26] 
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1.3.2   Virtex-5 Slice Configuration 
Each slice in Virtex-5 FPGA contains four LUTs. There are some internal multiplexers intended 
in each slice to control the connectivity of internal resources. Some logic blocks are dedicated in 
each slice for implementing arithmetic logics. The detailed slice structure in Virtex-5 FPGA is 
depicted in Figure  1-6 [24]. 
LUTs Carry 
Logic
Muxes Flip 
Flops
 
Figure  1-6 : Slice architecture in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA [24] 
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1.3.3   Virtex-5 Interconnection Network 
Global routing interconnection network in Virtex-5 FPGA contains the following routing 
interconnects : 
 Long interconnects : Routing of long interconnects have three connections : beginning, 
middle, and end. Between the beginning and end, there are five connections into a SM 
that can source all four directions. The long interconnections span within twenty four 
rows/columns of components with a SM connection for every six components. 
 Double interconnects : These interconnections span within three rows/columns with a 
SM connection for each component. 
 Hex interconnects : These interconnections have three connections into a SM and span 
within six rows/columns [27]. 
Figure  1-7 shows the interconnection network for a part of a design implemented into Virtex-5 
FPGA extracted by Xilinx FPGA Editor Tool [28]. The SM structure is made of some 
programmable interconnection points (PIP) enabled by a configuration memory cell. 
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Figure  1-7 : Partial interconnection network in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA [28] 
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1.3.4 SEU Controller Macro 
SEU controller macro (SEUC) provided by Xilinx Inc. is available in most Virtex FPGAs that 
performs two main actions. First, it corrects the configuration upsets caused by SEU once they 
are detected, i.e., scrubber. It then emulates SEUs via a controlled and predictable method by 
injecting errors into the configuration memory [29]. Thus, the upset evaluation in a design 
implemented into the FPGA is facilitated [30]. 
The SEUC occupies less than 4% in Virtex-5 device. Inside the macro, ICAP_Virtex5 and 
FRAME_ECC_VIRTEX5 primitives are employed in order to check the configuration status 
while the readback CRC scans (reads) the device. It is noted that the SEUC is susceptible to 
SEUs, yet may be fixed as the SEUC has the ability to scrub itself [31]. 
1.4 Fault Models in the SRAM-based FPGA Resources 
SEU may lead to fault occurrence in the FPGA resources and malfunction of the circuit. In this 
section, the fault models for different resources available in SRAM-based FPGAs are discussed. 
1.4.1 Fault Model in PIPs 
PIPs are the main components in SRAM-based FPGAs that contribute to route a source 
component to a destination component. A PIP is a pass-transistor linking two interconnections 
that can either be ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’. PIP failures due to SEU effect are classified as PIP short 
failure, PIP open failure and, the most important one, the PIP parasitic failure, also called PIP 
load failure. The PIP short failure occurs when an SEU strikes the configuration bit of the PIP 
that is already ‘OFF’ and links two active interconnections together while they have different 
functions in the design. On the other hand, PIP open failure occurs when an SEU flips the 
configuration bit of a PIP that is already ‘ON’ and breaks an interconnection into two parts. This 
corrupts the data transmission between source and destination points. The PIP parasitic or load 
failure occurs when an SEU flips the configuration cell of a PIP connecting a live interconnect to 
an unrouted one. Consequently, a parasitic capacitance is induced to the active interconnect 
delaying data propagation in the affected routes [32]. Figure  1-8 shows the fault models for a PIP 
in different scenarios. In Figure  1-8A, the PIP is initially “OFF” and connected between two 
active interconnects with different functions. Once an SEU flips the configuration bit, PIP 
switches to “ON” and links two active interconnections together (Figure  1-8B). This 
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phenomenon is called PIP short and its consequence is the transmission of wrong information due 
to this undesired connection. In Figure  1-8C, two active interconnections with the same function 
are connected through a PIP that is “ON”. When an SEU flips the configuration bit, the PIP 
switches to “OFF” and disconnects the data transmission link between two interconnects that is 
called PIP open (Figure  1-8D). Interruption in the flow of data from active interconnect 1 to 
active interconnect 2 is the result of a PIP open failure. Figure  1-8E represents an active 
interconnect connected to one side of an “OFF” PIP that is linked to an unused interconnect at the 
other side. Due to SEU injection, the configuration bit is flipped and connects the unused 
interconnect to the active interconnect (Figure  1-8F). This phenomenon may result in a change of 
circuit timing due to an additional parasitic load on the active interconnect. 
1.4.2 Fault Model in Buffers 
Buffers are the components used in most of the FPGA families especially Xilinx Virtex devices. 
A buffer is a driver which can either be “ON” or “OFF”. There are two types of buffers in Virtex 
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Figure  1-8 : PIP failure models due to an injected SEU [32] 
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FPGAs, namely, global buffers and clock buffers. Global buffers (BUFG) distribute high fanout 
signals throughout the device and are automatically inserted by Xilinx implementation tool for a 
targeted design. The other type of buffers, i.e., clock buffers, include clock enabled BUFG 
(BUFGCE), BUFGDLL, BUFGMUX, BUFGP, BUFCTRL, and BUFGMUX_CTRL. Regional 
and feature-specific clock buffers are BUFR, BUFIO, and BUFCF that are supported in most of 
Virtex devices [24]. Figure  1-9 shows the fault models for buffers due to SEU injection. The 
same models explained for PIP fault in Section  1.4.1 are also valid for fault model in buffers.  
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Figure  1-9 : Fault models for buffers due to an injected SEU [33] 
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1.4.3 Fault Model in Multiplexers 
A Multiplexer is an n-by-1 selectable switch controlled by configuration bits. The single output 
of the multiplexer is enabled by one of its n inputs activated through the control bits. 
Multiplexers are available in each slice of the most Xilinx Virtex family devices. They contribute 
in the routing interconnection network. Figure  1-10 shows the existing fault model for a 4-by-1 
multiplexer controlled by two configuration bits [33]. In the case of an SBU event, once an SEU 
flips one of the configuration bits, a different routing configuration is created and the logic 
behavior of the multiplexer changes. This is called a logic error. The consequence of SEU effect 
on the multiplexer is the transmission of wrong information through the multiplexer. 
1.4.4 Fault Model in LUTs 
LUTs are the useful logic resources available in each slice that are utilized as function generators 
in Virtex FPGAs. Virtex-5 contains four separate LUTs associated with each slice. Each LUT 
comprises of six independent inputs (A inputs – A1 to A6) and two independent outputs (O5 and 
O6). Any arbitrary defined six-input Boolean function can be implemented with LUTs. It is noted 
that, implementation of two arbitrary defined five-input Boolean functions are also possible. In 
addition, any combination of arithmetic operators (summation, multiplication, inversion) can be 
implemented through LUTs. Figure  1-11A shows the original LUT architecture extracted by 
Xilinx FPGA Editor Tool [28]. Figure  1-11B and C represent a 6-input AND gate implemented 
by LUT and its faulty model, respectively. It is seen from these figures that the faulty model 
shows a different logic behavior (constantly ‘0’) due to SEU effect in the LUT. 
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Figure  1-10 : Fault model for  multiplexer due to an injected SEU [33] 
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1.4.5 Fault Model in Switch Matrices 
SMs comprise of very short interconnections along with some PIPs that are used to link routings 
between slices and CLBs or between CLBs throughout the fabric. Each slice-to-slice connection 
requires passing through SMs. The PIPs as the main components of an SM are sensitive to SEU. 
A bit-flip in their configuration cell may change the routing configuration [34]. The routing 
resources are classified into two groups; the inter-CLB, and the intra-CLB routings. The inter-
CLB routings and used for CLB-to-CLB interconnection. These routing are longer and have to 
pass through SMs. The intra-CLB routings are shorter and located inside a CLB. The SMs are 
commonly used to route inter-CLB, while the buffers and MUXes are employed for intra-CLB 
routings. Figure  1-12 shows the SM model comprised of some PIPs and routes. Once an SEU 
flips the configuration bit of a PIP, the fault will occur and it might induce a delay due to the 
created parasitic path or it may change the routing configuration and cause malfunction in the 
design. 
1.4.6 Fault Model in Slice Registers 
The slice registers (latches or flip-flops) are the bit storage components available within the slice 
of Virtex FPGAs. Virtex-5 includes four flip-flops per slice. Available control signals for slice 
registers are set/reset (SR), clock enable (CE), and clock. The SR signal can be set as 
synchronous or asynchronous depending on the design criteria. 
The available register primitives in most Virtex families are [35] : 
 FDR : D flip-flop with synchronous reset, 
 FDS : D flip-flop with synchronous set, 
 FDRS : D flip-flop with synchronous set/reset, 
 FDC : D flip-flop with asynchronous clear, 
 FDE : D flip-flop with clock enable, 
 FDP : D flip-flop with asynchronous preset. 
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Figure  1-11 : Fault model for LUT [33] 
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Figure  1-12 : SM model and SEU effect [28] 
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Figure  1-13 shows the fault model for the slice register due to SEU effect. Once the SEU is 
injected, at the next rising edge of the clock signal, it provides erroneous data at the output Q 
which may cause malfunction in the circuit operation or wrong data transmission through the 
circuit. 
1.4.7 Fault Model in IOBs 
IOBs are group of basic elements that are used to implement the input and output functions of an 
FPGA device. The IOBs make the FPGA core accessible for the user for monitoring and 
measurement purposes. Figure  1-14 shows the IOB model for Xilinx Virtex FPGAs extracted by 
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Figure  1-13 : Fault model in slice register due to SEU effect 
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Figure  1-14 : IOB model for Xilinx Virtex FPGA [28] 
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Xilinx FPGA Editor tool [28]. It is noted that in most cases, an SEU breaks the IO circuitry and 
ceases the signal transmission to the output pads. As experimentally observed in [36] it may also 
generate DCs, while the top side of the FPGA is exposed to proton radiation. Toward the 
characterization of DCs in IOBs, it is conjectured that the SEU may alter the IO drive/standard of 
IOBs. 
1.5 AVIO-403 Project 
The AVIO-403 project was a team research work on the effect of cosmic rays on aircraft 
electronic devices and development of mitigation methods to reduce the on-board electronics’ 
downtime. Researchers from four academic institutions namely, Polytechnique Montréal, École 
de Technologie Supérieure (ÉTS), Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) and Concordia 
University were part of the team. Also, three industrial partners, Bombardier Aerospace, 
Canadian Space Agency (CSA), and MDA Corporation, were participating and funding the 
project partially. Several students were involved in this project, including three master’s and 
seven Ph.D. students as well as internship programs provided to undergraduate students. 
The main objective of AVIO-403 project was to provide a better understanding of cosmic 
radiation effects on electronic systems with an emphasis on SRAM-based FPGAs. The objectives 
include the qualification and quantification of radiation effects along with means for prediction 
and mitigation of these effects. By adapting conventional design and integration techniques of 
embedded systems to consider the cosmic radiation effects on the functionality and reliability of 
electronic modules, the following key objectives were guided the research [37] : 
a. The definition and implementation of an early assessment technique for high level digital 
design implemented into the FPGAs. 
b. The definition and implementation of a verification technique for different levels of 
abstraction in order to simulate the faults induced by radiation. 
c. The definition of a design approach in order to facilitate the pre-certification tests for 
radiation tolerance. 
d. The investigation of fault-tolerant techniques employed in complex industrial systems. 
1.6 EPICEA Project 
The Electromagnetic Platform for lightweight Integration/Installation of electrical systems in 
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Composite Electrical Aircraft (EPICEA) project is a team research work that has a very wide 
scope including the study of electromagnetic waves’ effect on aircraft, and cosmic rays effect on 
avionic systems that covers more objectives. 
This three-year European-Canadian joint research project will address numerous avionic 
engineering design issues in the development of future aircrafts, aiming at a significant reduction 
of energy consumption through more electrical aircraft and systems integration. To be more 
specific, this research will release, validate and verify a unique computer-modeling platform 
assimilating a complete understanding of electromagnetic (EM) issues on composite electric 
aircraft (CEA). This includes the analysis and characterization of EM coupling, interconnections, 
and cosmic radiations on electrical systems together with new concepts of antennas designed to 
maintain performance in composite environment without modifying aircraft aerodynamics. The 
targeted computer platform will support a decision-making process for selection of the best 
strategy for the integration of electrical systems. This project will also create a more robust EM 
protection for electrical systems, i.e., lightweight and cost effective, a lighter and safer electrical 
system architecture for EM protected, less redundant, safety compliant, easy to maintain systems, 
a less drag on new systems of antenna while maintaining EM performance, and also will point to 
best possible health monitoring solutions. The research outcome will limit the recourse for over 
conservative protection and unnecessary redundancy in architecture design. This will overcome 
the weight penalty currently jeopardizing the development of energy-efficient CEAs and will 
strengthen the aircraft safety. The anticipated activities create a great example of Canadian 
international collaborative research. It attracts, involves and trains numerous highly qualified 
personnel for emerging CEA development. Research expertise and novel knowledge generated 
by this project not only enhance Canadian research profile and spur corporate growth, but have 
an impact on our daily life. The project focuses on emerging market needs, and timely addresses 
worldwide challenges. This promotes a sustainable development of Canadian society. 
1.7 Problem Definition 
Almost 98% of all memory elements in SRAM-based FPGAs are configuration bits, of which 
90% and more control the routing resources. FPGAs are used in avionic industry and it is desired 
to come up with robust implemented designs against SEU. Once an SEU strikes the configuration 
bit of a routing interconnection, an extra delay may be induced by creating a short between a 
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routed path and an unused interconnection. Propagation of the induced delays in the consecutive 
logic modules implemented into FPGA may cause malfunctions in circuit behavior or cease the 
circuit operation. In order to characterize the effect of SEUs on SRAM-based FPGAs, two series 
of proton irradiation experiments have been performed at TRIUMF laboratory by our team in 
AVIO-403 project [32], [36]. The first report on extra combinational delays due to transient 
ionizing radiations has been presented in [32], where the existence of extra delays due to SEUs 
induced by proton irradiation has experimentally been observed and measured. The proposed 
setup in [32] has been shown to be able to detect extra combinatorial delays as small as 40 psec, 
and delays of more than 400 psec that may affect the targeted FPGA. Extra combinational delays 
have been observed when the board was bombarded by different protons energy levels. The 
experimental setup for the two series of experiments at TRIUMF is explained in details in 
 CHAPTER 2. 
Understanding the root cause of observed delay changes in the experiments performed in [32] 
and [36], as the first problem stated in this thesis, requires elaborating characterization techniques 
as well as accurate models for the observed delay changes. 
High frequency designs implemented to the SRAM-based FPGAs are more susceptible to SEU-
induced delay changes due to the shorter clock period and the slack time. The slack time in a 
synchronous design is defined as the minimum delay between the combinational logic data 
arrival time and the active edge of the clock, minus the flip-flop setup time. Creating 
measurement techniques for high frequency circuits for delay changes is considered as the second 
problem in this thesis. 
Sensitivity evaluation of the routing resources to delay faults caused by radiations, has not been 
addressed thus far in the literature. The susceptibility of the routing interconnection network in a 
state-of-the-art APSoC device exposed to neutron irradiation is taken into consideration as the 
third problem. An APSoC device comprises different types of interconnection with different 
topologies for each, and thus it is necessary to evaluate the sensitivity of each interconnection 
type and topology to radiation. To this end, a method to configure ring oscillators mostly with 
routing resources is proposed where logic resources rarely contribute. An experimental setup is 
proposed in order to measure DCs induced to the routing resources of the APSoC device, when it 
is exposed to neutron radiation at TRIUMF laboratory.  
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To provide the justification for this research project in delay faults detection and correction, while 
performing experimental measurements at TRIUMF, it was observed that 68 ring oscillators had 
broken, i.e., logic faults, against 56 observed ODCs, i.e., delay faults, during the same time lapse. 
As a rule of thumb, for TRIUMF experiments, these values justify that the delay faults detection 
and correction mitigate about 50% of faults caused by SEU in digital circuits implemented into 
FPGA. In addition, almost 98% of all memory elements in SRAM-based FPGAs are 
configuration bits, of which more than 90% control the routing resources. Moreover, our recent 
in-beam neutron irradiation experiments on the APSoC devices involving SRAM-based FPGAs 
show the high vulnerability of routing interconnection network to SEUs inducing DCs. It is 
observed that as we get towards the higher levels of DC, the probability of receiving more DCs 
increases. This is mostly attributed to the growth of parasitic interconnection network caused by 
SEU. Hence, the use of delay monitor circuit on sensitive nodes of the design is necessary in 
order to capture the transitions that may lead to delay faults. Sensitive node is defined as the 
endpoint of critical paths with the worst (smallest) slack time. 
1.8 Objectives 
The objectives of this research project are as follows : 
1. Explore characterization techniques to better understand propagation delays and delay 
changes (DC) induced by SEU in SRAM-based FPGAs of avionic systems in the 
aircrafts; 
 
2. Elaborate accurate models of extra combinational delays (ECD) in SRAM-Based FPGAs 
due to transient ionizing radiations; 
 
3. Create measurement techniques for high frequency circuits implemented into the SRAM-
based FPGAs in order to detect and measure DCs caused by SEUs on sensitive nodes; 
 
4. Elaborate mitigation techniques for DCs induced by SEUs toward a realistic and robust 
design of digital circuits implemented into the FPGAs while avoiding the TMR and 
minimizing the system downtime; 
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5. Investigate the likelihood and significance of DC occurrence in the routing 
interconnection network of state-of-the-art APSoC devices exposed to neutron irradiation; 
1.9 Research Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis achieved per each journal article are listed as follows. 
 
Article 1 : M. Darvishi, et. al., “Circuit Level Modeling of Extra Combinational Delays in 
SRAM-Based FPGAs Due to Transient Ionizing Radiation,ˮ IEEE Transactions on Nuclear 
Science, vol. 61, pp. 3535-3542, 2014. 
 Investigate the root cause of observed DCs in the Core and IOBs; 
 Elaborate circuit level models and simulation of delay changes; 
 Obtain good agreement with experiment results. 
 
Article 2 : M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, and Y. Blaquière, "Delay Monitor Circuit and Delay Change 
Measurement due to SEU in SRAM-Based FPGA," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, 
(Early Access), DOI : 10.1109/TNS.2018.2828785, 2018. 
 Design and implementation of a delay monitor circuit for high frequency circuits 
 Propose algorithms for SDC and CDC detection and measurement 
 Incorporate the delay monitor as a part of mitigation technique 
 Find the exact location (address) of PIP that contributes in DC generation in different 
levels 
 
Article 3 : M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, Y. Blaquière, et.al., “On the Susceptibility of SRAM-Based 
FPGA Routing Network to Delay Changes Induced by Ionizing Radiation,ˮ IEEE Transactions 
on Nuclear Science, Submitted. 
 Evaluate the sensitivity of routing network to SEU in PL part of APSoC devices 
 Propose a method to configure ring oscillators mostly with routing resources 
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 Propose an algorithm to identify extra parasitic interconnects in switch matrices 
automatically 
 Define the MTTDC notion, proving the relation between the order of DC and probability 
of receiving a subsequent DC 
 Prove the delay monitor efficiency for DC detection  
1.10 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. The literature review is presented in  CHAPTER 2. This 
chapter provides a literature review on the existing works on characterization of delay faults in 
FPGAs and mitigation techniques mainly for ASICs and FPGAs, as well as their advantages and 
limitations. Process for the research project as a whole and general organization of the document 
indicating the coherence of the articles in relation to the research goals is presented at the end of 
Chapter 2. In  CHAPTER 3, the proposed circuit-level models for extra combinational delays in 
SRAM-based FPGAs due to transient ionizing radiation are presented. This is the first work on 
modeling of combinational delays in FPGAs. In  CHAPTER 4, a delay monitor circuit for delay 
change/fault detection and measurement is proposed which can be applied to high speed designs 
implemented into the SRAM-based FPGAs. The monitor’s functional behavior and 
characterization are investigated and an experimental setup is introduced to verify its 
functionality in real implementation.  CHAPTER 5 presents the in-beam experimental results for 
the likelihood and significance of delay fault occurrence in the routing resources of a Zynq-7000 
APSoC device due to high-energy neutron irradiation. A method to configure ring oscillators 
mostly with routing resources is proposed, where logic resources rarely contribute. A full control 
over routing resources enables us to employ different interconnections available in this device to 
create routing-based ring oscillators. General discussion of the objectives and the achievements in 
this thesis is presented in  CHAPTER 6. Finally, concluding remarks and scope for further 
research are presented in  CHAPTER 7. 
1.11 Summary 
In this chapter, the fundamentals of the project along with the thesis objectives have been 
defined. A background of the cosmic ray effects in avionic electronics was presented and the 
destructive and non-destructive phenomena caused by SEUs on the electronic devices especially 
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those involved FPGAs have been introduced. Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA, which is the device under 
test in part of this thesis, and its corresponding resources have been reviewed. Fault models in 
FPGA resources generated by SEU have been stated. Then, an introduction to AVIO-403 and 
EPICEA projects where this thesis was involved in them has been stated. The problem and the 
objectives of the research have been introduced along with the research contributions. Finally, the 
organization of the thesis has been stated. The literature review concerning the cosmic rays 
effects in avionic electronics especially the SEU effects on FPGAs will be addressed in 
 CHAPTER 2. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the important aspects of the existing body of literature are presented. In particular, 
the related works on characterization of SEUs in CMOS SRAM memories and digital logic ICs 
are studied. The existing experiments for SEE and SEU characterization in SRAM-based FPGAs 
and mitigation strategies are then discussed. The concept of triple modular redundancy (TMR) 
and partial reconfiguration as the available and commonly-used mitigation techniques for design 
of fault-tolerant embedded systems are presented. Formal SEU detection and correction 
techniques in FPGAs are also discussed. Related works on design and implementation of time-to-
digital converters (TDC) applied to FPGAs are presented. In addition, delay fault detection 
schemes, testing strategies and their application in ASICs and mainly FPGAs are discussed. The 
last part of this chapter presents a review on routing faults detection and correction schemes 
applied to the FPGAs. 
2.2 SEU Effects in Digital ICs 
It is known that if the MOSFET fabrication technology is scaled down, sensitivity of ICs to 
ionizing radiation emitted by sun and galactic events is increased [38], [39], [7]. The ultra-scaled 
memory ICs are very sensitive to SEU. In addition, digital devices are more prone to digital 
single-event transient (DSET). Charge collection measurements in devices or junctions are 
commonly used to provide an insight about SEU effects in complex circuits such as SRAM cells 
[40], [41].  
In order to simulate the SEE effects at circuit level, the transient induced by single-event is 
modeled as a current source connected at the struck node of the circuit as shown in Figure  2-1 
[38]. Although this approach might be efficient for many applications, there are some drawbacks 
and limitations. In particular, the accuracy of the transient current used as the input source may 
affect the accuracy of the circuit simulation. A memory cell has been simulated in [42], the 
presence of single-events with the SPICE tools, when a current pulse has been applied as the 
stimuli in the circuit to reproduce the ionizing particle effect. 
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To circumvent the drawbacks of the SPICE simulation to investigate SEE, the mixed-mode 
technique is utilized by employing device simulation to predict the response to ionizing radiation 
of the struck device. The affected device by single-event is studied by simulation of the device-
level model while the other devices are presented by circuit-level model. This technique is called 
a mixed-mode technique and has been presented in [38], [43]. Mixed-mode analysis is useful in 
circuits including a few numbers of devices such as SRAM cells. Another advantage of mixed-
mode technique is the ability of simulating ionizing radiation effect in new devices such as ultra-
scaled multiple-gate devices. In this case, all transistors included in an SRAM cell can be 
simulated in 3-D device domain [44], [45]. On the other hand the main drawback of the mixed-
mode simulation is an increase in simulation time especially for large circuits. In addition, 3-D 
mixed-level simulation has low accuracy in existence of coupling effects between devices [46]. 
More specifically, scaling-down the CMOS fabrication technology increases the integration level 
and results in substantial coupling effects [47-49]. In order to overcome the high time 
consumption drawback of the mixed-mode simulation, full numerical simulation is used as an 
alternative, which provides higher accuracy for SEU evaluation in SRAM cells. This technique 
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Figure  2-1 : Simulation of SRAM cell to investigate SEE [38] 
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models all the devices entirely in 3-D mode. This technique has been employed to perform a fully 
numerical simulation of SRAM cell in 3-D mode [46], [47], [48]. 
2.3 Radiation Experiments on FPGAs 
In this section, existing works on radiation experiments on the FPGAs is studied. In order to 
characterize SEEs on FPGAs, some experiments are conducted to emulate the cosmic 
environment in the laboratory. Laboratories with special equipments for SEE investigation are 
called particle accelerator labs. There are several particle accelerators around the world [50]. Two 
leading particle acceleration labs are located in North America, Canada; Canadian Light Source 
(University of Saskatchewan), and Canada’s National Laboratory for Particle and Nuclear 
Physics (TRIUMF), Vancouver, British Colombia. 
A cross comparison of SEU responses in more than thirty devices (SRAM microprocessors and 
FPGAs) using different neutron/proton beams has been studied in [51]. It has been shown that the 
proton and neutron beams can be used for SEU test. Thus, the proton and neutron beams have 
been used in order to measure the atmospheric neutron SEU cross section in SRAMs, FPGAs, 
microprocessors, and SDRAMs. 
The “Rosetta experiment”, the atmospheric soft error rate testing in different technology FPGAs 
has been reported in [52]. In real-time experiments by evaluating large FPGAs fabricated in 
different CMOS technologies (0.15 μm, 0.13 μm, and 90 nm), their sensitivity to radiation-
induced SEUs has been investigated. The results have been comparable with those obtained by 
circuit simulations as well as with the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center
1
 (LANSCE) neutron 
beam results and Crocker Nuclear Laboratory (University of California, Davis) [52]. It has been 
shown that the sensitivity to atmospheric upsets is at least eight times less than that predicted by 
the Boeing experiments for SRAM devices. Moreover, it has been shown that the actual upset 
rate experienced by users is less than that of the rate of configuration memory cell upsets. 
SEU mitigation techniques for Virtex FPGAs exposed to proton radiation has been reported in 
[53]. In [53] the SEU characterization for both static and dynamic modes of operation with heavy 
ion and proton test has also been studied. Based on the results obtained, an SEU mitigation 
                                                 
1 . World’s biggest and fully equipped radiation lab located in Los Alamos, New Mexico, US established in 1943. 
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technique has been developed by combining TMR and SEU correction through configuration 
scrubbing to preserve the functionality of the implemented design in the case of upsets 
occurrence. 
A comprehensive framework of SEU-like fault injection has been presented in [54]. This 
framework has been considered as a method of reproducing radiation ground test results in order 
to investigate the vulnerability of microprocessors to SEUs. The fault injection strategies have 
been classified into two categories : hardware and software-based methods. In the software-based 
method, based on the DUT description level, some possibilities for fault injection have been 
shown to be summarized as follows : 
 Fault injection via SPICE, where the netlist is available [55]; 
 Fault injection via VHDL/Verilog coding, where the RTL or behavioral description of the 
design is available [56]; 
 Fault injection via instruction set simulator (ISS) model that is a simulation model using 
high-level programming languages. ISS mimics the microprocessor’s behavior [57]; 
  Fault injection with a laser beam [58]; 
 Fault injection via an FPGA where the RTL description of the design is available and  is 
mapped to the FPGA [59]; 
 Fault injection via code emulating upset (CEU) technique [60]. This method applies a bit-
flip to the struck memory cell randomly in time [61]. 
The first report on extra combinational delays in SRAM-based FPGAs due to transient ionizing 
radiations has been presented in [32]. A novel experimental setup has been presented in order to 
measure the extra combinational delays in a commercial FPGA-based test board (Digilent 
Genesys, including Virtex-5 XC5VLX50T). Employing this setup, enabled the detection of extra 
combinational delays between 40 psec and 400 psec. It is known that, there are five areas of the 
FPGA’s CLB that are susceptible to SEU as illustrated in Figure  2-2 [62]. It can be seen from this 
figure, the configuration bit of each part that is responsible to control its functionality is 
susceptible to SEU. 
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The main focus in [32] has been on the routing configuration bits of the SRAM-based FPGAs. 
These configuration bits are very sensitive to SEUs and the stored value could be inverted, i.e., 
bit-flip [63]. It should be noted that not all of the bit-flips induced by SEUs lead to an error, since 
some of them refer to the unused resources and do not affect the implemented design on the 
FPGA. However, those bit-flips that occur within the implemented design may give rise a design 
failure even in logic or timing. The common implications of bit-flip on the routing configuration 
bits are the creation of a short or an open. These two phenomena have been explained in [32] by 
using simplified implementation of a 2-input AND gate as shown in Figure  2-3. In this figure, the 
bold lines are the interconnections involved in the logic network and the pale lines are the unused 
interconnections. The unfilled squares represent the disabled PIPs and the filled squares refer to 
the activated PIPs. Figure  2-3A shows the implementation of an AND gate which is fault free, 
and Figure  2-3B shows an open state due to the bit-flip in a configuration bit (‘1’ to ‘0’) disabling 
the intended interconnect. Figure  2-3C illustrates a short state by flipping ‘0’ to ‘1’ in 
configuration cell enabling an unintended interconnection. Finally, Figure  2-3D represents a 
delay, in which a bit-flip (‘0’ to ‘1’) on a routing configuration enables its PIP and imposes an 
undesired connection between a live and an unrouted line. This results in creating an extra 
parasitic capacitance and hence an extra delay along the struck signal path. 
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Figure  2-2 : SEU sensitive areas in a CLB in FPGA [62] 
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Two identical ring oscillators (RO) functioning at almost the same frequency (   and    
       ) have been implemented at the core of FPGA in [32]. Instead of individual ROs 
frequency measurement, the intermodulation frequency                of the ROs has been 
measured. Using the setup in [32], a resolution of 18 Hz has been obtained when measuring the 
frequency difference, and 12 psec on observed delay variations. A set of 48 experiments has been 
performed when the proton source bombarded the top side of the FPGA. Each delay 
measurement has been stopped when the oscillation of one RO ceased due to a functional failure 
triggered by an SEU or after a specified period of time (10 minutes). Twenty three of those 
experiments came with one or cumulative ODCs. The delay change could produce either a 
reduction or an increase of the measured frequency difference depending on which of the two 
ROs affected. Figure  2-4 shows two sets of experimental results indicating the observed delay 
changes in [32]. Considering the initial assumptions in [32], the extra combinational delays may 
be the result of an undesired connection of unrouted interconnects to the live interconnects. 
(A) (B)
(C) (D)
 
Figure  2-3 : Simplified view of the bit flip impact on an implemented 2-input AND gate : (A) 
Fault free implementation, (B) an open case, (C) a short case, and (D) a delay case [32] 
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Following the experiments performed in [32], another set of experiments has been performed at 
TRIUMF laboratory on delay faults affecting the  IOBs of an SRAM-based FPGAs as reported  
in [36]. The experimental setup consists of two ROs created directly in the IOBs using their 
IOBUF primitives and have been implemented into the Virtex-5 FPGA. The ROs oscillated at 
slightly different frequencies,            and           . The first RO occupied 179 IOBs 
configured as a long delay chain connected to one inverter, while the second one occupied 
160 IOBs linked to one inverter. Three sets of experiments have been performed for delay 
measurement while each set comprised of ten experiments with different energy levels of 
     ,      , and      . Each experiment has been stopped when one RO ceased 
oscillation. A delay change produced a variation in the frequency difference of two ring 
oscillators. In the experiments of [36], larger ODCs than the ones obtained in [32] have been 
measured. A maximum magnitude of a single ODC observed was almost          and in total 
four ODCs had a value larger than         . It is shown that the large delay changes are due to 
accumulation of delays along the RO within a same IO bank. 
2.4 SEU Mitigation Techniques in FPGAs 
As discussed in Section  2.3, if an SEU occurs in a Virtex-5 FPGA device, it may affect the 
device configuration or alter the data flow in design [30]. 
 
Figure  2-4 : Experimental results indicating ODCs observed in [32] 
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In some circumstances, the alteration of a single bit within data can be ignored because of its 
limited effect. Since a bit-flip in a PIP can be recovered by data rewriting, the effect of SEU is 
short lived. In the cases where the data determines the operation of a system or forms the 
instructions, the error caused by bit-flip is significant and should be corrected. For instance, a bit-
flip in a finite state machine (FSM) can result in entering into an illegal or undetermined state. In 
these cases, some design prerequisites and assessment strategies are required to ensure the proper 
operation of the system against SEUs [30]. It is noted that the technique used to remove the effect 
of SEU is called mitigation [62]. 
If an error occurs in an FPGA device, it may be fixed in the next reconfiguration time. However, 
an important question remains. What happens during the time period between the failure caused 
by SEU and the device next reconfiguration cycle? Depending on the reliability level of the 
device and condition of its operation, the device may continue its normal operation or it may fail 
as a result of the SEU effect. In the next two sections, the TMR and partial reconfiguration are 
described as two well-known available techniques for SEU mitigation in FPGAs. 
2.4.1 Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) 
Some methods employ redundant logics and modules that are identical with the original ones in 
design. The final output of the redundant modules is generated through a voter circuit. The faulty 
module can be identified where the redundant modules provide disparate outputs. Two common 
redundant techniques are dual modular redundancy (DMR) [64-66] and TMR [67-69]. The DMR 
technique duplicates the modules of a design and the final output is generated through a 2-input 
voter. Although DMR has low cost and area overhead, it is not able to identify the affected 
module (original or redundant) when a fault happens [64].  
TMR method is a well-known SEU mitigation technique which triplicates the design under test 
[70]. The final output is generated through a voter. The voter reports the detected fault when one 
of the redundant modules provides a disparate value to the voter that is different from the values 
provided by the other redundant modules. When one module is failed due to the SEU, a safe 
functionality of the logic is ensured since the two redundant modules continue to provide the 
correct output. However, the errors should be corrected and not accumulated [70]. When two 
modules fail at the same time or within a certain period of time (less than detection time), TMR 
technique is not able to handle the fault detection process. In addition, the large cost, area 
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overhead, and power inefficiency due to the triplication of all modules associated with the design 
are considered as the disadvantages of this method. These limitations make the TMR less popular 
to be used individually. Thus, it is usually combined with other mitigation techniques in order to 
provide a robust fault-tolerant mitigation scheme. 
In [53] two mitigation techniques have been combined in order to achieve a robust design; TMR 
and static SEU correction through configuration scrubbing. The mitigation technique in [53] has 
shown to preserve the functionality of the device against SEUs. Moreover, in this technique, the 
soft errors do not create functional errors, the static errors do not create functional errors, and the 
self recovering feature of the TMR can automatically update the internal state data, when the 
configuration correctness is restored. 
2.4.2 Partial Reconfiguration 
Partial reconfiguration technique addresses the change of a small fraction of a reconfigurable 
hardware by loading a partial configuration file, usually a partial BIT file while the other parts are 
operating. After a full BIT file configures the FPGA, the partial BIT files can be downloaded into 
the FPGA to modify the reconfigurable regions while the integrity of the running application is 
preserved. It is noted that similar to the software, the hardware electronic systems can also be 
designed modularly by dividing the entire system to several sub-modules. It is desirable to alter 
one or several sub-modules in a system while the other sub-modules are operating. This is the 
main challenge in the current partial reconfiguration techniques. 
However, partial reconfiguration technique is not supported by all FPGAs, and thus, it requires 
dedicated software for modular design to achieve a partially configured system. Based on the 
design functionality, the partial reconfiguration technique is categorized into two groups [71], 
[72] : 
 Dynamic partial reconfiguration, also called active partial reconfiguration : allows to 
modify a part of the device while the other parts of the design mapped into the FPGA are 
still operating; 
 Static partial reconfiguration : when the device is deactivated during the reconfiguration 
process. It is noted that when downloading the partial BIT file into the FPGA, the other 
parts of the device are in shutdown mode. After the completion of the reconfiguration 
process, the stopped modules will start operating [73]. 
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Xilinx offers two types of partial reconfiguration for FPGA devices : module-
based and difference-based [73]. Module-based partial reconfiguration allows reconfiguring 
separated modules of a whole design implemented into the FPGA. Successful communication 
between separate modules of a design is ensured through special bus macros. The bus macro acts 
as a bridge connecting the reconfigurable modules to the other parts of the design. Also, a 
separate bitstream should be generated for each reconfigurable module in a design that is used to 
perform partial reconfiguration in the FPGA. 
Difference-based partial reconfiguration is used when a small change is applied to the design. For 
example, it can be used when LUT equations or contents of the memory blocks are changed. In 
this case, the generated bitstream contains the information of the difference between the structure 
of the current design and the new contents of an FPGA. There exist two types of difference-based 
partial reconfiguration, namely, the front-end and back-end methods. The front-end method is 
based on the design modification in hardware description language (HDL) and it requires the 
repetition of the synthesis and design implementation process. The back-end method allows 
applying the modifications during the implementation stage of the design and it does not require 
the design re-synthesis. Utilizing any of these methods leads to the generation of a partial 
bitstream which is used to perform partial reconfiguration in the FPGA [74]. 
Figure  2-5 shows the premise behind the partial reconfiguration technique. It is shown in this 
figure that the logic in FPGA design is divided into two regions : Static region and 
Reconfigurable region. The static region remains functional and is not affected while performing 
the partial reconfiguration [74]. It can be seen from Figure  2-5 that the logic implemented in 
Block A is modified by downloading one of the A1.bit to A4.bit partial BIT files. 
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Figure  2-6 represents a timeline with different time steps in order to clarify the functionality of 
the dynamic partial reconfiguration. For instance, at    the reconfiguration hardware starts its 
operation while it contains no configuration information. After a time period reaching   , the 
configuration data is transferred to the device. After a successful data transfer, the FPGA 
continues processing within Configuration A and Configuration B. Each of these configurations 
can be considered as an FSM, an algorithm, or even the processing element. The target is to 
partially reconfigure the Configuration B with Configuration C while the Configuration A 
continues operating. At   , the functionality of Configuration B is stopped and is replaced with 
Configuration C. Once the configuration data corresponding to Configuration C is transferred 
successfully, the device continues processing with Configuration A and Configuration C. This 
shows the advantage of dynamic partial reconfiguration in adapting the system architecture to the 
application requirements when the system is running. 
The advantages of partial reconfiguration technique are summarized as follows : area and power 
reduction [75], performance improvement [76], ability to change hardware [76], hardware 
sharing [76], shorter reconfiguration time [76], quick system start [75], and its wide application 
[75]. 
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Figure  2-5 : Basic premise of partial reconfiguration [74] 
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2.5 SEU Detection Techniques in FPGAs 
In general, SEU mitigation in FPGAs consists of two steps, SEU detection; and SEU correction. 
Therefore, a SEU-fault tolerant system consists of two sub-systems : fault detection and fault 
correction schemes. Most of the available techniques for SEU-induced fault detection applied to 
ASICs and FPGAs, stop the design for some cycles when the fault is detected. However, this is 
not a preferred solution in most of the applications especially in the avionic system of airplanes 
and spacecrafts travelling at very high altitudes. Generally, the SEU detection techniques are 
classified into readback and comparison, cyclic redundancy check (CRC), off-line test, and 
roving test [77], [78]. A brief discussion of these techniques is presented in the following. 
2.5.1 Readback and Comparison 
A traditional available technique to verify the stored data in the configuration memory is to read 
back the data and perform a bit-by-bit comparison [77]. The readback is performed through the 
mask (.msk) and readback (.rbb) files that are equal in size with the original bitstream used for 
configuring the FPGA. This method effectively triplicates the amount of the memory required for 
configuration and readback tasks. Therefore, this method is not considered as an efficient solution 
in avionic applications. 
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Figure  2-6 : Partial dynamic reconfiguration process [62] 
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2.5.2 Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) 
CRC frame check is another method for continuous readback of configuration data [79] and SEU 
detection developed by Los Alamos National Laboratories Space Data Systems Group [77]. This 
feature in Virtex-5 FPGA facilitates the SEU detection. Once the readback CRC is enabled, the 
configuration logic continuously reads back the content of the configuration memory and a 32-bit 
CRC value is generated. The first round of readback CRC value is considered as the golden value 
and the subsequent readback CRC values are compared with the golden one. When a mismatch is 
detected, the crc_error pin of the FRAME_ECC_VIRTEX5 primitive is asserted to high and the 
device is reconfigured [79]. 
 
2.5.3 Off-line test 
This technique applies some test vectors to the design implemented into the FPGA in order to 
diagnose a fault occurrence [80-82]. The off-line test method is applied only when the FPGA is 
not performing its main operational task. This is considered as a drawback of this technique [83-
86]. In addition, the limited number of test vectors and application dependency are the other 
limitation of the off-line test method [83], [87], [88].  
 
2.5.4 Roving test 
This technique relies on swapping blocks related to the implemented design and performs a 
progressive scan test in order to find a fault. Interrupting the entire system for one to three 
seconds and substantially reduced performance of the system are considered as the limitations of 
roving test. Another drawback of this technique is the increased latency for fault detection by 
increasing the design complexity [84], [89-91].  
Readback and comparison, and the CRC are the SEU detection techniques embedded in some 
FPGAs. The latter four SEU detection techniques are compared in some comparable features as 
presented in Table  2-1 [78]. 
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2.6 SEU Correction Techniques in FPGAs 
Once the SEU is detected through one of the techniques described in Section  2.5, the SEU 
correction should be applied. In general, two important SEU correction techniques are single 
frame correction, and SEU scrubbing (also called active partial reconfiguration) [70], [77]. A 
brief discussion of these techniques is described in the following.  
 
2.6.1 SEU Detection and Single Frame Correction 
Once an upset in the configuration memory is detected through readback method, only the 
affected data frame needs to be corrected. This technique writes only a single data frame while 
Table  2-1 : Comparison matrix of fault detection methods 
Method Speed of 
Detection 
Resource 
overhead 
Performance 
overhead 
Granularity Coverage 
Modular 
Redundancy 
Fast 
as soon as fault 
is manifested 
Very large  
Triplication 
plus voting 
logic 
Very small 
latency of voting 
logic 
Coarse   
Limited to 
size of module 
Good   
All manifested 
errors are 
detected 
Concurrent 
Error 
Detection 
Fast  
 as soon as fault 
is manifested 
Medium  
 trade-off with 
coverage 
Small  additional 
latency of cyclic 
redundancy check 
(CRC) logic 
Medium   
trade-off with 
resource 
Medium   
Not practical for 
all types of 
functionality 
Off-line 
BIST 
Slow   
only in off-line 
mode 
Very small Small   
slight start-up 
delay 
Fine   
possible to 
detect the 
exact error 
Very Good   
All faults 
including 
dormant 
Roving test 
Medium   
order of 1 
second 
Medium   
Empty test 
block plus test 
controller 
Large   
clock must be 
stopped to swap 
blocks. Critical 
paths may 
lengthen 
Fine   
possible to 
detect the 
exact error 
Very Good  
Multiple manifest 
and latent faults 
are detected 
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the configuration logic is put in “write state” for a short time. Therefore, most of the times, the 
configuration logic operates in the “read state” [77]. 
2.6.2 SEU Scrubbing (Active Partial Reconfiguration) 
The readback technique for SEU detection requires hardware implementation of the algorithms 
for reading and evaluating each data frame. In addition, a large memory space is required in order 
to store the variables and constants. Therefore, a beneficial technique can be employed by 
removing the readback and SEU detection parts and reloading the configurable logic block (CLB) 
frame segment entirely at a chosen interval to be used for SEU correction. This technique is 
called scrubbing or active partial reconfiguration. Scrubbing requires less overhead in the system, 
however it puts the configuration logic in “write state” for a longer time which depends on the 
design complexity [77]. 
2.7 Review of TDCs Implemented in FPGAs 
Events recognition and their time of occurrence representation in digital format is a key point in 
the most recent electronic instrumentation systems. The recognition and digital interpretation can 
be achieved by a TDC. For example, the arrival time of some incoming pulses or the time interval 
between two events can be measured by a TDC [92]. TDCs are also called time digitizers that 
measure a time interval between two pulses (start and stop) and convert it to a binary output. 
Depending on the accuracy and the range of measurement, two types of time measurement are 
addressed in the concept of TDCs; coarse and fine measurement. In most of the applications, it is 
desired to measure a time interval between a start and stop events. One solution is to measure the 
time of the start and stop events and then applying a subtraction. A course counter is based on a 
reference clock signal. As shown in Figure  2-7, once the start signal is asserted, the counter starts 
counting and ends when the stop signal is detected [93]. In this case, the time interval between 
the start and stop signals is         where    is the period of the reference clock. As shown in 
Figure  2-7, in order to measure the time  , the main time intervals of   ,    and    can be 
measured. The course counter measures the time interval of    by direct counting of full period of 
the reference clock signal [93]. A more accurate measurement technique with smaller 
measurement range is required for the small time intervals of    and   . Some analogue methods 
such as time interval stretching or double conversion and also some digital techniques such as 
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Vernier method and tapped delay lines are available to measure the small time intervals of    and 
  . Although the analogue methods obtain better accuracies, they suffer from temperature 
variation which disturbs the measurement resolution. Therefore, the digital techniques for time 
interval measurement are preferred due to their flexibility and robustness against external 
environment variations such as the temperature [94], [95]. 
The clock frequency limits the accuracy of the implemented counter. For example, a 200 MHz 
clock frequency provides a resolution of 5 nsec. If a resolution better than the clock period is 
required, interpolation circuits need to be employed [94], in which a fraction of clock period is 
measured rather than the whole clock period. A significant amount of time is often required in 
interpolation circuits to perform their function. 
Among the digital techniques, the Vernier interpolator that is based on Vernier technique is very 
popular [96]. It includes a triggerable oscillator along with a coincidence circuit. Vernier 
technique is the digital version of the time stretching technique. Two oscillators are tuned at    
and    frequencies and start oscillation at the arrival time of START and STOP signals. Once the 
leading edges of the oscillators coincide, the measurement is terminated and the number of 
periods counted for oscillators (   and   ) leads to the time interval T extraction as [92] : 
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Figure  2-7 : Time interval measurement method [93] 
44 
 
 
Design of oscillators with accurate and stable frequency is a challenge in Vernier technique. This 
technique is realized by two tapped delay lines with slightly different delay times  , also called 
differential delay line or Vernier delay line. Figure  2-8 shows a simplified circuit diagram of a 
tapped delay line. Propagating the signal through D flip-flops delays the START signal. The 
delayed versions of this signal are sampled at the arrival time of STOP signal. The STOP signal 
latches all the flip-flops. Therefore, the time interval between START and STOP signals is 
propagated through a certain number of flip-flops [97].  
It is shown that the counters can be used to measure long time intervals but with a low resolution 
while the interpolation circuits can only measure small time intervals with high resolution. 
Therefore, a combination of these techniques, called the Hybrid method, may be employed for 
coarse and fine time measurement [94]. One of the most common techniques for hybrid 
measurement is the Nutt method [98]. As it is shown in Figure  2-7, the time interval of    is a 
factor of the clock period          . Based on the Nutt method, the time interval of   is 
calculated as           . 
A digital circuit can be considered as a network of transistors switching between low and high 
states along with some interconnection lines. In a digital circuit, propagation delay in signals is 
caused by transistors and interconnections that route a source point to a destination point. 
Therefore, some applications such as delay lines and asynchronous logic circuits require a precise 
delay control between two points in a circuit. Configuring the routing matrices enables the 
precise control of the delay in an FPGA [99], [100]. 
Several TDC architectures such as tapped delay lines (TDL) [101], delay locked loop (DLL) 
[102], Vernier delay line (VDL) [103], multi-level TDC [104] and the triggered RO [105] have 
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Figure  2-8 : Simplified circuit diagram of a tapped delay line [92]  
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been so far presented by researchers. Most of the implementation tools used in existing 
architectures rely on full custom ASIC design or standard cell ASIC design. However, these 
implementations suffer from inflexibility, high cost, and long time to market. In addition, these 
design modules cannot be implemented into the FPGAs. In other words, not all of these designs 
can be converted directly into an HDL code for FPGA targets [106]. 
2.8 Delay Fault Detection and Test 
An SEU may cause a bit-flip in configuration cell and induce DCs in the design implemented in 
SRAM-based FPGAs. In this section, some recent works on delay faults detection, correction and 
testing are discussed. 
An approach for delay faults testing in Xilinx Spartan FPGAs applicable for on-line and off-line 
manufacturing test has been presented in [89]. This approach is based on built-in self test (BIST) 
method that requires no expensive external test equipment. Figure  2-9 shows the outline of the 
delay fault BIST architecture in [89]. Several paths under test have been configured where each 
path had the same sequence of programmable logic blocks wire segments. In this design, each 
PLB acts as a buffer for the signal traversing along the path. Also, the propagation delay 
associated with each programmable logic block is assumed to be identical in a fault-free design. 
The main idea of this technique is to compare the delays of paths under test. When a rising 
transition occurs at the input, the transition propagates through the paths under test and reaches at 
the input of the OR and NAND gates. Then, the signal FIRST and             respond to the fastest the 
slowest arriving transitions, respectively. The signal FIRST enables the local oscillator and the 
signal             will cease it. Therefore, the number of counted pulses for the oscillator can 
determine the delay D along the paths under test. In a fault-free circuit, the D value is smaller 
than a predetermined threshold delay value associated with the programmable logic blocks. 
Therefore, for the D values greater than the threshold, a delay fault is reported. This design has 
been utilized for delay fault testing in programmable logic blocks, LUTs and Adder 
configurations. 
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An automatic test pattern generator (ATPG) for open, short and delay fault on 3-D FPGA 
interconnections have been studied in [107]. It has been shown that twelve test patterns were 
sufficient to achieve 100% open faults coverage while forty TPs were required to cover short 
faults. The fault models used in ATPG are shown in Figure  2-10. The open and short faults are 
defined as : 
 An open fault is a line segment open when the switch controlling the line is stuck at ‘0’. 
 A short fault occurs when the line’s control switch is stuck at ‘1’ and the line segment 
may tie to another line segment (L2LSF
1), or the line’s switch control (L2SSF2), or a 
control line is tied to another control line (S2SSF
3
).  
                                                 
1 . Line-to-Line Short Fault 
2 . Line-to-Switch Short Fault 
3 . Switch-to Switch Short Fault 
I
FIRST
I
PLBs
PUTs
FIRST
LAST
OSC
To Counter
LAST
OSC
 
Figure  2-9 : Delay fault BIST architecture studied in [89] 
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Regarding the delay faults, since the shortest path in the design has the smallest variation in the 
slack time, it can determine the sensitivity of the delay fault detection. It should be mentioned 
that since the delay faults often occur at high frequency clock signals, the shortest path is a better 
choice than a long path. The shortest path for a target segment does not ensure that its wire length 
is also the shortest. For instance, a path including a double-length line can be longer than a path 
including two single-length lines. In the design shown in Figure  2-11, the shortest path comprises 
of three lines, two SMs linked to a flip-flop (FF) and a LUT. The extracted delay associated with 
the fault-free path was 2.45 nsec and the delay value after fault occurrence in the path was almost 
2.85 nsec resulted in detection of 0.4 nsec delay fault [107]. Using the presented models and 
algorithms, an ATPG has been established to generate test patterns to detect all the opens, shorts 
and delay faults. In addition, the scalability of the model has been considered for different types 
of FPGAs. 
A mechanism called timing-error-resilient network-on-chip (TRNoC) has been presented in 
[108]. It allows the network-on-chip (NoC) to operate at higher frequencies at the expense of 
some sporadically timing errors. The timing errors have been compensated by employing an error 
recovery strategy. In addition to the static variations, dynamic variations such as VDD drops, 
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Figure  2-10 : Presented ATPG architecture for delay fault detection in [107] 
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temperature and aging affect the NoC. These dynamic variations result in unpredictable behavior 
in the timing characteristics of the NoC. This may be a challenging issue in NoC design 
especially for the components that require significant timing margins. The TRNoC architecture 
comprises a lightweight timing-error detection mechanism along with a distributed error recovery 
mechanism. These mechanisms provide the lossless operation of the design, while leaving the 
fault-free paths of the network unaffected. The salient characteristics of the TRNoC architecture 
are summarized as :  
 Independent per-input and per-output error handling confined only to the control paths of 
the design routes. 
 Full protection against single and back-to-back timing errors and no package loss 
guarantee. 
 Unaffected components by timing errors are kept isolated. 
The technique in [108] is highly restricted to the available slack. The drawbacks of this 
architecture tailored to network-on-chip applications are summarized as : 
 This technique is based on double sampling method that requires additional clock signal 
(CLK and CLK + ∆). Providing additional clock signals with fine timing margins is a 
costly and overwhelming challenge in ASIC design. 
 In TRNoC architecture, once an error is detected, the requests from the affected input port 
should be stopped. During the next cycle (which is spent for error recovery), no request 
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Figure  2-11 : Segment delay fault model presented in [107] 
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should be sent to the output ports until the state of the affected input port returns to 
normal. 
 In addition to the request-masking, at the time of error detection, all credit updates should 
also be stopped. 
 The TRNoC architecture cannot handle receiving consecutive delayed dequeue signals at 
the input. 
Time-borrowing circuit architecture along with hardware prototyping for timing error resilience 
has been studied in [109]. A technique called TIMBER has been employed for error resilience 
that masks the timing errors by borrowing time from successive pipeline stages in ASICs. The 
motivation behind TIMBER technique is the analysis of the distribution of critical paths in a 
processor, where only a small fraction of flip-flops serve as both start and end-points. 
The time-borrowing technique is realized when the time borrowed from the next pipeline stage is 
absorbed by a noncritical path being sensitized in the next stage. This may lead to timing errors 
especially in high frequency applications. Therefore, the time-borrowing technique is not 
recommended for high frequency designs. As shown in Figure  2-12, the TIMBER-based error 
detection and masking mechanisms divide the checking period into three identical intervals; one 
interval for time borrowing (TB) and two intervals for error detection (ED). Thus, an increase in 
clock frequency is 30 /3 = 10% which delivers less benefit for high speed applications. A 
conventional master-slave TIMBER flip-flop comprised of two master latches and one slave 
latch. When the TIMBER flip-flop is configured in non time-borrowing mode, the slave latch 
serves to hold the previous data to drive the inputs to the subsequent pipeline stage. On the other 
hand, when the TIMBER flip-flop is configured in time-borrowing mode, two master flip-flops 
can switch between sampling data and driving the inputs to the subsequent pipeline stages. In 
view of this, the slave latch is not required in the circuit. The circuit design of the optimized 
TIMBER flip-flop is called Dedicated TIMBER flip-flop. Figure  2-13 shows the dedicated 
TIMBER flip-flop circuit along with the clock control design [109]. The key features of the 
dedicated TIMBER flip-flop architecture are summarized as : 
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 Replaying the faulty instruction or Roll-back the entire process, 
 This technique is not effective for high speed applications since the time budget for time 
borrowing and error detection is limited. 
 The timing error is propagated through at least three successive pipeline stages. 
Consequently, the performance improvement compared to traditional error detection 
schemes is not more than 10%. 
 The main drawback of this technique is propagating glitches during the error detection 
process. 
 Using inverter chains in control logic circuitry for delaying clock in TIMBER technique 
results in low resolution due to the large latency of the inverters. 
 TIMBER technique decreases the slack time on critical paths which are linked since it 
adds a substantial delay on the critical path due to the large latency caused by delay 
inverters. 
 This technique is only useful for low frequency applications and it cannot detect the 
timing error values of greater than 60 MHz. 
A time redundancy technique to derive low-cost soft-error tolerant implementations for ASICs 
has been studied in [110], in which a perturbation tolerant circuit based on time redundancy has 
been designed. In a single-ended combinational circuit, hardware triplication is required in order 
to distinguish between correct and incorrect values. However, this is not the case for all the 
products because of the cost, area and power inefficiency. It is noted that it is possible to 
overcome this issue by exploiting the temporal nature of transient faults. Since the transient faults 
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· Timing error masked by 
time-borrowing
· Timing error not flagged
Error-detection (ED) interval
· Timing error masked by 
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Figure  2-12 : TIMBER-based error detection and error masking technique [109] 
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manifest for a short period of time, only the majority voter circuit could be triplicated rather than 
the entire hardware.  
Figure  2-14 shows the implementation of time-domain majority voter in [110]. The scheme is 
based on employing three latches with identical input (the single-ended output from 
combinational circuit) and delayed versions of the clock signal. As shown in Figure  2-14A, 
Latch 2 and Latch 3 are clocked with a certain delay of δ and 2δ compared to the clock of 
latch 1, respectively.  
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Figure  2-13 : Dedicated TIMBER flip-flop (A), and clock control design (B) [109] 
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Employing the TMR architecture in time-domain majority voter along with redundant delayed 
clock signals (CLK + δ, and CLK + 2δ) is costly and also area and power inefficient. In addition, 
generating redundant clock signals with a certain delay value requires an accurate clock control 
circuit. Figure  2-14B shows an alternative design implementation where three latches share the 
same clock signal. The input of Latch 2 is delayed with a certain amount of δ and the input of 
Latch 3 is delayed by 2δ. The realization of this scheme is straightforward as compared to the one 
in Figure  2-14A. Error detection and correction (EDC) codes are the base functions of this 
technique that are suitable only for small designs. The time redundancy technique requires to 
repeat each circuit operation, the clock signal should be stopped and the faulty operation should 
be re-executed. The utilized TMR architecture induces substantially large amount of parasitic 
delays to the critical path of the DUT. 
The Razor pipeline architecture has been presented in [111] and [112]. In Razor flip-flops’ 
architecture, each Razor flip-flop comprises a main system flip-flop plus an assistant shadow 
latch linked to a multiplexer and an XOR gate. The main system flip-flop is clocked with system 
clock (CLK) while the shadow latch is clocked with a delayed version of the clock signal (CLK + 
δ). The delayed version of the output of combinational logic is presented at the latch output. The 
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Figure  2-14 : Digital circuit implementation of time-domain majority voter; with delayed clock 
signals (A), and with delayed output signal (B) [110] 
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XOR gate compares the outputs of the main system flip-flop and the shadow latch raising a flag 
once a difference is observed. The main drawback behind Razor flip-flop technique is high 
silicon area cost since a shadow latch, a multiplexer and an XOR gate are required for each main 
system flip-flop. In addition, the realization of the extra clock signal used in the architecture 
requires an accurate clock control circuit.  
A time dilation technique that provides concurrent error detection and correction along with 
support of off-line manufacturing scan testing for ASICs has been studied in [113]. Employing 
new scan flip-flop architecture allowed detecting and correcting errors at the penalty of one clock 
cycle. The silicon area, cost and power consumption have been substantially reduced compared to 
the Razor design technique. Figure  2-15 shows the time dilation flip-flop architecture in [113]. 
The topology employs a multiplexer and an XOR gate linked to the main flip-flop in order to 
serve the timing error detection and correction. This topology is required for each main flip-flop 
in the system. In TD flip-flop topology shown in Figure  2-15, the error detection is performed by 
comparing the sampled input and output of the main flip-flop. The multiplexer with the feedback 
configuration forms a memory element, also called multiplexer-latch, which captures delayed 
data from the error flip-flop for error correction. 
The error flip-flop is clocked with a delayed version of the main system clock. The features of the 
time dilation flip-flop architecture are summarized as follows : 
 High silicon area cost due to the large extra logic gates insertion 
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Figure  2-15 : Time dilation flip-flop for error detection and correction studied in [113] 
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 Performance degradation due to a complex circuit employed for error detection 
 Required large number of control signals 
 High penalty of latency in error detection due to the complex detection scheme 
 TD flip-flop architecture is able to detect timing errors only in the range of nanoseconds 
and larger 
 Generation of extra clock signal requires an accurate clock control circuit design 
A robust digital sensor and sensor insertion flow for in-situ path timing slack monitoring in 
system-on-chips (SoC) has been presented in [114]. In this technique, the timing slack is 
converted to a digital format and stored in a scan register chain to be fetched at any time during 
test and operation modes. In addition, layout-aware and netlist-level sensor insertion flow have 
also been introduced. The sensor has been designed with 28 nm standard cell library. In the past 
few years, the CMOS technology is scaling down very quickly and paving the way for lots of 
core-processor and SoCs. However, the decreased transistor area per technology as well as the 
increased variability in MOS transistor parameters limits the technology scaling. The variations 
such as : static process variation due to manufacturing, dynamic variations such as power supply 
and temperature, and aging variations are increasingly emerged in the scaled down fabrication 
technologies. PVT variation and bias temperature instability have induced aging variations 
especially in smaller fabrication technologies of SoCs. The circuit diagram of the sensor 
architecture in [114] for the SoCs is shown in Figure  2-16. The capture flip-flop records the slack 
time of the circuit path at its D and Q ports. The D and Q ports are linked to the small size buffers 
in sensor block for the monitoring purpose. The small size of the buffers linked to the D and Q 
ports of the capture flip-flop ensures the low parasitic load added to the circuit path. 
The data sampled by capture flip-flop is stored at the next rising edge of the clock inside the rise 
transition detector module. This value is compared with the data sampled by capture flip-flop at 
current rising edge of clock. The ACT flag is raised when the current data and the precedent data 
are mismatched. This flag is used to latch the states from monitor unit (MU) to the capture and 
result storage unit (CRSU). The delay line consists of a minimum size chain of buffers. The flip-
flops attached to the end of the buffers capture the state of delay line at each rising edge of the 
clock signal. The delay line buffers and their associated flip-flops convert the timing slack into a 
corresponding digital data. The output data from MU is sampled by the flip-flops associated with 
the scan chain inside the CRSU module. In order to ensure the glitch immunity, the flip-flops in 
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this unit are clocked with the ACT signal rather than system CLK. The Sensor_SI signal is tied to 
a logic ‘1’ that is considered as the scan input for the first flip-flop in CRSU module. 
Employing minimum size buffers as delay line elements in the sensor architecture restricts its 
application to SoCs since the resolution of the delay intervals is limited to the net delay of each 
buffer. This sensor may not be a preferred solution for high speed application, where the slack 
time is narrower, especially for the designs relying on FPGAs. 
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Figure  2-16 : Sensor architecture presented in [114] 
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2.9 Routing Fault Detection and Correction 
In order to test and detect manufacturing defects in the interconnect structure of the FPGAs, 
several techniques have been presented. Most of these techniques rely on BIST that exhaustively 
tests all cross-points in the switch matrices in order to find the faulty point [115-119]. 
Test pattern generators (TPG) are another technique to detect the faults in interconnections [80], 
[81]. The algorithm in [120] relies on the technique used in [119], which employs linear feedback 
shift register (LFSR) in order to generate multiple test configurations from a single test 
configuration. Self-testing areas (STAR) technique in [82] is comprised of several disjoint tiles to 
scan the FPGA for fault detection. The tiles include a basic BIST architecture called BISTER and 
apply some test patterns to the blocks under test and the wires under test. 
In order to detect the faulty cell, the STARs are roved across the FPGA based on the concept of 
partial reconfiguration. The drawback of the STAR technique is interrupting the entire system for 
one to three seconds, since the BISTER tiles have to be reconfigured in order to rove the STARs. 
Thus, the performance of the system employing the STAR technique is substantially degraded. 
Another disadvantage of this technique is the increased latency for fault detection by increasing 
the design complexity implemented to the FPGA. This is due to the fact that the roving time 
increases with the number of tiles that are used to implement the design. 
A partitioning method for interconnect fault recovery has been studied in [121]. It partitions the 
physical design into a set of tiles where each tile comprises of some logic blocks and routing 
interconnects. In order to provide a reliable logic and local interconnection in the implemented 
design, multiple configurations have been considered. Correcting the configuration upsets in this 
method has been performed by swapping the configurations for each tile independently. 
However, this technique requires some spare logic resources for the case of logic faults in LUTs 
and also some global interconnects for the case of fault in the segmented interconnects. Once a 
routing error is detected, reconfiguration of the FPGA is sufficient to mitigate the fault. However, 
reconfiguration of the FPGA entirely takes more time, and thus the time required for fault 
detection should be significantly lower than the time taken for the FPGA reconfiguration. 
In the technique presented in [122], the routing faults such as stuck-at faults and bridging faults 
in the SMs of the FPGA have been detected via a test configuration. This technique relies on 
sending different values across every two nets that are routed through a common SM. The bitwise 
parity value received by the inputs of a LUT is compared with the pre-computed parity value and 
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in the case of a distinct value, a routing error is reported. Taking advantage of the partial 
reconfiguration, the cost and time for an entire FPGA’s reconfiguration is decreased. Therefore, 
the time required for fault detection in the routings is lower as compared to other existing works 
discussed in Section  2.9. However, large area overhead, power consumption increase, and 
significant delay added to the routings due to the excess number of logic gates are the main 
drawbacks of this technique. In view of this, this technique may not be generalized to high speed 
applications. In addition, reconfiguration of the entire design at the time of fault detection in 
routings is another issue that makes this technique inefficient. 
2.10 Coherence of the Articles in Relation to the Research Goals 
In the last two chapters up to now, we discussed the current challenges regarding the impact of 
cosmic rays on electronic components employed in the aircrafts that travel at very high altitudes. 
The SRAM-based FPGAs have attracted a great deal of interest in aerospace and aeronautic 
sector due to their system integration, high configurability, and flexibility. However, they are 
very susceptible to cosmic rays. The susceptibility of the SRAM-based FPGAs to SEEs 
particularly the SEU has been extensively studied in the literature. We reviewed the state-of-the-
art of SEU effects in SRAM-based FPGAs as well as the existing mitigation techniques in 
 CHAPTER 2. However, the vulnerability of the routing resources of the FPGAs to SEU, to the 
best of our knowledge, has been overlooked thus far. Since in modern FPGAs almost 90% of 
configuration bits control the routing resources, it is desired to investigate the sensitivity of the 
routing network to SEU. 
This thesis is based on three journal articles. In the first article, the susceptibility of routing 
resources in an SRAM-based FPGA to SEU is presented while the device has been exposed to 
ionizing proton radiation to induce DCs. In the first report on the observation of DCs in the 
routing resources of the SRAM-based FPGAs by members of our research team, a hypothesis has 
been suggested for the root cause of the observed DCs. In this article, circuits involved in delay 
change generation and propagation are reverse-engineered with precise models using the Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) 65 nm CMOS technology, similar to the 65 nm 
triple-oxide technology node used to build Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. 
In the second article, a delay monitor circuit is proposed to detect and measure the DCs observed 
in the experiment performed on an SRAM-based FPGA. The observed DCs presented in the first 
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article can be detected with the proposed delay monitor and the results are compared to those 
obtained experimentally and by circuit level simulations. In this paper, based on the results 
obtained, we claim that as the level of DC detection increases, the probability of receiving more 
DCs in the routing resources of an SRAM-based FPGA will increase. In addition, it is shown that 
the proposed delay monitor circuit can be a part of mitigation technique for SEUs targeting 
routing interconnection network of the FPGA. A method to lower the clock frequency at the time 
of DC detection is proposed in order to tolerate further DCs on the critical path and avoiding 
system downtime. 
In the third article, an investigation on the vulnerability of routing resources in APSoC devices 
including SRAM-based FPGA is presented. The in-beam neutron experiments are performed at 
TRIUMF laboratory. In this article, a method to configure ring oscillators mostly with routing 
resources and a few logic resources with full control over the routings is proposed. Also, an 
algorithm to automatically identify the extra parasitic interconnects linked to a logical net due to 
SEU is proposed. In this article, it is shown that there exists a relation between the order (level) 
of DCs and the probability of getting more DCs. Results obtained for each RO support the trend 
that as DCs occur, the probability of getting a subsequent DC increases as shown be the steady 
decrease of the mean time to delay change (MTTDC) as the order (level) of DC occurrence 
increases. 
 CHAPTER 3 presents the first article on the circuit level modeling of extra combinational delay 
in SRAM-based FPGAs due to transient ionizing radiation.  CHAPTER 4 covers the second 
article with the emphasis on the design and implementation of a delay monitor circuit for the DCs 
induced by SEU in SRAM-based FPGAs.  CHAPTER 5 presents the content of the third article in 
which the characterization of the susceptibility of routing resources in SRAM-based FPGAs to 
SEUs induced by ionizing radiation is investigated. A general discussion on the objectives of this 
thesis and the achievements obtained are presented in  CHAPTER 6. Finally, some concluding 
remarks and scope for future research are outlined in  CHAPTER 7. 
2.11 Summary 
In this chapter, a review of the state-of-the-art works regarding different topics related to this 
thesis has been presented. SEE effects in digital ICs and FPGA fabrics have been reviewed with 
an emphasis on the SEU. Related radiation experiments and SEE characterization methods on the 
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SRAM-based FPGAs have been reviewed. Available SEU mitigation techniques as well as the 
detection and correction schemes applied to the FPGAs have been presented. A review on TDCs 
implemented in FPGAs has been presented. Finally, the available fault detection and correction 
techniques applied to the routings of the FPGAs have been reviewed. 
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CHAPTER 3 ARTICLE 1 : CIRCUIT LEVEL MODELING OF EXTRA 
COMBINATIONAL DELAYS IN SRAM-BASED FPGAS DUE TO 
TRANSIENT IONIZING RADIATION 
3.1 Overview 
The SRAM-based FPGAs are sensitive to ionizing radiation inducing SEU. These semiconductor 
devices are structured in an array of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLB) connected via a 
programmable routing interconnection network. Routing interconnection network is controlled by 
SRAM cells that are called configuration bits which are susceptible to SEU. An SEU may change 
the configuration of a programmable interconnection point (PIP) controlled by an SRAM 
memory cell in SRAM-based FPGAs. PIPs are the main components that contribute to route a 
source to a destination component. This chapter is the reproduction of a published article in IEEE 
Transactions on Nuclear Science. 
 
– M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, Y. Blaquière, C. Thibeault, S. Pichette, and F. Z. Tazi, "Circuit 
Level Modeling of Extra Combinational Delays in SRAM-Based FPGAs Due to 
Transient Ionizing Radiation," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 61, pp. 3535-
3542, 2014. 
 
3.2 Abstract 
This paper presents circuit level models that explain the extra combinational delays in a SRAM-
based FPGA (Virtex-5) due to Single Event Upsets (SEUs). Several scenarios of extra 
combinational delays are simulated based on the circuit architecture of the FPGA core, namely 
Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) and routing. It is found that the main delay contribution 
originates from extra interconnection lines that are unintentionally connected to the main circuit 
path via pass transistors activated by SEUs. Moreover, longer delay faults observed on 
Input/Ouput Blocks (IOBs) due to SEU were investigated through simulations. In all cases, 
results are in close agreement with the ones obtained experimentally while exposing the FPGA to 
proton irradiation. 
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3.3 Introduction 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are semiconductor devices that are based around an 
array of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) connected via a hierarchy of configurable 
interconnects [21]. FPGAs have become the preferred common solution to implement digital 
systems targeting different applications [17]. The SRAM-based FPGA comprises some I/O 
blocks (IOBs), memory modules, logic blocks and routing resources controlled by SRAM cells, 
called configuration bits [21]. The sensitivity to radiation of SRAM-based FPGAs has been 
studied over the years [52, 123-126]. The first report on extra combinational delays due to 
transient ionizing radiations has recently been presented in [32] where their existence due to 
Single-Event-Upsets (SEUs) induced by proton radiation has experimentally been observed. 
The main contribution of this paper is the validation of the root causes of extra combinatorial 
delays, also called Observed Delay Changes (ODCs), on SRAM-based FPGA through circuit 
level simulations of the internal circuitry of Configurable Logic and I/O Blocks [127-129] and 
their interconnections. 
This paper presents circuit models created to understand and simulate the source of extra 
combinational delays experimentally observed, which are ranging from 22 psec to as much as 
422 psec in the core logic of FPGA [32]. To our knowledge, the proposed model and 
methodology represent the first work ever on the simulation of extra combinational delays due to 
SEU occurring in FPGAs. The models are accurate enough to obtain close correlation with the 
experimental results. The proposed methodology can also be used to predict the probable delay 
values due to radiation in any design implemented on FPGA. 
The effects of SEUs on delay faults affecting the Virtex-5 IOBs were investigated and some 
substantially larger delay changes were observed while exposing the FPGA to irradiation [36]. 
The root cause of these large observed delay changes was verified in this paper with, circuit level 
simulations employing the Input/Output Buffer Information Specification model (IBIS) [130]. 
FPGA irradiation experiments were also performed at the TRIUMF laboratory using a variable 
energy and fluence proton beam [36]. 
This paper is structured as follows. Some background information regarding the previous work is 
presented in Section  3.4. Section  3.5 describes FPGA’s circuit level models for observed delay 
change root cause validation. Typical circuit-level configurations that could induce ODCs in the 
core of SRAM-based FPGA are presented in Section  3.6. Simulations of SEU effect on delay 
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faults affecting the Virtex-5 IOBs are presented as well as the comparison between simulation 
results and experimental ones observed by proton irradiation for both core-based and IOB-based 
Ring Oscillator (RO) circuits are discussed in Section  3.7, and finally, conclusions are drawn in 
Section  3.8. 
3.4 Background on Extra Combinational Delays in SRAM-Based FPGAs 
Configuration memory cells in SRAM-based FPGA are sensitive to radiation that causes a bit-
flip of the stored values [34, 131, 132]. These SRAMs are mainly used to configure 
interconnects, look-up tables and I/O blocks. The two impacts of a bit-flip on configuration bits 
related to interconnections are open, a disappearing link between two nodes; or short, usually 
defined as an undesired connection between two routed signals. While SEU can modify logic 
behavior in SRAM-based FPGA, it was conjectured in [32] that delays could be induced by a 
short between a routed path and an unused wire. 
Figure  3-1 illustrates the experimental setup that was utilized at the TRIUMF laboratory to 
demonstrate the induced extra delays in SRAM-based FPGA. Extra combinational delays were 
observed while the board was bombarded by protons of energy ranging from 35.4 MeV to 
105 MeV for several runs. The Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA (XC5VLX50T) was used to implement 
two ring oscillators, RO1 and RO2, made of look-up tables (LUTs) configured as inverters in the 
core of Virtex-5 operating at similar frequencies. The output of each ring oscillator was 
connected to an external inverter (7404). The outputs of the two 7404 inverters were shorted by a 
5.1 kΩ resistor while one inverter output is monitored by a spectrum analyzer. The resistive 
shorted outputs provide a signal with a frequency spectrum containing the frequency difference 
between the two RO frequencies (F2 - F1). This difference is mainly due to the parameter 
variation in fabrication process and slight difference in the oscillator’s routing. The measurement 
of the frequency difference (F2 - F1) instead of the individual frequency F1 or F2, led to a better 
resolution. The ring oscillators were adjusted to the length of 1799 inverters giving 
F1  F2  1.25 MHz and a frequency difference of about 12.4 kHz. The supply voltage (VCC) for 
inverter chip (7404) was 1.2 V, while the supply voltage for the core and the inputs/outputs of the 
FPGA was 1.0 V and 3.3V respectively. Other experiments were performed with ring oscillators 
implemented in IOB and will be described in section  3.7.2. 
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3.5 FPGA Circuit-Level Models for ODC Root Cause Validation 
A set of 48 experiments were performed in which the proton source bombarding the top side of 
the FPGA. Each delay measurement was stopped when the oscillation of one RO ceased due to a 
functional failure triggered by an SEU. Twenty three of those experiments came with one or 
cumulative ODCs. The delay change could produce either a reduction or an increase of the 
measured frequency difference depending on which of the two ring oscillators was affected. 
3.5.1 Circuit Level Models 
One contribution of this paper is to present circuit level models of the FPGA that takes into 
account the CLB along with their interconnection modules in order to simulate SEU-induced 
delays. The Virtex-5 FPGA is based on an array of configurable logic blocks with two slices each 
[21]. The circuit is modeled as a two dimensional array comprising slices and switch 
boxes/switch matrices (SB) interconnected by a network of routing wires as shown in Figure  3-2. 
Xilinx does not formally provide any detail on internal Virtex-5 FPGA circuitries. However, 
according to [127, 128], SBs are made of an array of nMOS pass transistors with some vertical 
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Figure  3-1 : Experimental setup used by AVIO403 team at TRIUMF to measure extra delays [32] 
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and horizontal interconnects inside. A slice includes a Configurable Logic Element (CLE) and 
8:1 input multiplexers (IMUX). Also, the CLE is comprised of a LUT [133].  
Figure  3-2 presents the top level view of two adjacent CLBs, where two different configurations 
of slice-to-slice interconnection are shown as examples. The first configuration, path A-to-B, is 
introduced to simulate the behavior of direct slice-to-slice link of the RO between two adjacent 
CLBs. The second configuration, path C-to-A, represents the other possible interconnection 
between two slices in a same CLB. Both configurations are reported by the Xilinx FPGA Editor 
tool [28]. In the first configuration, the CLB-to-CLB interconnection length, LCC, is longer than 
the Slice-to-SB interconnection length, LSS, in the second configuration. These configurations are 
introduced as models for ROs implemented on FPGA enabling the prediction of the probable 
ODCs. 
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Figure  3-2 : Model of a two configurations of slice to slice interconnection in Virtex-5 
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3.5.2 Model Configuration Tuning 
Figure  3-3 represents our circuit model for the main switch matrix structure used by ROs, as 
reported by the Xilinx FPGA Editor tool. The model includes the location of pass transistors 
(PIP) and the Pass-transistor to Pass-transistor interconnection, LPP, (bounce model) for nodes C-
to-A configuration of Figure  3-2. 
A signal crosses the switch box SB from their input to output pins (circles in Figure  3-3) via 
vertical and horizontal interconnects and through Programmable Interconnection Point (PIP) 
made of pass transistors. Indeed, based on the Xilinx FPGA Editor tool, an input signal can be 
routed directly to one or more output pins through a single PIP, named direct route. Also, it is 
possible to bounce the input signal indirectly through an intermediate interconnect and PIP and 
then fed to an output pin, named indirect bounced route. Two bounced routes are shown in Figure 
 3-3. An indirect bounced route would be typically used for a C-to-A route while a direct bounced 
route is used for A-to-B configuration shown in Figure  3-2. 
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Figure  3-3 : Switch matrix structure reported by Xilinx FPGA Editor including our equivalent 
circuit for the second configuration 
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The circuit models employed to simulate both interconnect configurations of the RO 
implementation used in the experiments are detailed in Figure  3-4A (path A-to-B) and Figure 
 3-4B (path C-to-A), respectively. A signal shaping filter comprised of four inverters generates a 
realistic pulse signal waveform. According to Figure  3-4A, any interconnection between two 
slices located in two adjacent CLBs has to pass through two switch boxes with an interconnection 
length of LCC. In Figure  3-4B, the interconnection between two slices located in a same CLB 
passes through a switch box with two interconnections of length LSS. The switch box is 
comprised of an array of pass transistors and very short interconnections shown as LPP in Figure 
 3-4B. Our simulations show that the effect of LPP on propagation delays is negligible compared to 
the one of a pass transistor along the path. 
The proposed models have been adjusted to match the delay extracted from the Xilinx ISE Static 
Timing Analysis (STA- TRACE) tool [134] run on the place and route netlist and used for the 
proton irradiation experiments. Simulations were performed with Cadence Spectre circuit 
simulator [135] having the interconnect lengths LSS and LCC configured as the sweeping variables 
for both configurations using the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) 1.2 V 
65 nm CMOS technology [136], similar to the 65 nm triple-oxide technology node used to build  
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Figure  3-4 : Structure of slice-to-slice interconnection A) between two adjacent CLBs, B) in a 
single CLB 
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Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. Simulations were performed with minimum size transistors and the 
metal3 layer for interconnects. 
Figure  3-5 presents the propagation delay results from Slice-to-SB (node C to node A) and Slice-
to-Slice (node A to node B) as a function of the interconnection length to adjust LSS and LCC in 
the first and second configurations. We found that an interconnection length of LSS = 1.74 µm in 
the second configuration (node C to node A) matches the inverter and net delay of 138 psec that 
was extracted by Xilinx STA-TRACE. The same procedure was performed to match the value of 
LCC in the first configuration (node A to node B) and the corresponding value amounts to 
7.35 µm, which matches the net delay of 484 psec. Our simulation results showed that the effect 
(LSS=1.74µm, 138psec)
(LCC=7.35µm, 484psec)
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Figure  3-5 : Delay variation as a function of short interconnection length for the configurations 
used to define LCC in Figure  3-4A and LSS in Figure  3-4B 
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of LPP on the delay is negligible compared to PIP’s effect, so its value was neglected. As shown 
in the following section, the adjusted lengths LCC and LSS and our circuit models provided 
sufficient accuracy to reproduce the ODCs observed experimentally. 
3.6 Circuit Level Configurations Inducing ODCs in FPGA Core 
An SEU in SRAM-based FPGA can affect a configured circuit by creating a short, an open or a 
modification in the propagation delay. Indeed, it is assumed in this paper as in [32] that the 
experimentally observed delay change is caused by an SEU that increases the interconnect load 
parasitic capacitance. Under these circumstances, three circuit scenarios of delay changes were 
investigated, as explained in the following subsections. 
3.6.1 Models for Delay Change Due to Extra Parasitic Interconnects 
An SEU affecting an SRAM-cell controlling a PIP could create a short, for example, between a 
vertical line and the main horizontal routing line, as shown in the simplified schematic view of 
Figure  3-6A. This model is valid for both inter-slice routing configurations presented in Figure 
 3-3. According to our simulation results, the main contributor to the delay is the PIP pass-
transistor that is turned ‘on’ and increases the parasitic capacitance by connecting an undesired 
vertical unused interconnection to the main routing path. While Figure  3-6A is an example of a 
single interconnect parasitic (1-SEU case), Figure  3-6B shows that cumulative SEUs can create 
larger parasitic load than the 1-SEU case on the main routing path. In Figure  3-6B, it is assumed 
that a primary SEU affected the configuration bit of the SRAM-cell and turned on the 
corresponding PIP pass transistor and made a permanent connection between one horizontal and 
one vertical interconnect that are not yet connected to the main routing path. The extra 
capacitance is added on the main routing path when another SEU flips the configuration bit of the 
SRAM-cell that connects the two former parasitic lines to the main routing path and therefore 
creates an extra parasitic delay. Figure  3-7 illustrates a 3-SEU case where an even larger 
combinational delay is created by a sequence of three consecutive SEUs. The first two SEUs 
enabled PIPB and PIPC, and then another SEU activated PIPA to create a combinational delay 
larger than the one observed in the 2-SEU case. 
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Figure  3-6 : Effect of an SEU on a Programmable Interconnection Point (PIP) in SB, adding a 
combinational delay : A) 1 ODC case (1 SEU), B) 2 ODC case (2 SEUs) 
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It is noticeable that the presented structures can be applied for both configurations introduced in 
Figure  3-3. In our convention, for the configuration presented in Figure  3-4B, the (1) case was 
simulated, which means 1 SEU has shorted a parasitic interconnect to the main routing path while 
its length is 1 LSS. The (1), (2) and (4) cases were simulated for the configuration presented in 
Figure  3-4A, while an SEU has connected a parasitic interconnect to the main routing path with 
the lengths of 1 LCC, 2 LCC or 4 LCC, respectively. 
Notice that regarding the probable interconnection lengths in Virtex-5, direct CLB-CLB 
connections in Virtex-5 FPGA can be 1 LCC, 2 LCC or 4 LCC [129, 137], as shown in Figure  3-8. 
More scenarios have been simulated for the configuration of Figure  3-4A that includes 2-SEU 
and 3-SEU cases. The nomenclatures of (1,1), (1,2), (1,4), (2,1), (2,2), (2,4), (4,1), (4,2) and (4,4) 
are defined while the main routing path is affected by 2 SEUs. For instance, the case (1,1) 
identifies a cumulative case where two parasitic interconnects with the length of 1 LCC due to two 
consecutive SEUs are connected to the main routing path as shown in Figure  3-6B. Also, the case 
(1,2) implies two parasitic interconnects with the length of 1 LCC and 2 LCC respectively 
connected to the main routing path. The case (4,4) represents two parasitic interconnects both 
with the length of 4 LCC linked to the main routing path. 
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Figure  3-7 : A sequence of three SEUs connecting three interconnects of length 1LCC to the main 
routing path 
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In addition, different scenarios were simulated for a sequence of three SEUs where the equivalent 
of three interconnects of lengths (1, 2 or 4) LCC become connected to the main routing path 
between two slices located in two adjacent CLBs. The proposed nomenclatures for the sequence 
of three SEUs are as the following : (1,1,1), (1,1,2), (1,1,4), (1,2,1),…, (4,4,4) for a total amount 
of 27 cases. For instance, the (1,1,1) case introduces the case where three parasitic interconnects 
due to three consecutive SEUs are connected to the main routing path, while their length equals 
to 1LCC, as illustrated in Figure  3-7. Notice that the delay change created by the (4,4,4) case is 
quite larger than the delay change due to (1,1,1) case. It is noticeable that the horizontal 
interconnect length for both configurations presented in Figure  3-4 is the unit length that is kept 
constant at LCC = 7.35 µm or LSS = 1.74 µm. 
3.6.2 Models for Delay Change Due to SEU Effect on IMUX 
As stated in Section  3.5, the IMUX circuit couples the input terminals of CLE to the general 
interconnect. The assumption for delay change due to pass transistors in IMUX is illustrated with 
the example in Figure  3-9. In this case, the main routing path passes through pass transistors M1 
and M2 while M4 is off and its configuration bit is '0'. 
Once an SEU affects the configuration bit of the SRAM-cell MC2 that controls the pass transistor 
M4, it creates a bit-flip that makes M4 ‘on’. Since M3 was previously driven by activated 
CLB CLB CLB CLB CLB
CLB CLB CLB CLB CLB
CLB CLB CLB CLB CLB
Single=1LCC Double=2LCC Quad=4LCC
Double=2LCC
Quad=4LCC
 
Figure  3-8 : Examples of various interconnection lengths in Virtex-5 FPGA [129, 137] 
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configuration bit MC0, a parasitic path (dotted) is created via M1, M2, M4 and M3 back to the 
general interconnect that is assumed to be LSS. This SEU on MC2 produced a noticeable delay 
change of 26 psec found by our circuit level simulation. 
3.6.3 Models for Delay Change Due to Extra Stuck-at Parasitic Interconnect 
Furthermore, another phenomenon observed in FPGA is caused by an extra parasitic interconnect 
that is stuck-at logic state '0' or '1' [138, 139]. This situation can occur when a logic node is tied 
to a specific logic value (by the synthesis tool or the designer). Indeed, examinations of some 
XDL files describing existing routed designs revealed that the tied specific logic value could pass 
through up to 5 PIPs before reaching its final destination. On a main routing path, this parasitic 
stuck-at interconnect can create a stuck-at fault or induce an extra combinational delay. 
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Figure  3-9 : Mechanism of delay change creation in IMUX circuit 
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Figure  3-10 : Extra stuck-at parasitic interconnect 
This phenomenon is shown in Figure  3-10. The stuck-at fault or extra combination delay effect 
mainly depends on the number of PIPs between the main routing path and the parasitic stuck-at 
interconnect. Section  3.7 presents the simulation results that demonstrate these two effects. It 
shows that there exists a threshold on the number of PIPs that generates a delay instead of a 
stuck-at fault. 
Assume a ring oscillator implemented in an FPGA as shown in Figure  3-11. An SEU can affect 
the SRAM-cell that controls the pass transistor linking a parasitic interconnect to the main 
routing path between two consecutive inverters. Under some circumstances, the end of parasitic 
line could be stuck at '0' or '1'; and may produce a delay change in the main routing path that 
would change the frequency of the ring oscillator or would cease the oscillation. Our circuit 
model started with one cross line added into the main routing path via a pass transistor enabled 
by an SEU, while the end of the line was stuck at '0' or at '1'. This additional cross line broke the 
ring oscillator for both cases. Then for both cases, additional lines with pass transistors were 
added in series of the first one until the ring oscillator started ringing.  
Simulation results obtained with these 3 models are compared to bombardment results in 
Section  3.7. 
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3.7 Comparison of Simulated and Measured Delays 
3.7.1 Delay Fault Results in Virtex-5 FPGA Core 
Circuit-level simulations of ODCs were performed for the three proposed scenarios presented in 
Section  3.6 and illustrated in Figure  3-6, Figure  3-7, Figure  3-9 and Figure  3-10 for a total of 
three different scenarios. The simulated delays correlate fairly well with the ODCs measured at 
TRIUMF. The histogram of Figure  3-12 shows all the delay changes observed during all the 
experiments at TRIUMF. In the case where more than one ODC was observed during an 
experiment; each individual ODC was measured independently and included in the histogram. 
The number ni on top of each bin in Figure  3-12 refers to number of configurations that provide a 
delay change within the delay span represented by bin ni as listed in Table  3-1. 
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Figure  3-11 : Delay change mechanism in ring oscillator by additional cross lines stuck at ‘0’ or 
‘1’ induced by SEU 
 
75 
 
Notice also that the index ‘2nd’ stated in Table  3-1 corresponds to the second configuration shown 
in Figure  3-4B that connects a parasitic interconnect to the main routing path while its length 
could be 1 LSS. Recall that 1 LCC represents the unit length extracted when tuning our model for 
the first configuration in Section  3.5.2, equal to 7.35 µm. The three introduced scenarios in 
Section  3.6 due to extra parasitic interconnects were simulated according to the possible 
interconnection lengths defined in Figure  3-8. 
For example, a simulation delay of 39.2 psec was obtained with the 1 ODC case (1-SEU) shown 
in Figure  3-6A, which is stated in as the configuration (1) in bin number n3 of Table  3-1. This 
value is a close match with the 38 psec measured value at TRIUMF. 
Regarding the delay change due to SEU effect on IMUX circuit (defined in Section  3.6.2) in bin 
n1, a small simulation delay change of 25.8 psec was observed. 
 
 
 
Figure  3-12 : Histogram of measured delays at TRIUMF [32] and simulated delays for the ring 
oscillators implemented in the core of FPGA 
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In the case of extra stuck-at parasitic interconnects (Section  3.6.3), our simulations for the stuck 
at '0' case showed that the first four cross lines break the ring oscillator while with a fifth line, the 
ring oscillator started ringing and produced a delay change of 148.9 psec, as reported in bin n12. 
For the stuck at '1' case, the first eight cross lines stopped the oscillation of the ring oscillator 
 
Table  3-1 : Simulated configurations for ODC root cause validation reported in Figure  3-12 
Number Corresponded Configurations, as Defined in Sec. IV 
   IMUX Circuit 
   (1)2nd 
   (1), (2), (1,1), (1,2) 
   (4), (1,4), (2,1), (2,2), (2,4), (4,1), (4,2), (4,4), (1,1,1), 
(1,1,2), (1,2,1), (1,2,2) 
   (1,1,4), (1,2,4), (1,4,1), (1,4,2), (1,4,4), (2,1,1), (2,1,2), 
(2,2,1) 
   (2,1,4), (2,2,2), (2,2,4), (2,4,1) 
   (2,4,2), (2,4,4), (4,1,1) 
   (4,1,2) 
   (4,1,4) 
    (4,2,1), (4,4,1) 
    (4,2,2), stuck-at ‘1’ 
    (4,2,4), (4,4,2), stuck-at ‘0’ 
    (4,4,4) 
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while with the ninth one, the ring oscillator was functional and produced a delay change of 
135.2 psec as reported in bin n11. These results are explained by the fact that an nMOS pass 
transistor is able to pass a '0' better that a '1' in its ‘on’ state. 
The histogram of the simulated ODCs shows a trend indicating that the most probable delay 
changes are ranging from 40 psec to 100 psec, as observed also experimentally at TRIUMF. It 
confirms that the proposed scenarios and configurations for simulation were sufficient to detect 
those delay changes and consequently the histogram of simulated results is in good agreement 
with the experimental one. 
3.7.2 Delay Fault Results in Virtex-5 FPGA IOB 
This section investigates the delay faults affecting I/O blocks (IOBs) of Virtex-5 FPGA due to 
transient ionizing radiation [140]. The experimental setup is the same as shown in Figure  3-1 but 
the two ring oscillators are made of IOBs rather than LUT inverters in the FPGA core as shown 
in Figure  3-13. The two ROs oscillate at slightly different frequencies,            and 
          . The first ring oscillator occupies 179 IOBs configured as a long delay chain 
connected to one inverter, while the second one occupies 160 IOBs with one inverter. Overall, 
the two ring oscillators occupy 71% of the 480 available IOBs in Virtex-5 with FF1136 package 
[141]. 
The FPGA including the implemented design was bombarded with proton source irradiation 
under different energy levels (63, 50 and 35MeV). On some experiments, the one RO oscillation 
ceased before observing any delay change. The experimental results [36] clearly provided larger 
delay changes than those obtained with RO in the FPGA core (Section  3.4). Our hypothesis 
behind the origin of these large delay changes is that an SEU event modifies the drive and/or the 
buffer standard of IOBs. The bias voltage for FPGA IOBs was 3.3 V. 
To validate this hypothesis, SPICE simulations were performed with the Input/Output Buffer 
Information Specification (IBIS) models [130] extracted from Xilinx ISE tool. IBIS models are 
generally used to perform various board level signal integrity simulations and timing analysis 
especially for high speed signals. 
For each IBIS model simulation, the difference between two consecutive rise times/fall times of 
the output signal with the ones of the 12 mA LVCMOS25 I/O standard was measured while 
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changing the I/O standard and/or drive strength of intended IOBs in the ROs. Each measurement 
was also performed for Maximum, Typical and Minimum cases of the intended output signal 
while the measurement threshold levels, called Vinl and Vinh in the IBIS model, were varied 
according to each I/O standard. These Max, Typ and Min output voltages take into account the 
worst cases and typical combinations of varying temperature, voltage and process population 
sample [130]. 
Alongside the IBIS model simulation, an emulation experiment was performed to support the 
hypothesis behind the origin of these large delay changes due to SEU that modifies the drive 
and/or the buffer standard of IOBs. In emulation, the buffer type and I/O standard for all IOBs 
was modified while the frequency of two ring oscillators (ROs) were measured instantly with 
oscilloscope. Recall that two ROs oscillate at slightly different frequencies,            and 
           with 12 mA LVCMOS25 I/O standard. While changing the I/O standard, if the 
oscillation frequency changes, it confirms that the buffer type and standard will change by SEU. 
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Figure  3-13 : Implementation of two ring oscillators created by Virtex-5 IOBs [140] 
79 
 
The histograms of experimental, emulation, and simulation results corresponding to delay faults 
affecting IOBs of the Virtex-5 FPGA are shown in Figure  3-14. Also, that some large delay 
values in the range of nano-seconds (2.3 nsec to 3.9 nsec) that would appear as outliers on the 
histogram were measured and also obtained by simulations. These longer delay values have been 
created by some I/O standards such as LVTTL, LVCMOS18, LVCMOS33 and PCI. 
All the measured delays at TRIUMF were divided into single ODCs. It should be noted that there 
was also a 6.2 nsec observed at TRIUMF. This particular case is still under investigation in order 
to reproduce it through simulations. 
The emulation and simulation results employing the SPICE IBIS model show a good agreement 
with experimental results, which indicates the usefulness of the IBIS model to evaluate delay 
 
Figure  3-14 : Histogram of measured delays at TRIUMF [36], emulation and simulated delays for 
the ring oscillators implemented inside the FPGA utilizing the Virtex-5 IOBs 
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change due to irradiation affecting the IOBs. Indeed, the simulation results show a trend for the 
most probable delay changes while bombarding the board with proton source. This trend is 
similar to delay changes trend observed experimentally which supports the hypothesis of I/O 
standard change due to proton irradiation. This trend was also confirmed by emulation as 
presented in Figure  3-14. 
Notice that the blank bins observed on the simulation histogram correspond to blank bins on the 
experimental histogram as well. Blank bins are most likely due to delay configurations having a 
low probability of occurrence and have not been observed since the limited amount of 97 
measured ODCs. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This paper presented results supporting the assumption that extra combinational delays in SRAM 
FPGAs due to radiations are caused by bit-flip of SRAM-cells configuring FPGA 
interconnections and switch boxes. The simulation results are closely correlated to those observed 
during proton irradiation experiments. Several delay causing scenarios have been simulated.  
Regarding delay changes affecting the I/O blocks of Virtex-5 FPGA, an experimental setup was 
also tested at TRIUMF including two ring oscillators inside the FPGA created directly in the 
IOBs. The hypothesis of I/O standard alteration while bombarding the FPGA board performed in 
[36] was verified through circuit level simulations and also emulation. IBIS models of I/O blocks 
were used to compare delays of the primarily implemented design to that of supported I/O 
standards and drive strengths in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. Each measurement was performed for 
Maximum, Typical and Minimum levels of the intended output signal. The simulation results are 
in good agreement with the ones obtained at TRIUMF which supports the I/O standard alteration 
hypothesis. Emulations were also performed to validate the hypothesis behind the origin of large 
delay changes observed due to SEU event that modifies the drive and/or the buffer standard of 
IOBs. In emulation, the buffer type and I/O standard of all IOBs were changed while the 
oscillation frequency of two ROs was measured. In the case where the oscillation frequency 
changed, it confirms the alteration of I/O standard due to SEU effect. 
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CHAPTER 4 ARTICLE 2 : DELAY MONITOR CIRCUIT AND DELAY 
CHANGE MEASUREMENT DUE TO SEU IN SRAM-BASED FPGA 
4.1 Overview 
As stated in  CHAPTER 3, extra combinational delay in SRAM-based FPGAs due to transient 
ionizing radiation have been modeled in circuit-level using Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Company (TSMC) 1.2 V 65 nm CMOS technology, similar to the 65 nm triple-
oxide technology node used to build Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. Simulation results for the design 
implemented at the core of FPGA and also with IOBs were in good agreement with those results 
obtained experimentally at TRIUMF laboratory. This chapter intends to discuss the design and 
implementation of a delay monitor circuit in an SRAM-based FPGA for real-time delay detection 
and measurement on a sensitive node of a design. This chapter is the reproduction of a published 
article in IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. 
– M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, and Y. Blaquière, "Delay Monitor Circuit and Delay Change 
Measurement due to SEU in SRAM-Based FPGA," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear 
Science, vol. 65, pp. 1-8, (Early Access), DOI : 10.1109/TNS.2018.2828785, 2018. 
4.2 Abstract 
This paper presents a monitor circuit designed for the detection of extra combinational delays in a 
high frequency SRAM-Based FPGA. As in most of SRAM-based FPGAs more than 90% of the 
configuration bits control the routing resources, systems designed on FPGA are particularly 
vulnerable to interconnection delay changes caused by Single Event Upset (SEU) affecting the 
configuration memory. The proposed monitor is part of a mitigation technique dedicated to 
protect the circuit routing delay integrity while the system is being exposed to SEUs generated by 
radiation. Experimental results show that the probability of a delay change occurrence can 
increase as the number of delay changes affecting a node increases. Indeed, this increase depends 
on the configurable interconnection network and design placement in FPGA. Delay 
measurements using the proposed monitor revealed the existence of single delay changes ranging 
from 29 up to 151 psec. Also, cumulative delay changes in the range of 279 to 309 psec being the 
results of an extra interconnection network added by SEUs have been detected. Measured delay 
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values are in good agreement with those observed experimentally under proton radiation and also 
circuit-level simulations and emulations. 
4.3 Introduction 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are an attractive solution to implement systems for 
space and aeronautic applications. Configuration bits in SRAM-based FPGA are sensitive to 
radiation and have been studied over years [52, 66, 124, 142-146]. Almost 98% of all memory 
elements in SRAM-based FPGAs are configuration bits, of which 90% and more control the 
routing resources [147]. Recent studies reported observations of permanent extra combinational 
delays due to SEU induced by proton radiation in addition to short and open faults [32, 140]. 
Circuit-level models and simulations determined the most probable root cause of delay changes 
being bit-flips of SRAM-cells configuring interconnections and switch boxes, which create shorts 
between routed and unused wires, named parasitic interconnects [148-150]. The stuck-at faults 
can also induce a delay change to the path rather than just a logic fault [148, 151]. An SEU 
affecting a configuration bit of interconnections or switch boxes in SRAM-based FPGA can 
permanently delay the arrival of data signal. A delay observed on a node due a configuration bit 
flipped by an SEU is defined in this paper as a Single Delay Change (SDC). An SEU as a Single-
Bit Error (SBE) affects one location in FPGA fabric at a time. In the case where a sequence of 
SEU injections creates delay change on a same node, the probability to observe larger delay 
changes can increase. The latter is named Cumulative Delay Change (CDC) in this paper. 
Experiments in [32] showed that the SDC due to the bombardment of the top side of the Virtex-5 
FPGA with proton irradiation could be as large as 128 psec for the core circuit. A CDC up 
to 422 psec was also observed. 
These permanent delay changes may lead to malfunction of circuits by generating delay faults. 
Increasing the timing margin or reducing the operating frequency is a trivial mitigation technique 
to reduce the likelihood of these delay faults and tolerating delay changes on combinational 
paths. For high frequency FPGA designs where timing closure is an issue, it might not be 
possible to use these additional timing margins. To reduce the timing cost, some mitigation 
techniques employ in-situ monitors on data path to sample signals before or after the clock edge 
in order to predict or to detect timing errors respectively [109, 110, 113, 152]. The TIMBER 
technique  [109] detects a late arriving signal and correct the delay fault by borrowing time from 
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successive pipeline stages. This technique is not timing efficient for most SRAM-based FPGA 
applications due to the overhead imposed by its “TIMBER flip-flops” topology. Other timing 
error detection techniques allow high frequency operation at the expense of sporadically 
experiencing run-time timing errors on the affected path, such as the one proposed in [152] 
tailored to network-on-chip applications. However, the detection and recovery mechanisms of 
these techniques cannot be generalized to any applications. The scan flip-flop [113] allows 
concurrent error detection and correction by an extra single clock cycle for error correction while 
stopping the whole design on error detection and re-executing erroneous operations. The large 
extra logic gates occupy high silicon area and create performance degradation. 
The main contribution of this paper is a circuit that performs real-time monitoring of delay 
changes. The monitor can be configured according to the timing budget (or available timing 
slack) of each selected node in the FPGA. An experimental setup confirmed the functionality of 
the monitor circuit in real implementation. This setup emulates SEU injection into the FPGA and 
allows locating the exact bit location and position that creates the delay change within the 
configuration memory frames. The observation of CDCs has been shown in the past by circuit-
level modeling, simulation, and emulation [148]. This paper confirms experimentally that CDCs 
are directly linked to SRAM bits used to configure the interconnection network. 
It is worth mentioning that some stuck-at faults may create delay change ([32, 148]) and they will 
be detected by the proposed delay monitor. However, other stuck-at faults (logic faults) are not 
detectable with the proposed monitor because only the transitions on the paths are taken into 
consideration in this application. 
This paper is structured as follows. The motivation and design of the proposed real-time monitor 
architecture is discussed in Section  4.4. Detailed discussions on CDC detection and measurement 
and the proposed methodologies employing the delay monitor circuit are covered in Section  4.5. 
Validation of the proposed technique with an experimental setup on a Virtex-5 FPGA is 
presented in Section  4.6 along with results for experiments to detect CDCs and to locate upset 
configuration bit location. Finally, we conclude in Section  4.7. 
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4.4 Real-Time Monitor for Delay Change Detection 
An SEU affecting a configuration bit of interconnections or switch boxes in SRAM-based FPGA 
can permanently delay the arrival of data signal, labeled Signal Under Test (SUT), from a 
StartPoint flip-flop to any EndPoint flip-flop in a synchronous circuit as shown in Figure  4-1. 
A Delay Change (DC) on an SUT induced by an SEU larger than its worst timing slack (τslack) 
may lead to circuit malfunction. τslack is defined as the minimum delay between the combinational 
logic data arrival time (τCQ+τCL) and the active edge of the clock (Tclk), minus the flip-flop setup 
time τsu (Figure  4-2B). A data signal path with a slack smaller than a DC can potentially generate 
a delay fault. It is worth mentioning that there are two slacks for each logic path in the cone (i.e. 
rising and falling transitions), and the number of paths grows exponentially with the depth of the 
logic cone. A DC on a logic cone net will not necessarily be observed on the SUT. To be 
observed, this DC must be received on the critical path and a transition on this critical path must 
occur. The likelihood of delay faults is reduced if the clock frequency is such that τslack is larger 
than any DC for all circuit nodes. However, this timing overhead could be prohibitive for high 
speed circuits, especially if CDC must be mitigated. Proton irradiation experiments conducted on 
Virtex-5 FPGA showed that CDC on a signal path can be 3.3 times larger than SDC [32, 140], as 
will also be seen in Section  4.6. 
The slack time of a path is relative to the operating clock period (Tclk) and the longest critical path 
(slowest) determined in the design. Critical paths with negligible slack times are more susceptible 
to timing failure due to a DC. In this paper, sensitive nodes are defined as the endpoint of these 
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Figure  4-1 : Timing issues in synchronous circuits : SEU implication on a configuration bit of 
interconnections or switch boxes associated with logic cone of SUT 
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critical paths with the worst (smallest) slack time. For some designs, latency optimization could 
limit the number of critical paths where monitors can be inserted to their corresponding sensitive 
nodes [153]. Since the monitor circuit must be physically placed and routed in the fabric, its 
overhead will significantly affect the time required for design’s placement and routing. Hence,  
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Figure  4-2 : DC Monitor architecture for delay change detection (A). Its timing diagram is shown 
without delay change (B), and with delay change (C) 
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reasonable effort has to be made at the design stage in order to limit the number of critical paths. 
However, the delay monitor is efficient when the design comprises few numbers of sensitive 
nodes. 
A design implemented into the FPGA comprises sensitive nodes and non-sensitive nodes. It is 
worth mentioning that SDC on non-sensitive nodes can be mitigated with the feature available in 
SEU Controller (SEUC) IP core in the FPGA which can detect and correct an SBE occurred by 
an SEU. Without SEUC, the design could crash due to CDCs induced on the non-sensitive nodes 
where no monitor is linked. Scrubbing technique to correct the errors encompasses a wide range 
of techniques [154-156]. The scrubbing cycles for the intended Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA 
(XC5VLX50T) in this paper is almost 7.10 msec. Notice that the SEUC is itself susceptible to 
SEUs. Some of SEUs that are less critical can be corrected as the SEUC has the ability to scrub 
itself [31]. 
In order to reduce the timing overhead of making a circuit tolerant to a DC, we propose : first, to 
make the circuit tolerant to any SDC with a clock frequency such that τslack is larger than SDCmax 
(maximum possible SDC) for all sensitive nodes and second, to add a DC monitor on nodes to 
allow the detection of SDCs. Actions can then be taken as soon as an SDC is detected on these 
sensitive nodes, such as scrubbing (localized bitwise partial reconfiguration), raise a system flag, 
reduce the clock frequency [24], or apply any other mitigation actions. Stopping the clock signal 
is not the preferred solution for designs implemented into FPGAs, especially for real-time control 
applications. Therefore, on DC detection, the system clock period could be temporarily increased 
to compensate for the maximum second DC occurrence on sensitive nodes, hence avoiding any 
system down time. This reduced frequency mode is applied until the circuit affected by an SEU is 
partially or entirely reconfigured. Lowering the operating frequency of the system at the time of 
DC detection is achieved by using the BUFGMUX_CTRL primitive provided by Xilinx which is 
available in Virtex-5 FPGAs and onwards. This logic primitive is a clock buffer with two clock 
inputs and one clock output. A select pin S can switch anytime between two clock inputs without 
causing any glitch. In our application, as soon as the DC Flag of Figure  4-2A is asserted, it is 
used to command the S pin of BUFGMUX_CTRL to switch to a lower frequency. 
The proposed monitor raises a flag upon the occurrence of any DC induced by an SEU on an 
SUT in Figure  4-2. Its timing diagram emphasizes routing delays τ1 to τ4 that can be significant in 
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the monitor. An adjustable delay line (ADL) is configured with a threshold delay τADL to satisfy 
both Equations (4-1) and (4-2) to make the circuit run. Equation (( 4-1) gives the limitation of the 
routing delays for FF2 in Figure  4-2 in order to detect a DC. τADL can be adjusted in order to 
match a DC threshold (DCTh) that needs to be detected as shown in the relationship of 
Equation (( 4-2). This DCTh takes into account the delay sensitivity to process, voltage and 
temperature (PVT) variations and also to the τADL  accuracy. In fact, in the ideal case where 
τ1   τ2   τ4   , a precise τADL adjustment will put its value equal to  τslack    Th. 
Equation (( 4-3) states the criteria for FF1 where DCmax is defined as the maximum DC that will 
not assert the output of FF1, hence will be detected by the monitor.  
In normal operation without DC (Figure  4-2B), the ADL can be configured such that the SUT 
transition propagates up to inputs DFF1 and DFF2 and both arrive before TCLK - τsu and sample the 
same data value and the circuit runs without any error. When a delay change such as SDC 
occurred, the transitions at DFF1 and DFF2 arrive before and after the clock transition respectively 
(Figure  4-2C), and the DC flag is asserted. To fulfill the monitor’s functionality and detect SDC, 
τADL must be tuned according to the unavoidable routing delays τ1, τ2, τ3, and τ4 and depends on 
monitor placement in the FPGA. 
Fine Adjustable Delay Lines (ADL) can be made with carry logic blocks available in most 
FPGAs. ADL tuning can be done using the two types of outputs for each carry logic stage in 
Virtex-5 used in ADL configuration; MUXCY, and OR-gate outputs. Four carry logic stages 
form a CARRY4 primitive. Therefore, eight possible outputs can be properly chosen in order to 
satisfy Equation (( 4-1). Notice that the accuracy/precision of the τADL also depends on the delay 
line resources and how it is performed. Other structures might be used with better precision at the 
cost of logic or routing area. Details on ADL architectures are out of the scope of the paper. The 
sensitivity of SEUC to SEU can be counted as a drawback in the first glance; however, SEUC is 
able to scrub itself. The proposed monitor architecture is efficient when the design comprises few 
τ1 + τ2 + τADL + τ   τslack 
( 4-1) 
τ1 + τ2 + τADL + τ   τslack    Th ( 4-2) 
                    ( 4-3) 
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numbers of sensitive nodes. The logic overhead of the monitor must be taken into consideration 
especially when the Design Under Test (DUT) occupies a large area in the FPGA fabric. 
It is worth mentioning that it is possible for the transition on FF2 to enter the metastability under a 
small DC. In the worst case, the monitor will not flag this small DC. 
The main contribution and value of the proposed delay monitor circuit is to perform real-time DC 
detection while increasing temporarily the clock period by the order of the maximum delay 
change (DCmax) value in order to counter extra DCs received on the same SUT. Thus, the design 
is kept functional at high frequency while the SEUC will do a full scrubbing cycle of 
configuration bits. 
The proposed monitoring scheme is employed in addition to the scrubbing cycle occurring every 
7.1 msec approximately in the Virtex-5. According to our observation, SEU created DCs are the 
probable event. Therefore, our scheme aims at detecting in real time those DCs affecting the most 
sensitive nodes in order to avoid a failure caused by a second delay change that could happen 
before the next scrubbing cycle. Moreover, the latest generation of FPGAs show longer 
scrubbing times, consequent to the gate count increment. 
4.5 Cumulative Delay Change Detection 
The proposed delay monitor circuit is able to detect DC occurrence on an SUT. Two conditions 
must be met to detect a DC on a node : (a) only a DC larger than the worst slack on a sensitive 
node can be detected if the signal transition propagates on the path related to the worst slack (i.e. 
critical path), (b) the monitor must be configured to satisfy Equations (( 4-1) to (( 4-3) taking into 
account that the ADL resolution depends on which output (OR-gate or MUXCY) is selected. 
4.5.1 Sensitivity to Cumulative Delay Changes 
Any first DC occurs when an SEU flips a configuration bit of a Programmable Interconnection 
Point (PIP) in a switch box (such as SB1 in Figure  4-3) connected to a node in SUT’s logic cone, 
which adds the capacitive load of a parasitic interconnect (A), named Level 1 DC. DC is 
accumulated on SUT if successive Level 1 SEUs hit any other PIP directly connected to a node in 
the SUT’s logic cone. 
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Higher Level SEU can also create CDC, such as shown in Figure  4-3 where Level 2 SEU hits any 
PIP in SB2 connected to the parasitic interconnect A and then Level 3 SEU adds parasitic 
interconnect D to the parasitic network. Notice that any added parasitic interconnect makes SUT 
more susceptible to receive further DCs. 
4.5.2 Proposed Algorithm for Detection of Cumulative Delay Changes 
This section provides the algorithm proposed to detect CDCs on an SUT thanks to the delay 
monitor circuit. In reality, the average time between two DCs depends on many factors such as 
SEU injection speed, SUT’s logic cone cross section, and it is not exactly predictable. In an 
emulation sequence, bit-flips are injected sequentially at the SRAM configuration addresses; 
however, two consecutive location addresses do not necessarily belong to the same SUT’s logic 
cone. A new experimental setup is proposed to detect and measure CDCs with our proposed DC 
monitor. This setup performs sequential scan of configuration bits during multiple SEU injections 
and reports the configuration bit location that generates a DC on SUT.  
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Figure  4-3 : Levels of SEU connecting parasitic interconnects to the SUT's logic cone resulting in 
CDC occurrence 
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Our experimental bench injects cumulative SEUs into the FPGA using the SEU Controller macro 
(SEUC) in Xilinx Virtex-5. The SEUC is configured in Detection Only Mode (DOM), which 
allows sequential injection of SEUs into the FPGA without error correction and let the user 
control the time of injection. 
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Flip the configuration bit 
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level2 
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Yes
Get the address of that 
delay change
Last 
address 
in the 
list?
No
Yes
End
Start
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Figure  4-4 : Flow graph of level 2 DC detection 
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In order to detect and measure these CDCs on an SUT, we proposed to instantiate multiple DC 
monitor circuits configured with different threshold delay values. In this case, a given monitor 
would detect a DC according to a defined DCTh. In fact, this strategy can detect and measure 
CDCs with accuracy depending on the span of each bin (container), the number of bins and the 
bin accuracy, which is sensitive to process, voltage and temperature (PVT) variations. The span 
of a bin depends on the values of DCTh of two consecutive monitors including the PVT variation. 
If the span of a bin is larger than the minimum DC value, multiple delay changes could then fall 
into the same bin. In fact, our proposed setup allows the detection of CDCs only when the added 
DC falls into different bin. 
In this paper, in addition to the level 1 DCs, the level 2 and the level 3 DCs generated on an SUT 
node in Figure  4-2A due to an SEU injection have been detected and measured. 
Figure  4-4 shows the flow graph of the proposed methodology in order to detect level 2 DCs 
induced on the SUT node. An address is chosen from a level 1 DC table, and is injected into the 
FPGA while the SEUC is configured in DOM. Then, all the configuration bit addresses are 
scanned by the SEUC, and in the case where a second DC is detected, its address is captured as 
well as its monitor’s DC bin. If this address is not already in level 1 DC table, it is registered in 
the level 2 DC table. 
The proposed recursive pseudo-code shown in Figure  4-5 generalizes the detection concept for 
any CDC, which discovers the parasitic interconnect network using a Depth-First Search (DFS) 
algorithm. In this algorithm, there is a table of location addresses for each DC levels. Two 
arguments are associated with the DC_Detection function : level, which means the rank of 
occurrence of DC, and parent, which refers to the address of the previous DC level belonging to 
the chain of DCs. Notice that for the level 1 DC, there is no address associated to the previous 
parent. 
Detection of level 3 DCs due to SEU injection has a concept similar to the algorithm in 
Figure  4-4 with an additional step where for each of the level 1 DC addresses chosen, a level 2 
child DC address will be selected and injected into the FPGA to induce an SEU. 
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4.6 Experiments and Results 
4.6.1 Test Bench 
The DC monitoring functionality was validated by an implementation in a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA 
linked to an SUT sensitive node. The objective is to characterize the probability of occurrence 
and values of 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 DCs on a given node. 
This has been done experimentally by flipping one by one all the routing bits allocated in the 
SRAM and reporting the ones which affected the particular node under test. A simple benchmark 
is sufficient for characterization. The SUT is a logic cone of only one node, from a 64-bit Linear 
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) at the rate of system clock, 400 MHz in order to assess its 
susceptibility to SEU and measure cumulative delay changes affecting the node. The test bench is 
depicted in Figure  4-6. A PLLs_CLKMUX module generates the system clock. While no delay 
change is injected to the SUT, both FF1 and FF2 sample the same value at the rising edge of the 
clock signal. The value of τADL (FF2 only) must be tuned with respect to the unavoidable routing 
delays τ1, τ2 and τ4 in order to fulfill the requirements for signal transition to both FF1 and FF2 
according to Equations (( 4-1) to (( 4-3). However, other values of τADL can be set in order to 
detect longer or shorter DCs. Notice that the timing slack varies with Process-Voltage-
 
Figure  4-5 : Proposed recursive pseudo-code (DFS) for DC detection 
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Temperature (PVT), as will be described in Section  4.6.3. The ADL was implemented with carry 
chain blocks  
and flip-flops available in FPGA slices. The ADL outputs can be provided by the outputs of 
CARRY4 primitive, which are two types : OR-gates output; and the carry multiplexers 
(MUXCYs) output. The ADL delay is adjusted from the selection of any of these outputs in the 
carry chain. The minimum extracted resolution for each carry logic output in Virtex-5 (65 nm 
technology) is around 20 psec. 
4.6.2 Experimental Validation of the Proposed DC Monitor 
An experimental setup was employed to confirm the functionality of the monitor circuit in real 
implementation. The experiment benefits from the SEU Controller macro (SEUC) IP core in 
Virtex-5 FPGA [29]. Bit-flips are injected through emulation using SEUC via an UART serial 
communication port. For each bit-flip injection, the status of the monitor circuit is captured by 
ILA. The SEUC is set on Detection Only Mode (DOM), which does not perform error correction. 
For each injected SEU, the SEUC sends back the exact location and position of the bit-flip 
(upset) within the configuration memory frames as well as the type of error (i.e., Single-Bit error 
(SBE) or Multiple-Bit error (MBE) [29]. When the DC flag is asserted, the configuration bit 
location is automatically sampled by Chipscope. 
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Figure  4-6 : The test bench configured to validate the delay monitor’s functionality 
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Figure  4-7 shows the post place and route simulation results of the circuit in Figure  4-6. The sut 
signal is fed to FF1 and its delayed version (delayed_sut) is fed to FF2 (Figure  4-2). At the 
time of SDC injection on the SUT node (at 576 nsec), the signals dff1 and dff2 are shifted by 
the same delay change, hence, the two flip-flops sample different values and the sdc_flag is 
asserted.  
 
 
 
Figure  4-7 : Post place and route simulation results of SDC detection scheme using the DC 
monitor 
 
Figure  4-8 : Experimental result of SDC detection obtained by ChipScope Pro Analyzer (ILA) 
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Experimental waveforms extracted by the ILA tool are shown in Figure  4-8. The UART interface 
in SEUC makes a brief report that provides the opportunity to record the exact configuration bit 
location of any injected bit-flip. 
When SEUC operates in DOM, the faulty location is reported by tracing uart_tx signal of 
SEUC. This signal is the serialized representation of data_in parallel input in SEUC 
transmitter. For each byte transmission, the Tx_complete signal is raised while the bytes are 
sent serially. 
Table  4-1 compares our proposed monitor architecture with alternative methods such as TIMBER 
flip-flop [109] and scan flip-flop [113] in some comparable features. The main advantage of the 
proposed DC monitor architecture is the employed compact CARRY4 primitive as a delay 
element rather than large area consuming inverter chains and OR trees. Moreover, the proposed 
monitor compares advantageously to TIMBER and scan flip-flop since it can detect delay 
changes in the range of n times of 20 psec rather than nanoseconds. Similar to any logic circuit, 
the input capacitive load of monitors will add a delay to the sensitive nodes. This result as well as 
area overhead were not clearly describe in [109, 113] due to the large volume of logics employed 
to configure the architectures. Delay overhead induced by our monitor on SUT was extracted by 
Static Timing Analyzer tool from Xilinx and depends on its physical distance with the SUT. For 
example, in our test bench, the SUT of Figure  4-6 has one fanout in the same slice and its net 
delay increases from 295 psec to 326 psec, or 10.5 % with the DC monitor. Indeed, the monitor  
Feature Timing 
Error 
Coverage 
Delay 
Element 
Type 
Operational 
Mode 
Technology 
TIMBER Flip-
Flop [109] 
Range of nsec Inverter chains Low frequency 90 nm 
Scan Flip-
Flop [113] 
Range of nsec OR tree Mid frequency 90 nm 
This Work n times of 
~20 psec 
Carry chain High frequency Virtex-5  
(65 nm) 
Table  4-1 : Comparison of our proposed monitor with alternative methods 
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loads the sensitive node with a delay overhead as small as 31 psec in best-case and as large as 
40 psec in the worst-case extracted by the Static Timing Analyzer tool while it is closely placed 
to the sensitive node. In the case where the monitor is placed as far as possible from the sensitive 
node, the minimum delay overhead is 87 psec in best-case and the maximum is 99 psec in the 
worst-case. 
4.6.3 Experiments to Detect Cumulative Delay Change (CDC) 
Twelve monitors with different threshold delays (DCTh) on the same SUT were used to detect and 
measure first and cumulative second and third DCs. The delay overhead induced by these 
monitors on SUT was almost 65 psec in best-case and as large as 81 psec in the worst-case. This 
SUT is a single net with no logic cone and according to the Static Timing Analyzer (STA), it has 
a total path delay of 1.36 nsec with a slack of 0.95 nsec at 400 MHz. Delays and therefore DCTh 
depend on PVT. Variation of DCTh due to PVT was extracted from STA for (slow process-
0.95V-85°C) and (fast process-1.05V-0°C) corner cases. Each monitor would detect a DC 
depending on its DCTh and its corresponding variation. Our experiments on the SUT shown in 
Figure  4-6 allowed detecting 24 level 1 DCs, 43 level 2 DCs and 83 level 3 DCs. Notice that the 
locations in level 1 DCs table that created a second DC are not included in the level 2 DC table. 
Moreover, the locations in level 1 and 2 DC tables that created a third DC are not included in the 
level 3 DC table. 
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Figure  4-9 : DC bins and maximum bin values for detected level 1, level 2, and level 3 DCs 
extracted from STA 
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The twelve monitors, linked to the SUT node in Figure  4-2A, were configured with the DC bins 
shown in Figure  4-9. The maximum bin value where level 1, level 2, and level 3 DCs were 
detected is also identified. This means that no DC greater than those values was observed 
experimentally. The start and end delay values of each horizontal bar in Figure  4-9 were used to 
configure ADL. They were derived from the best-case and worst-case corners for delay value in 
each stage of delay element (i.e., carry logics of CARRY4 primitive). 
Figure  4-10 presents the interconnection network representation for three of the 24 level 1 DCs. 
Only the fault location for level 1 DCs is shown for simplicity. The locations indicated in the first 
column provide the exact location of the error within a frame [29]. The second column shows 
four of the 43 level 2 detected DCs, and finally, the third column depicts nine of the 83 detected 
level 3 DCs. 
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Figure  4-10 : Three sets of experimental results for CDC detection 
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The histogram of Figure  4-11 presents all 24 level 1 DCs, 43 level 2 DCs and 83 level 3 DCs. 
These results show that the maximum value of level 1 DC detected by our monitor is in the range 
of 129 ~ 151 psec, which is close to the maximum value of 128 psec obtained experimentally at 
TRIUMF [32]. Also, the detected level 2 DC falls in the range of 179 ~ 206 psec which is in good 
agreement with the value of 194 psec measured at TRIUMF. It is observed that the probability of 
occurrence of a DC can increase as the number of DC affecting a node increases with the size of 
the parasitic network. Indeed, this increase depends on the configurable interconnection network 
and the design placement in FPGA. Also, we observed a shift in DC level distribution towards 
higher delay values as the level increases, which is consistent with the fact that level 2 DCs 
 
Figure  4-11 : Distribution of all detected DCs by twelve employed monitors with threshold DC 
values shown as the bins 
 
Table  4-2 : Occurrence of DC increase with DC level 
Delay change 
order 
Absolute number 
of occurrences  
Normalized number 
of occurrences 
First DC 24 1 
Second DC 49 2.04 
Third DC 91 3.79 
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cumulate the effects of level 1 DCs, and level 3 DCs cumulate the effects of level 1 and level 2 
DCs. 
The DC occurrence as a function of DC level is shown in Table  4-2. In this table, all possible 
second DCs (i.e. those level 1 and 2 DCs that create a second DC) and third DCs (i.e. those 
level 1, 2 and 3 DCs that create a third DC) were included to provide a better statistical evaluation 
of CDC occurrence as the DC detection level increases. A normalization factor is applied by 
considering that the first DC has an occurrence of 1. For instance, these results show that the 
probability of occurrence of a second DC after a first DC is 2.04 larger than that for a first DC. In 
fact, the probability of occurrence increases because SEUs affecting a node increase the size of 
the parasitic interconnect network. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Given the importance of routing resources in recent FPGAs, this paper presented a monitor 
circuit for delay change detection that can be employed as part of an SEU mitigation technique 
dedicated to preserve the system timing integrity. Post place and route validation and 
experimental results confirm the functionality of the monitor. The proposed monitor compares 
advantageously to TIMBER and scan flip-flop since it can detect delay changes in the range of n 
times of 20 psec rather than nanoseconds. The monitor loads the sensitive node with a delay 
overhead as small as 31 psec in best-case and as large as 40 psec in the worst-case when it is 
closely connected to the sensitive node. The delay overhead was as small as 87 psec in best-case 
and as large as 99 psec in the worst-case when the monitor was placed as far as possible from the 
sensitive node. Further experiments employing several monitors linked to the sensitive node were 
performed to detect cumulative delay changes. It has been observed that the probability of a delay 
change occurrence on an SUT line increases as the level of occurrence, first, second or third, 
increases. This result justify our delay change mitigation strategy of real-time detection of the 
first delay changes in order to avoid a delay fault caused by a second delay change on the same 
signal path. This is achieved with a very small impact on the system performance. 
4.8 Acknowledgment 
The authors would like to thank CMC Microsystems for providing tools as well as CRIAQ and 
ReSMiQ for their financial support. 
100 
 
CHAPTER 5 ARTICLE 3 : ON THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF SRAM-
BASED FPGA ROUTING NETWORK TO DELAY CHANGES 
INDUCED BY IONIZING RADIATION  
5.1 Overview 
The presence of extra combinational delays, also called DCs, in the routing resources of SRAM-
based FPGA due to transient ionizing radiation were represented and modeled in circuit level in 
 CHAPTER 3. It was shown that the simulation results are in good agreement with those ones 
obtained experimentally which confirm the accuracy of the proposed circuit level models for DC 
generation and propagation in the SRAM-based FPGAs. A delay monitor circuit was proposed in 
 CHAPTER 4 in order to detect and measure the SEU-induced DCs on the routing resources of 
the SRAM-based FPGAs. To this end, the proposed delay monitor was implemented on the same 
FPGA that has been employed for the experiments stated in  CHAPTER 3. The obtained results 
were in good agreement with those ones obtained with in-beam experiments and also by circuit 
level simulations. Also, it was claimed that there is a relation between the level (order) of DC 
occurrence and the probability to receive more DCs. This chapter intends to present the results on 
the investigation of the susceptibility of routing interconnection network to delay changes 
induced by ionizing radiation. Also, the claim that has been stated earlier in  CHAPTER 4 is taken 
into consideration for validation in this chapter. This chapter is the reproduction of a submitted 
article in IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. 
– M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, Y. Blaquière, C. Thibeault, and S. Pichette, "On the Susceptibility 
of SRAM-Based FPGA Routing Network to Delay Changes Induced by Ionizing 
Radiation," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, (Submitted), March 2018. 
5.2 Abstract 
This paper presents the results of investigations on the susceptibility of routing network in 
SRAM-based FPGAs exposed to neutron radiation creating single-event upset. A method to 
configure test circuits mostly with routing resources and few logic resources is presented. Full 
control over routing resources enables the use of different interconnection types in order to create 
routing-based oscillators. A method is proposed to route through the 2-D array of switch matrices 
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inside the interconnection network and to automatically identify the involved programmable 
interconnection points associated with a node. An experimental setup is proposed to measure 
delay changes induced by single-event upset to the FPGA routing resources while it is exposed to 
neutron radiation. The proposed setup requires no external equipment such as manufactured 
equipments or external instruments for delay change measurement. The experimental results 
show that our setup is able to measure induced delay changes as low as 5 ps on higher frequency 
oscillators. 
5.3 Introduction 
SRAM–based Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) have attracted a lot of interest in 
various applications due to their high digital circuit density and growing performance capability. 
In addition, reconfigurability in field makes them very attractive for applications in harsh 
environments such as space and aeronautic [16]. These semiconductor devices are structured in 
an array of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLB) connected via a programmable routing 
interconnection network [16], [148]. 
Recent advances in semiconductor technology allowed integrating programmable logics with 
very complex systems in a single silicon die. State-of-the-art FPGAs include not only the 
programmable logic fabric but also hard-core circuits like complex processing systems, and 
complex interface between the Processor Subsystem (PS) and Programmable Logic (PL) [157]. 
These new All Programmable System-on-Chip (APSoC) devices have been used extensively in 
avionic and space applications in recent years [26, 158-161]. The PL part of the APSoC is the 
FPGA itself and is intended for implementation of high-speed logic and data flow circuits and 
systems. The PS part contains a microcontroller. Hence, the functionality of any system 
implemented into an APSoC can be partitioned between PL and PS. Among the APSoC devices, 
the Xilinx Zynq-7000 fabricated in the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s 28 nm 
technology node has been used for radiation effect studies in recent years [161-166]. This type of 
APSoC is very attractive in the space and aeronautic sector due to its system integration, high 
configurability, and flexibility. 
Routing resources in SRAM-based FPGAs are controlled by SRAM cells that are called 
configuration bits [17]. Their sensitivity to ionizing radiation has been studied over years [22], 
[52], [124], [143-145] and showed that in addition to short and open faults, permanent extra 
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combinational delays can be observed. These extra delays are generated by Single-Event Upset 
(SEU) as reported in [32], [140]. As determined by circuit-level models and simulations, the root 
cause of delay changes (DC) is the bit-flip of SRAM-cells controlling the routing resources, 
mainly found in Switch Matrices (SM). The bit-flip may link an unrouted interconnect to a live 
interconnect. This phenomenon results in an extra capacitance load added to the live interconnect, 
and hence delays the arrival of data signals passing through the live interconnect [148]. The 
impact of ionizing radiation inducing SEU on the interconnection network of SRAM-based 
FPGAs is a serious matter, given that more than 90% of SRAM configuration bit are dedicated to 
routings [66, 167]. 
This paper presents the results of investigations of the likelihood and significance of delay fault 
occurrence in the routing resources in the programmable logic (PL) of a Zynq-7000 APSoC 
device due to neutron radiation. We propose a method to configure Ring Oscillators (RO) mostly 
with routing resources and few logic resources. Full control over routing resources enables the 
use of different interconnection types in order to create routing-based ROs. The configuration of 
different ROs is automated using the Xilinx Vivado scripting tool. A method is proposed for 
traversing SMs inside the interconnection network to automatically identify the involved 
Programmable Interconnection Points (PIP) associated with an input or output pin of an SM. We 
also propose an experimental setup to measure DCs as low as 5 ps induced to the routing 
resources of the Device Under Test (DUT) including the implemented ROs while it is exposed to 
neutron radiation. Thanks to the proposed setup, no external equipment (e.g., such as 
manufactured equipments or external instruments) is required for DC measurement. 
This paper is structured as follows. Some background information is presented in Section  5.4. An 
overview of the routing resources in Zynq-7000 APSoC is presented in Section  5.5. A model for 
SM along with a method to route through it is presented in Section  5.6. The proposed method for 
configuration of different ROs with routing resources and the procedure for automated design 
using the Xilinx Vivado scripting tool is discussed in Section  5.7. Experimental setup for in-beam 
neutron irradiation, hardware implementation of ROs as well as the algorithm to readback the 
data are presented in Section  5.8. Conclusion and future works are finally drawn in Section  5.9. 
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5.4 Background 
This paper focuses on the susceptibility evaluation of the routing interconnection network in the 
PL resource in a Zynq-7000 device to SEUs while the device is exposed to neutron radiation. 
This state-of-the-art APSoC device offers specialized modules such as integrated complex PS. It 
should be noted that almost 98% of all memory elements in the PL part are configuration bits, of 
which more than 90% control the routing resources [66, 167]. Routing interconnects in the PL 
resource are linked through a 2-D array of SMs. An input pin of each SM comprises a set of PIPs 
where a PIP, a CMOS transistor switch, can be programmably turned on/off to add/remove 
interconnects. Once an unwanted PIP is activated, a correction mechanism is required to recover 
the original state of that PIP, such as presented in [143], [168], [34, 169, 170]. Sensitivity 
evaluation of logic resources in Zynq-7000 APSoC to ionizing radiation was studied in recent 
years [157, 163-165]. Ionizing radiation effects such as SEU in the memory elements of Zynq-
7000 APSoC were presented as an important issue in [165]. The impact of using different system 
architectures on a Zynq-7000 APSoC in the overall system failure rate was studied in [162, 164]. 
Several system architectures such as memory organizations and communication schemes were 
implemented and exposed to proton irradiation. Heavy ions and proton experiments conducted on 
a Zynq-7000 APSoC showed that the PL and PS parts have different sensitivity to ionizing 
radiation-induced errors such as SEU [165]. Also, cache memories and BRAMs are very 
sensitive to SEU where each of them needs a different mechanism for SEU detection and 
correction [165]. The vulnerability of different types of memory modules, failure rate in memory 
elements and data have been studied for Zynq-7000 APSoC exposed to ionizing radiation [161-
166]. Recent studies involving routing resources in a variety of applications such as clock tuning 
[171], Time-to-Digital Converters (TDC) [95, 172], Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) [173], 
and True Random Number Generators (TRNG) [174] have shown that full control of the delay at 
the finest granularity between two given points of the circuit is an essential requirement. The 
placement of circuit elements can be fully controlled by the designer, while routing resources are 
less controllable. Implementation of logic-based ROs was reported such as ring-oscillator PUFs 
(ROPUF) [175-180]. Although, these ROs are good to assess the behavior of logic resources 
against different phenomenon such as environmental changes, supply voltage drop, temperature, 
and aging effect, they are not suitable for investigation of interconnection network’s delay 
changes in radiation experiments. 
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5.5 Overview of Routing Resources in Zynq-7000 APSoC 
Generic SRAM-based FPGA model, standalone or merged in an APSoC, consists of some 
fundamental logic cores linked via an interconnection network. There exists a common global 
model for several families of SRAM-based FPGAs including three types of resources : logic 
resources, routing interconnects, and switch matrices [181]. In this paper, we focus on the 
routing resources and switch matrices that are the roots of the interconnection network. 
5.5.1 Logic and Interconnect Tiles Resources 
Logic resources are linked via an interconnection network comprised of different interconnection 
types. Some interconnects are dedicated to specific logics or functions and the rests are global. 
Interconnects in the network span in horizontal plane traversing the gate array from west to east 
and in vertical plane from north to south. SMs are employed to link various interconnects and 
transmit information inside the FPGA. 
The topology of a CLB and interconnect (INT) tiles in Xilinx 7-Series FPGAs is shown in 
Figure  5-1. The planar SM is associated with CLB and has an injective mapping where each 
input node on the right side is connected to only one node on its left side (in CLB tile with 
SLICEL). The INT tile consists of one Wilton SM (WSM) where each input node has a multiple 
mapping to several output nodes and vice versa [182]. A net, such as NetA in Figure  5-1, is made 
of a list of nodes and represents a logic net. A WSM node can be an input or an output for the 
data signal that reaches it and is always unidirectional. A WSM input node sends data signal to 
several outgoing nodes (called downhill node) and one of the PIPs connected to an output node is 
configured to receive data signal from one of its multiple incoming nodes (called uphill nodes). A 
PIP specifies a configurable connection between an SM input and an SM output as depicted in 
Figure  5-1 [183]. 
In addition to CLB and INT tiles, other tiles are available in 7-Series FPGAs to make connection 
to other functional elements such as BRAM, Digital Signal Processor (DSP), Clock Management 
Tile (CMT) and I/Os. Their DC analysis is out of the scope of this paper. This work focuses on 
SEU-induced DCs affecting the interconnection network between CLBs. 
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5.5.2 Interconnect Types Available in 7-Series FPGAs 
The 7-Series FPGAs generally consist of fifteen types of interconnects for data signal 
transmission throughout the PL of APSoC device. Interconnects linking the Wilton SMs are 
categorized as follows : 
 SINGLE (1L) : unidirectional interconnects that span 1 CLB; 
 DOUBLE (2L) : unidirectional interconnects that span 1 or 2 CLBs; 
 HQUAD (4L) : unidirectional interconnects that span 4 CLBs; 
 VQUAD : unidirectional interconnects that span 6 CLBs; 
 BOUNCEACROSS : unidirectional interconnects that span 1 CLB only vertically; 
 VLONG : bidirectional long interconnects that span 20 CLBs vertically; 
 VLONG12 : bidirectional long interconnects that span 12 CLBs vertically; 
 
Figure  5-1 : Topology of CLB and INT tiles in Xilinx 7-Series FPGAs extracted by Xilinx 
Vivado (Each CLB comprises two slices). Logical net  NetA connects a source flip-flop to a 
destination LUT made of seven nodes each made of SINGLE (1L) interconnects 
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 HLONG : bidirectional long interconnects that span 20 CLBs horizontally; 
 GLOBAL : homogeneous and unidirectional interconnects that span 20 CLBs vertically 
and are dedicated to route specific signals (clock, reset, enable, etc.); 
 BENTQUAD : unidirectional interconnects that bend and span 6 CLBs; 
 PINFEED : short interconnects that link Wilton SM to planar SM (coming into planar 
SM); 
 OUTBOUND : short interconnects that link planar SM to Wilton SM (outgoing from 
planar SM); some of them also span 1 CLB; 
 BOUNCEIN : short internal Wilton SM interconnects at some input nodes used to 
bounce signal; 
 PINBOUNCE : short internal Wilton SM interconnects at some output nodes used to 
bounce signal; 
 HVCCGNDOUT : GND and VCC interconnects to link Wilton SM nodes to logic ‘0’ or 
logic ‘1’, respectively. 
Table  5-1 provides the number of each interconnect’s type connected to a Wilton SM. Four out of 
a total of 24 OUTBOUND interconnects span one CLB, while the other twenty interconnects link 
planar SMs to the Wilton SMs. Notice that interconnects of a same type may have different 
topologies. For example, SINGLE or DOUBLE interconnects that span one and two CLBs 
respectively, may have a fanout of one or two Wilton SMs, as shown in Figure  5-2. 
A logical net, for example NetA shown in Figure  5-1, is made of a list of nodes {Source, 
CLBLM_M_A, LOGIC_OUTS2, WN1BEG0, NL1BEG1, EE1BEG1, IMUX7 CLBLM_M_D6, 
Destitation} connecting a flip-flop source to a LUT destination that has been routed with Xilinx 
Vivado. NetA has seven nodes made of SINGLE (1L) interconnect that spans only 1SM. There 
exists a group of input pins associated with a planar SM at the side of Wilton SM (right side of 
planar SM for SLICEL and left side of planar SM for SLICEM) that feeds data signal from 
Wilton SM to planar SM via PINFEED interconnects (Figure  5-1). The dashed interconnects 
NN1BEG3, WW2BEG0 and SR1BEG1 in Figure  5-1 are examples of undesired interconnects 
that could be connected to the node LOGIC_OUTS2. They can be connected and add a capacitive 
load to NetA via a bit-flip generated by an SEU on their respective PIP. 
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5.5.3 PIP Notion and Interconnect Coordinate 
In 7-Series FPGAs, a PIP is called by the name of interconnect it is connected to and the 
interconnect coordinates. In addition, depending on the interconnect’s tail (the beginning or the 
end of interconnect), the PIP takes an index of BEG or END. For example, a PIP in the tiles 
having coordinates X=10 and Y=17, connecting the beginning (BEG) of a DOUBLE (2L) 
interconnect coming from southeast (SE) tile and the beginning (BEG) of a SINGLE (1L) 
interconnect going to northwest (NW), is identified as : 
 
pip INT_R_X10Y17  SE2BEG0 à  NW1BEG2 
Table  5-1 : Types and number of interconnects linked to each WSM in 7-series FPGAs [181] 
Interconnect Type  Number of Interconnects 
Connected to each Wilton SM 
DOUBLE  70 
SINGLE  68 
BOUNCEACROSS  17 
VLONG  3 
HLONG  3 
PINFEED  42 
OUTBOUND  24 
BOUNCEIN  9 
PINBOUNCE  16 
GLOBAL  12 
HQUAD  17 
BENTQUAD  34 
VQUAD  18 
VLONG12  2 
HVCCGNDOUT  2 
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where INT_R_X10Y17 denotes that the PIP belongs to the tile located at coordinate X10Y17. 
The numbers before BEG denote the interconnects’ length they are connecting (2 for DOUBLE 
interconnect and 1 for SINGLE interconnect). The last number indicates the index in order to 
distinguish interconnects of a same category. 
The outputs of each slice (flip-flop outputs, Mux outputs, or LUT outputs) are denoted as 
CLBLx_y_pinname that are connected to the planar SM. Depending on the source component’s 
location, x can be ‘M’ or ‘L’ representing SLICEM (memory) and SLICEL (logic), respectively. 
The SLICEL is used to implement only combinational logic function, while the SLICEM can 
also be configured to implement distributed 64-bit RAM or shift registers. Also, the slice’s type 
is denoted by y which can be ‘M’, ‘L’, or ‘LL’ that represent the SLICEM, first SLICEL, and 
second SLICEL in a CLB, respectively. For example, CLBLM_M_A shown in Figure  5-1, means 
that the output of the first LUT (i.e., A) in SLICEM is chosen. The planar SM connects the output 
pins of slices to the PIPs denoted by LOGIC_OUT. 
Figure  5-3 shows the parasitic interconnects connected to the NetA depicted in Figure  5-1. The 
undesired interconnect of NN1BEG3 is linked to NetA due to the 1st SEU effect on the 
configuration bit of the PIP in WSM1. This results in an additional capacitive load to NetA and 
consequently delaying the signal traversing the net. Then, the interconnects of SR1BEG1 or 
Wilton SMWilton SMWilton SM
Wilton SM
SourceDestination
Destination
Wilton SM
Source
Destination
DOUBLE & 1 fanout
DOUBLE & 2 fanouts
SINGLE & 1 fanout
SINGLE & 2 fanouts
 
Figure  5-2 : Different topologies of DOUBLE (top) and SINGLE (bottom) interconnects in 7-
Series FPGAs 
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WW2BEG0 in WSM2 are connected to WSM1 through a 2
nd
 SEU. Finally, a 3
rd
 SEU links the 
interconnect of NW6BEG1 to the precedent parasitic interconnects by affecting the configuration 
bit of the PIP in WSM3. It is assumed that each SEU affects one PIP at a time. 
5.6 Identification of Extra Interconnects Linked to a Logical Net 
As mentioned earlier in Section  5.5.2, a bit-flip generated by an SEU on the respective PIP of an 
interconnection, links a parasitic extra interconnection to the live net (e.g., interconnection of 
NN1BEG3 to NetA in Figure  5-1) and a DC is induced to this net. Sensitivity evaluation of 
different interconnect types in the routing network to SEU and DC generation as the scope of this 
paper, requires the identification of the respective PIPs associated with the parasitic extra 
interconnects. Manual PIP identification is a time consuming, tedious, and inaccurate process. 
Therefore, an automated algorithm is proposed in order to identify those PIPs in different WSM 
levels associated with a configured net (e.g., NetA in Figure  5-1). 
5.6.1 Routing Algorithm for Switch Matrices 
It is possible to determine all the PIPs associated with each node of NetA in Figure  5-1 that are 
connected to an input or output pin of a WSM. A trivial method is to select an input/output pin of 
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Figure  5-3 : Interconnection of unrouted interconnects to NetA in different WSM levels due to 
SEU implication for the example in Figure  5-1 
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a WSM and manually check the PIP Junction Properties in Vivado. This property identifies the 
PIPs of only one pin of a WSM at a time. It means that, it is not possible to identify the PIPs 
associated with several pins of a WSM, or the PIPs in different WSM levels simultaneously. This 
is very time consuming and inaccurate due to possible mistakes in net selection for designs 
including several nets. Automatic determination of all PIPs associated with each node facilitates 
the analysis of SEU-induced DCs. 
An algorithm is proposed for WSMs that automatically extracts all the PIPs in all WSM levels 
associated with each pin for any logic net as described in Figure  5-4. In this pseudo-code, the 
source and destination logic cells are generated and placed with the FPGA floorplanner in 
STEP 1. The notion of logic cell here refers to a slice logic element, such as flip-flop or LUT. 
Then, a net is routed between the source and destination (STEP 2). Starting from the first WSM 
(wsm_level = 1) in STEP 3 associated with the routed net, a loop is defined in STEP 4 by 
considering all the nodes consistent with the routed net connected to a WSM input. In STEP 5, 
all the nodes associated with level 1 WSM are found by calling the fnode_PIPs function 
defined in STEP 11-18. Using the non-empty condition on the node_list, for each found 
PIP in level 1 WSM, the PIPs available in the next WSM level are explored and saved. Figure  5-5 
shows a partial result for extraction of all PIPs associated with nodes LOGIC_OUTS2 and 
NN1BEG3 available in WSM1 and WSM4 respectively (Figure  5-1) by implementing the 
pseudo-code of Figure  5-4. The results for higher levels of WSMs are not shown in this figure for 
the sake of clarity. The PIPs in the left column are those linked to LOGIC_OUTS2 in WSM1 
shown in Figure  5-1, while the PIPs in the right column are those connected to NN1BEG3 in 
WSM4. 
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Figure  5-4 : Proposed algorithm for WSMs 
 
Figure  5-5 : Extracted PIPs connected to LOGIC_OUTS2 and NN1BEG3 interconnects in 
WSM1 and WSM4 
set_property FIXED_ROUTE    {CLBLM_M_A CLBLM_LOGIC_OUTS12 WN1BEG0   NL1BEG1   
EE1BEG1   IMUX7   CLBLM_M_D6}     [get_nets netA] 
Figure  5-6 : Example of a directed routing in Vivado using TCL scripting 
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5.7 Proposed Architecture for Delay Change Evaluation 
The configuration bits exhibit a substantial vulnerability to SEU. This results in an additional 
capacitive load to a logic net and consequently delaying the signal traversing the net. As more 
than 90% of configuration bits in most of SRAM-based FPGAs control the routing resources, it is 
desired to investigate the sensitivity of different types and lengths of interconnects to SEU 
available in the regular massive interconnection network of the FPGA device. This section 
presents an architecture based on arrays of ring oscillators (ROs) to evaluate the sensitivity to 
SEU of each respective interconnect as listed in Table  5-1 in bold style. 
Among the fifteen different types of interconnects associated with the PL part of the Zynq-7000 
APSoC, six of them cannot be employed to build ROs due to their dedicated role or specific 
location in the fabric. For example, the GLOBAL interconnects are dedicated to specific signals 
such as clock, reset, enable. HVCCGNDOUT interconnects are dedicated VCC and GND for 
TIEOFF logic. The PINFEED and OUTBOUND interconnects located between planar SM and 
Wilton SM and ROs cannot be built with only these interconnects. BOUNCEIN and 
PINBOUNCE are extremely short internal Wilton SM interconnects used to bounce signal. The 
remaining seven interconnects listed in Table  5-2 were used to build seven different ROs. A 
combination of VLONG, VLONG12 and HLONG interconnects was also used to configure a RO 
with long interconnects. 
Figure  5-7 shows a routing diagram representation of three different sets of ROs implemented to 
the FPGA. Figure  5-7(a) to Figure  5-7(c) show routing diagrams of horizontal ROs, the 
BENTQUAD RO, and the vertical ROs, respectively. In this figure, each Wilton SM is shown 
with a circle (SM) and each interconnect is shown with an arrow (I). The proposed RO 
architecture makes use of long routing paths and only two logic components. It is known that 
logic resources made of LUTs are vulnerable to radiation [32], [140] and their number are 
minimized in our experiments to increase the delay faults occurrence compared to logic fault due 
to SEU. Each RO is implemented with only one interconnect type. For example, SINGLE (1L) 
RO type is made with a chain of 1L interconnects connected together through consecutive Wilton 
SMs. Each RO consists of two LUTs and the chain of interconnects. One of the LUTs is 
configured as an inverter and the other one as a buffer. Two pins are associated with the buffer, 
cut and enable, in order to turn on or off the oscillation. 
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The orientation and placement of ROs depends on the orientation of its constitutive interconnects 
(Figure  5-7). The BENTQUAD interconnects bend and span six CLBs unlike the other horizontal 
ROs that are straight. Table  5-2 provides the orientation (i.e., H for Horizontal and V for Vertical) 
and number of Wilton SMs used to implement each type of RO. The RO configured with 
BENTQUAD interconnects took more number of Wilton SMs because of its shape and bending 
within the SMs and it is therefore expected to be more sensitive to SEU. The frequency 
measurement was performed through a pre-configured Linux scheduler using high resolution 
timers configured as frequency counters. Each RO has its dedicated counter located on a 
reference board, i.e. another Zedboard including a Zynq-7000 FPGA, not submitted to radiation 
(Figure  5-8 (a)). Given the high neutron beam flux during experiments, a sampling rate of 
1000 samples/sec was considered for frequency counters over a high resolution in the frequency 
measurement. Therefore, a resolution of 1 kHz was obtained which translates into a theoretical 
delay measurement resolution of :  
Table  5-2 : Characteristics of the implemented ROs to the FPGA 
RO Type 
O
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
Number 
of 
Wilton 
SMs in 
RO 
Measured 
Frequency 
(kHz) 
Delay 
Resolution 
(ps) 
1L H 96 4906 41.53 
2L H 67 22750 1.93 
4L H 36 6392 22.47 
LONG H 58 16104 3.86 
BENTQUAD H 124 23541 1.80 
BOUNCEACROSS V 32 29852 1.12 
VQUAD V 51 29784 1.13 
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Figure  5-7 : Routing diagram for three different sets of ROs implemented to the FPGA : (a) 
diagram of 1L, 2L, 4L and LONG interconnects, (b) diagram of BENTQUAD interconnects, and 
(c) diagram of BOUNCEACROSS and VQUAD interconnects 
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where fn is the nominal frequency of each RO. The term fn-1 denotes the minimum decrement of 
the nominal frequency caused by a DC. Table  5-2 presents the measured nominal frequencies of 
each RO along with the corresponding theoretical delay resolution. As can be seen in Table  5-2, 
the delay resolution for 1L and 4L ROs was not sufficiently small due to their smaller frequencies 
compared to the other ROs. 
5.8 Experiments and Results 
In the experiments, different ROs were implemented on the PL side of ZedBoard Zynq-7000 
APSoC (including 7Z020-CLG484 where 7Z020 is the device name and CLG484 is the package 
name) and their frequencies were measured during run time while the top side of the DUT was 
exposed to neutron radiation. Frequencies were expected to change due to SEU injection and the 
extra load that creates delay changes on ROs’ routings. Experiments were performed at TRIUMF 
laboratory in a beam line that provides a high-intensity neutron beam having a similar energy 
spectrum as the neutron found in the terrestrial atmosphere. The energy spectrum ranges from 10 
to 400 MeV and its flux is 5e6 neutrons/cm
2
/sec [184]. It should be noted that even at low 
intensity, some minutes of exposure in neutron beam can be considered as years of operation in 
high atmosphere. 
5.8.1 Setup 
The frequency of implemented ROs is measured by using a dedicated pre-configured Linux 
scheduler to be used as a high resolution timer. This timer is used as an individual frequency 
meter for each RO during irradiation run time. In order to protect the frequency meters against 
radiation, they were implemented on a second ZedBoard that is referred as the reference board. 
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(b) 
 
Figure  5-8 : (a) Diagram of experimental setup including DUT and reference (REF) ZedBoards; 
(b) Interfacing two ZedBoards via FMC cable; (c) Front and top view of neutron beam shaft at 
TRIUMF lab 
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The interface between the two ZedBoards is realized via a single low-pin-count (LPC) FMC slot 
provided on the ZedBoard. The LPC FMC connector exposes 68 single-ended I/Os that can be 
configured as 34 differential pairs. This interface spans over two PL I/O banks in 7Z020-CLG484 
device. Figure  5-8 (a) shows the diagram of experimental setup prepared for the TRIUMF 
radiation experiments. Figure  5-8 (b) shows two ZedBoards interfaced via LPC FMC cable ready 
to be sent to the neutron beam tunnel. Front and top view of the neutron beam shaft are also 
shown in Figure  5-8 (c). The setup is installed on the beam shaft and is sent to 6m underground 
where the neutron beam is located. 
5.8.2 Results and Discussion 
Sixteen experiments were performed at TRIUMF laboratory for various run times. Data 
acquisition from the reference board was performed in control room. Data corresponding to each 
RO’s frequency was individually saved in a text file using a software routine. 
For example, Figure  5-9 shows one set of results obtained for the RO configured with HQUAD 
interconnects called RO 4L. As can be seen in this figure, the RO frequency decreases over time 
due to SEU-induced DCs. The run time for this set was almost 16ʹ40ʺ. The histogram of results 
for one set of RO 4L is shown in Figure  5-10. This histogram shows six overlapped Gaussian 
distributions, while each distribution corresponds to an oscillating frequency including variations 
mainly due to jitter. The mean value of each distribution is considered as the RO’s frequency 
during the radiation run time. The mean of the first distribution on the right is the nominal 
frequency at the beginning of neutron exposure run. The next distribution peak represents the 
frequency decrement of the RO due to the addition of a parasitic interconnect to the RO’s routed 
net, which creates a DC and decreases the RO frequency. 
Gaussian Mixture Model : Histograms of obtained results were matched to Gaussian Mixture 
Models (GMM). GMM is a parametric probability density function that is represented as a 
weighted sum of M Gaussian distributions. They are commonly used in parametric modeling of 
the probabilistic distribution of continuous measurements. A GMM is given by : 
 
                          
 
              (5-2) 
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Figure  5-9 : One set of results obtained for the RO 4L configured with HQUAD interconnects. 
The RO frequency decreases over time due to induced DCs 
 
Figure  5-10 : One set of results obtained for the RO 4L configured with HQUAD interconnects 
with GMM model and separated distributions 
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where x is a D-dimensional data vector (i.e., measurements),              , are the weight, 
and              denotes the individual Gaussian distribution components. The mixture weights 
must always satisfy the constraint that      
 
   . Commonly, a complete GMM is 
parameterized by all the mean vectors, covariance matrices and weights of individual Gaussian 
distributions [185]. GMM curve as well as the separated distributions (Gaussian Fit 1(nominal 
frequency) to Gaussian Fit 6) are shown in Figure  5-10. 
A database of frequency variations for all ROs in sixteen runs was analyzed to extract DC values 
generated by SEUs. It should be mentioned that DC was not necessarily observed on all the 
oscillators during all the runs. Therefore, for those runs where a DC does not occur, only a single 
distribution exists (i.e., M=1 in Equation (5-2)). The minimum DC value to be experimentally 
measured with the proposed setup not only depends on the resolution of its corresponding RO 
(see Table  5-2), yet to the capability of the GMM model to distinct two close DCs in separate 
Gaussian distributions. The minimum separation factor was extracted by applying the GMM 
model on two Gaussian distributions when the minimum separation value was swept between 
1 ps and 100 ps with steps of 10 fs. Our validation shows that the minimum separation detected 
by the GMM model was almost 5 ps using the maximum standard deviation of 28.8 kHz 
observed in our experimental data. The minimum observed DC in the course of sixteen runs in 
neutron exposure experiments was 8 ps which is consistent with the DC of 5 ps obtained through 
simulation over PVT variation as shown in Table  5-3, supporting that our data analysis method 
enables the detection of a small DC occurrence. 
Figure  5-11 shows the DC values for all runs of RO configured with BENTQUAD interconnects 
called RO BTQ, where a DC was observed. The frequency of RO BTQ before neutron exposure 
is shown in Table  5-2 considering that the board has been reset between each run. In this figure, 
if similar DC values are repeated, multiple DCs are shown as stacked bars. The values observed 
in different runs of RO BTQ show a trend in DCs. Tracing the values in horizontal axis shows 
that a group of DCs can fit in the same category but with a small variation. The reason behind 
this variation could be a slight difference between the interconnect lengths for a same 
interconnect type. 
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In order to find a relationship between the DC results obtained experimentally and of the delay 
created by the different interconnects, delays are extracted from the Xilinx Static Timing 
Analyzer (STA) tool in Vivado. Parasitic interconnects were added to the RO’s routed net with 
the algorithm presented in Section  5.6.1 and the difference in RO’s frequency was measured for 
all the PIPs and all WSM levels. Table  5-3 gives the extracted DC value corresponding to each 
interconnect type in one WSM level by considering the process-voltage-temperature (PVT) 
variations. If an interconnect type falls in multiple DC ranges, it means that there are several 
topologies available for that type. It is noted that, multiple different parasitic interconnect types 
can be connected together due to previous SEUs and then might be linked to the RO’s routed net 
with a new SEU resulting in a large DC value. For example, as shown in Figure  5-3, it is possible 
that the parasitic interconnects NW6BEG1, WW2BEG0, SR1BEG1, and NN1BEG3 are connected  
 
Figure  5-11 : Measured delay change values for all runs of RO BTQ 
 
121 
 
together via previous SEUs injected to the PIP inside WSM2 and WSM3. Then, a newer SEU 
injected to the PIP inside WSM1, may link these parasitic network to the RO’s routed net. For 
instance, the DC value in the range of 132~141 ps shown in Table  5-3 could also be induced 
through two SEUs. To this end, a primarily SEU may link a 2L (or 4L) interconnect to a 
PINBOUNCE (or BOUNCEIN) interconnect and a secondary SEU may link this parasitic 
netwotk to the RO’s routed net. 
All of DC occurrences for each RO type are shown in Figure  5-12 in the course of 16 runs along 
with the 17 extracted DC ranges of Table  5-3 for comparison. DCs as small as 8 ps and as large 
as 364 ps were experimentally observed. The abbreviations of BNC and VQD in Figure  5-12 
Table  5-3 : Estimated induced DC value corresponding to each interconnect type 
Interconnection 
Type 
Approximate value 
of DC induction [ps] 
Label in 
Figure 
‎5-12 
HVCCGNDOUT 5~20 (1) 
PINBOUNCE or 
BOUNCE IN 
21-40 (2) 
BOUNCE IN 41-60 (3) 
OUTBOUND 61-76 (4) 
OUTBOUND or 
PINFEED 
74-89 (5) 
1L or 2L 91-114 (6) 
2L or 4L 109-127 (7) 
4L or 
BOUNCEACROSS 
124-133 (8) 
4L or VQUAD 132-141 (9) 
VQUAD or 
BENTQUAD 
140-151 (10) 
BENTQUAD or 
VLONG12 
161-169 (11) 
VLONG12 or 
VLONG 
163-171 (12) 
VLONG 191-218 (13) 
HLONG or 
VLONG 
216-248 (14) 
HLONG 271-284 (15) 
HLONG or 
GLOBAL 
281-310 (16) 
GLOBAL 332-346 (17) 
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represent the ROs configured with BOUNCEACROSS and VQUAD interconnects, respectively. 
It is seen in this figure that the RO BTQ and RO BNC show the highest sensitivity, while the RO 
VQD and RO 1L show the lowest sensitivity to SEU, although no DC lower than 41 ps could be 
detected on RO 1L because of its low frequency limitation. 
Considering the GMM distribution, the time of DC occurrences were extracted for each run of 
ROs as shown in Figure  5-13. For each distribution, the individual data points (i.e., frequency 
values) are added one-by-one to the distribution curve and the distribution error is calculated. If 
the added data belongs to the distribution, the error will decrease. When adding a new data point 
increases the error, it means that it does not belong to the current distribution curve and falls into 
the next distribution. Figure  5-13 shows the time of occurrences for RO BTQ in all run times. 
The horizontal axis is the time in milliseconds and the vertical axis is the run number. The area 
labeled with ‘No hit’ in the legend is the time before the 1st DC observation. The impact of 
1
st
 DCs on the RO’s routing net will last until the time that 2nd DCs occur and so on. 
The ‘Last DC’ label is the time after the last DC occurrence until the end of the run.  A trend is 
observed where when the first DC appears later, chances of having multiple subsequent DCs 
increases. This result can be explained from the fact that a network of parasitic interconnects is 
built independently and once the RO is finally connected to it, the probability of getting more DC 
increases since the parasitic network encompasses several SMs and then more PIPs can be 
affected by SEUs. The experiments performed at TRIUMF laboratory supports the fact that DCs 
are induced by configuration bit-flips caused by SEU. The SEU changes the SRAM cell content 
and links a parasitic interconnect to a live net. Different RO configurations implemented into the 
FPGA allows obtaining different DC values ranging from almost 8 ps up to 364 ps. 
The results of the time of DCs occurrence obtained experimentally for all ROs (presented for one 
RO in Figure  5-13) can be considered in statistical evaluation and exponential distribution of the 
time between DCs in a Poisson point process, i.e., a process in which events occur continuously 
and independently at a constant average rate. Indeed, suppose the DUT is in normal operation at 
t = 0 where no DC is yet induced by SEU (i.e., the areas labeled with ‘No hit’ in the legend of 
Figure  5-13). Consider the first DC is induced at t1, the second DC is induced at t2, up to the last 
DC. The Probability Density Function (PDF) of an exponential distribution can be identified as 
Equation (5-3). 
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Figure  5-12 : All DC occurrences for each RO type observed in the course of 16 runs along with 
simulation results 
 
Figure  5-13 : DC time of occurrences for RO BTQ in the course of 16 run times 
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                          (5-3) 
where   is defined as the mean (average) of the exponential distribution and it is a scalar 
parameter. The term t is considered as the time interval between a DC occurrence and the 
precedent DC          , except for the first DC, that is the time since the beginning (t = 0) up to 
t1. Those time intervals are generally assumed to be a random number (based on the random 
nature of SEU injection) that are exponentially distributed. This is known as the exponential fault 
law, where the fault is intrinsically the induced DCs in our application. Since the well-known 
term of Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) [186-189] is not an appropriate definition for our 
application (the system does not necessarily fails due to DC induction), we define these time 
intervals as Mean Time To Delay Change (MTTDC). 
A commonly-used alternative parameterization is to define       that is considered as DC 
events rate. In this specification, the parameterization involves the “rate” parameter arises in the 
context of DCs arriving at a rate  , when the time between DC occurrences has a mean of  . 
Table  5-4 provides the mean values         of DCs occurrence for all ROs within sixteen run 
times. For each RO type, the number of Wilton SMs that configure the RO (see Table  5-1) is 
noted in parenthesis. This table is sorted from the most sensitive RO (i.e., shortest mean time to 
1
st
 MTTDC) up to the less sensitive RO (i.e., longest mean time to 1
st
 MTTDC). Results obtained 
for each RO supports the trend that as DCs occur, the probability of getting a subsequent DC 
increases as shown be the steady decrease of the MTTDC as the order (level) of DC occurrence 
increases. This trend is also explained from the buildup of an unwanted network of interconnects 
as the exposure time increases, hence adding more PIPs to the original RO path. It should be 
noted that during the course of several hours of experiment, no oscillation break down has been 
observed. 
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Table  5-4 : Mean values of DCs occurrence for all ROs in the course of sixteen run times 
 RO type 
 
DC level 
RO 1L  
96 
RO 2L 
67 
RO BTQ 
124 
RO BNC 
32 
RO VQD 
51 
RO 
LONG 
58 
RO 4L 
36 
 Mean Time to DC      [ms] 
1
st
  689 1,502 13,498 16,313 26,555 73,143 173,477 
2
nd
  87 404 7,386 12,020 1,722 40,393 139,188 
3
rd
  37 144 2,896 1,575 69 10,069 106,570 
4
th
  15 88 1,776 1,341  5,056 81,388 
5
th
   64 855 1,167  4,072 11,445 
6
th
    850 1,123  2,535  
7
th
    718 325  2,096  
8
th
    376     
9
th
    144     
10
th
    27     
11
th
    7     
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5.9 Conclusion and Future Works 
This paper has presented a detailed analysis of routing resources in PL part of a Zynq-7000 
APSoC that includes an SRAM-based FPGA (7Z020-CLG484) available on a ZedBoard. ROs 
have been configured using only two LUTs and routing resources as the delay chain implemented 
at the core of the FPGA. The frequency of ROs has been measured using dedicated timers in the 
reference board. The DUT have been exposed to neutron irradiation at TRIUMF laboratory. 
Results obtained experimentally have shown up to eleven DC occurrences. Evaluation of the time 
of DC occurrence shows a trend when the first DC appears later, chances of having multiple 
subsequent DCs increases. This result may be explained from the fact that a network of unwanted 
interconnects is built independently and once the RO is finally connected to it, the probability of 
getting more DC increases since the unwanted network encompasses several SMs and then more 
PIPs can be affected by SEUs. The notion of MTTDC was defined in support of mean time to DC 
occurrence in each RO. The trend shows that as DCs occurred, the probability of getting a 
subsequent DC increases as shown be the steady decrease of the MTTDC as the order (level) of 
DC occurrence increases. It is noted that the proposed methodology to build routing-based ring 
oscillators, the algorithm to identify extra parasitic interconnects linked to a logic net, as well as 
the experimental setup for delay change measurement can be applied to other FPGA family such 
as any generation of Xilinx FPGAs compatible to the Vivado design flow. 
Providing an SEU emulation tool in order to inject bit-flips to the FPGA and comparing the 
results with those obtained experimentally would be part of our future work. It is currently a 
challenge since there is no link between the PL and PS parts of Zynq-7000 APSoC and there are 
some issues in communication between single-event mitigation tool (SEM) and the processor. 
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CHAPTER 6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is the characterization, modeling and validation of the delay 
changes induced to the routing resources of the SRAM-based FPGAs due to SEU. It was further 
seen in the literature review that the logic and memory modules in SRAM-based FPGAs are 
susceptible to SEEs particularly SEU. However, the vulnerability of routing interconnection 
network to SEU and further implications of delay changes on the signals traversing the affected 
paths inside the FPGA, to the best of our knowledge, was overlooked in the literature. 
In view of this, we have proposed circuit level models for extra combinational delays induced by 
SEU in SRAM-based FPGAs due to transient ionizing radiation. To this end, circuits involved in 
delay change generation and propagation have been reverse-engineered using the Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) 65 nm CMOS technology, similar to the 65 nm 
triple-oxide technology node used to build Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. Circuit level simulation results 
obtained have been in good agreement with those obtained experimentally at TRIUMF 
laboratory. Also, the simulations and emulations performed on the I/O blocks (IOB) of the FPGA 
revealed the reason behind the larger DCs observed at TRIUMF in the ring oscillators that have 
been directly created by IOBs. It has been shown that the SEU alters the standard or drive of the 
IOBs. The IBIS model has been employed for the investigation of DC impact on the IOBs. 
In the second part of this thesis, a delay monitor circuit has been proposed to detect and measure 
the observed delay changes. The proposed monitor circuit comprises an adjustable delay line, two 
flip-flops and an XOR gate. It is advantageous for the compact and simple architecture compared 
to the existing delay fault detection circuits that have been presented in the literature in 
 CHAPTER 2. The adjustable delay line employed in the monitor design takes advantage of carry 
chain logics available in most of SRAM-based FPGAs. Appropriate delay tuning at the adjustable 
delay line and controlling the net delays for monitor’s routings enabled us to detect the induced 
delay changes with accuracy in the range of picoseconds for Xilinx FPGA. The SEU injection 
has been performed through the SEU controller IP core supported by most of SRAM-based 
FPGAs. The detected and measured delay changes by the monitor circuit have been shown to be 
in good agreement with those obtained experimentally at TRIUMF laboratory and also with the 
results of the circuit level simulations. In view of this, single delay changes (SDC) ranging from 
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29 ps to 151 ps have been detected. It was shown that the proposed delay monitor can be 
considered as a part of a proposed mitigation technique. It means that it is employed in addition 
to the scrubbing cycle occurring every 7.1 msec approximately in the Virtex-5. According to our 
observation, SEU created DCs are the probable event. Therefore, our scheme aims at detecting in 
real time those DCs affecting the most sensitive nodes in order to avoid a failure caused by a 
second delay change that could happen before the next scrubbing cycle. Moreover, the latest 
generation of FPGAs show longer scrubbing times, consequent to the gate count increment. It is 
noted that the proposed delay monitor circuit for delay change detection and measurement could 
be applied to other types of SRAM-based FPGAs, mainly the state-of-the-art devices. 
The extensive investigation of the susceptibility of routing interconnection network in SRAM-
based FPGAs to delay changes induced by ionizing radiation has been presented in the third part 
of this thesis. To this end, we have proposed a method to configure ring oscillators with mostly 
routing resources and a few logic resources implemented to a state-of-the-art APSoC device 
including an SRAM-based FPGA. We have also proposed an algorithm to automatically identify 
the extra parasitic interconnects linked to a logical net due to SEU. An experimental setup for 
delay change measurement has been proposed and implemented while the board including the 
ring oscillators has been exposed to a high energy neutron radiation at TRIUMF laboratory. 
Experimental results have shown that different interconnection types represent different 
behaviors against induced delay changes. Moreover, it has been shown that the susceptibility of 
different interconnects to SEU is not the same. For example, it was shown that the ring oscillator 
configured with BENTQUAD interconnects has shown the observation of up to eleven DCs. The 
time of delay change occurrence has been measured in the results and the notion of mean time to 
delay change (MTTDC) has been defined. It has been shown that later is the occurrence of the 
first delay change to happen, larger is the chance to receive more delay changes. Also, the results 
obtained have supported the fact that as the level of the delay change occurrence increases, the 
probability of getting a subsequent DC would increase. This has been shown by the steady 
decrease of the MTTDC as the order (level) of DC occurrence increases. 
It is noted that the configuration of ring oscillators with routing resources is highly constrained 
with DRC checker in Vivado. It means that increase or decrease of the ring oscillator length may 
not be achieved as easy as the ring oscillators made of logic resources, e.g. inverters. Hence, the 
presented ring oscillators in this thesis presented different resolution and frequency based on the 
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length of delay line that was fine to run the ring oscillator. In addition, the proposed architecture 
for configuration of ring oscillators with routing resources can be adapted in other types of the 
APSoC devices including Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs. Also, the proposed algorithm to identify 
the parasitic interconnects linked to a logical net and the experimental setup for delay change 
measurement are extensible and amenable to other types of state-of-the-art APSoC devices. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation addresses the important problem of the effect of cosmic rays on electronic 
components employed in aircraft avionic system. The increasing demand for utilization of 
semiconductor devices in avionic systems has presented a substantial vulnerability against 
cosmic radiations. SRAM-based FPGAs are mainly susceptible to a specific type of SEE, called 
SEU. Sensitivity evaluation of SRAM-based FPGAs to extra combinational delays caused by 
SEUs has not been addressed thus far in the literature. Extra combinational delays, also called 
delay changes, have been observed experimentally for the first time in SRAM-based FPGAs by 
our research group, when the top side of the device has been exposed to high energy proton beam 
at TRIUMF laboratory. In this thesis, delay changes observed have been presented and their root 
cause has been investigated. To this end, the circuit-level model of the delay changes in SRAM-
based FPGAs has been proposed which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first work on the 
modeling of combinational delays in FPGAs. Due to the intellectual property issues, details of the 
internal circuitry of the FPGA chip are not available. Therefore, circuits involved in delay 
propagation have been reverse-engineered by performing precise modeling of internal blocks 
inside the FPGA and executing simulations. Several scenarios of extra combinational delays have 
been simulated based on the circuit architecture of the FPGA core and routing resources. It has 
been shown that the main contributions to delay are extra interconnection lines unintentionally 
connected to the main circuit path via pass transistors activated by SEUs. Moreover, regarding 
the delay changes affecting the IO blocks of the SRAM-based FPGA, an experimental setup 
including two ring oscillators inside the FPGA created directly in the IO blocks has also been 
tested by our research group at TRIUMF. The main reason of longer delay changes observed on 
the IO blocks due to SEU was unknown at the time of experiments. It was conjectured by our 
group that the I/O standard or drive might be altered while bombarding the FPGA board. 
However, no proof has been provided by them to support this phenomenon. In this dissertation, 
we have strived toward the validation of this hypothesis through circuit level simulations. IBIS 
models of I/O blocks have been used to compare delays of the primarily implemented design to 
that of the supported I/O standards and drive strengths in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA. Each 
measurement has been performed for the maximum, typical and minimum levels of the intended 
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output signal. Simulation results are in good agreement with the experimental results obtained at 
TRIUMF, and they have supported the I/O standard alteration hypothesis. 
The second part of this dissertation has presented the design and experimental validation of a 
delay monitor circuit for detection and measurement of delay changes caused by SEU in the 
SRAM-based FPGA. Since in most of the SRAM-based FPGAs more than 90% of the 
configuration bits control the routing resources, the systems designed on FPGA are particularly 
vulnerable to interconnection delay changes caused by SEU that affect the configuration memory. 
The proposed monitor has been considered as part of a mitigation technique dedicated to protect 
the circuit routing delay integrity while the system has been exposed to the SEUs. Experimental 
results have shown that the probability of occurrence of a delay change can increase when the 
order of delay changes affecting a node increases. This increase depends on the configurable 
interconnection network and the placement of the design in the FPGA. The delay measurements 
using the proposed monitor have revealed the existence of single delay changes ranging from 29 
up to 151 psec. Also, cumulative delay changes in the range of 279 to 309 psec which are the 
results of an extra interconnection network added by SEUs, have been detected. Measured delay 
values have been in good agreement with those observed experimentally under proton radiation at 
TRIUMF laboratory and also the circuit-level simulations and emulations. 
Finally, a detailed analysis of routing resources in the programmable logic part of a Zynq-7000 
APSoC, that includes an SRAM-based FPGA (7Z020-CLG484) available on a ZedBoard has 
been presented. To this end, ring oscillators have been configured using only two LUTs and 
routing resources as the delay chain implemented at the core of the FPGA. The frequency of ring 
oscillators have been measured using dedicated timers in the reference board that has not been 
subjected to the radiation. The DUT have been exposed to neutron irradiation at TRIUMF 
laboratory. Results obtained experimentally have shown up to eleven delay change occurrences 
on a single ring oscillator. Evaluation of the time of the delay change occurrence has shown a 
trend when the first delay change appears later, chances of having multiple subsequent DCs 
would increase. This result can be explained by the fact that a network of parasitic interconnects 
is built independently. The Mean Time To Delay Change (MTTDC) occurrence in each ring 
oscillator has been defined. The trend has shown that when delay changes occurred, the 
probability of getting a subsequent delay change increased. 
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7.2 Scope for Future Work 
Toward the improvement of the objectives achieved in this dissertation, some recommendations 
for the future work are presented. 
The proposed delay monitor circuit has been tested and validated experimentally on Virtex-5 
FPGA using the available tools such as Xilinx ISE which exhibits some limitations for the 
designer. However, modern tools such as Vivado, which supports Virtex-5 and onwards, provide 
more flexibility for the designer to implement the monitors in the state-of-the-art FPGAs. To this 
end, it would be beneficial to generate a tool that would automatically tune and add the adjustable 
delay line of monitors in a design according to a specified slack time of all extracted sensitive 
nodes in a design. Also, it might be possible to achieve better resolutions for the adjustable delay 
line by incorporating the programmable interconnection points associated with switch matrices. 
In addition, the impact of the size of logic cone could be investigated. It has been mentioned that 
the delay monitor circuit is beneficial for designs with few number of critical paths. However, 
increasing the design density will increase the number of critical paths and will not be beneficial 
to incorporate the monitor on all of the critical paths. Hence, further analysis would be interesting 
to derive a relation between the design densities, number of critical paths and also the numbers of 
less critical paths, i.e., the paths that may not detect lower DC orders, yet become critical against 
higher levels of DC. Therefore, a sort of most critical paths reported by this analysis may help to 
employ the delay monitor circuit only on the nodes that are really necessary. 
Regarding the investigations performed on the susceptibility of routing resources to SEU in a 
Zynq-7000 device, some improvements may be made. Moreover, currently there is a challenge to 
make a link between the PL and PS parts of Zynq-7000 APSoC for SEU injection purpose and 
there are some issues in communication between single-event mitigation tool (SEM) and the 
processor. Therefore, providing an SEU emulation tool in order to inject bit-flips to the FPGA 
and comparing the results with those obtained experimentally can be part of the future studies. 
 
 
 
 
133 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[1] G. C. Messenger, "Radiation Hardening of Electronic Systems Invited Paper," IEEE 
Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 16, pp. 160-168, 1969.  
[2] R. H. Maurer, M. E. Fraeman, M. N. Martin, and D. R. Roth, "Harsh Environments : 
Space Radiation Environment, Effects, and Mitigation," Johns Hopkins Apl Technical 
Digest, vol. 28, pp. 17-29, 2008. 
[3] T. Freeman. Facing up the Secondary Neutrons [Online]. Available : 
http://medicalphysicsweb.org/cws/article/research/34364 
[4] J. H. G. Swift. Mitigating single-Event Upsets, WP395 (v1.0) [Online].  
[5] F. Kastensmidt and P. Rech, FPGAs and Parallel Architectures for Aerospace 
Applications : Soft Errors and Fault-tolerant Design : Springer, 2015. 
[6] Radiation Hardening [Online]. Available : 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiation_hardening  
[7] R. C. Baumann, "Radiation-induced soft errors in advanced semiconductor technologies," 
Device and Materials Reliability, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 5, pp. 305-316, 2005. 
[8] J. L. Autran, S. Semikh, D. Munteanu, S. Serre, G. Gasiot, and P. Roche, "Soft-Error Rate 
of Advanced SRAM Memories : Modeling and Monte Carlo Simulation," 2012. 
[9] R. Edwards, C. Dyer, and E. Normand, "Technical standard for atmospheric radiation 
single event effects, (SEE) on avionics electronics," in Radiation Effects Data Workshop, 
2004 IEEE, 2004, pp. 1-5. 
[10] Process management for Avionics : Preparation of an Electronic Components 
Management Plan [Online]. Available : 
http://www.iec.ch/about/brochures/pdf/technology/avionics.pdf 
[11] B. Vibishna, K. Beenamole, and A. K. Singh, "Understanding single-event effects in 
FPGA for Avionic system design," IETE Technical Review, vol. 30, pp. 497-505, 2013. 
[12] R. Koga. Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) Sensitivity in EEPROMs [Online]. 
Available : http://klabs.org/richcontent/MAPLDCon98/Papers/c2_koga.pdf 
[13] F. Sturesson. Single Event Effect (SEE) Testing [Online]. Available : 
http://space.epfl.ch/webdav/site/space/shared/industry_media/08%20SEE%20testing%20
%20F.Sturesson.pdf 
[14] R. Koga, S. H. Penzin, K. B. Crawford, and W. R. Crain, "Single event functional 
interrupt (SEFI) sensitivity in microcircuits," presented at the Radiation and Its Effects on 
Components and Systems, 1997. RADECS 97. Fourth European Conference on, Cannes, 
1997. 
[15] J. F. Tarillo, N. Mavrogiannakis, C. A. Lisboa, C. Argyrides, and L. Carro, "Multiple Bit 
Error Detection and Correction in Memory," in Digital System Design : Architectures, 
Methods and Tools (DSD), 2010 13th Euromicro Conference on, 2010, pp. 652-657. 
[16] F. L. Kastensmidt, T. Jorge, T. Both, P. Rech, G. Wirth, R. D. L. Reis, et al., "Analysing 
the Impact of Aging and Voltage Scaling under Neutron-induced Soft Error Rate in 
134 
 
SRAM-based FPGAs," in ESREF : European Symposium on Reliability of Electron 
Devices, Failure Physics and Analysis, 2014. 
[17] J. J. Rodriguez-Andina, M. J. Moure, and M. D. Valdes, "Features, design tools, and 
application domains of FPGAs," IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 54, 
pp. 1810-1823, 2007. 
[18] S. Liu, M. Boden, D. A. Girdhar, and J. L. Titus, "Single-Event Burnout and Avalanche 
Characteristics of Power DMOSFETs," Nuclear Science, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 53, 
pp. 3379-3385, 2006. 
[19] D. Munteanu, J. L. Autran, and S. Martinie, "Numerical Simulation of Transient 
Response in 3-D Multi-Channel Nanowire MOSFETs Submitted to Heavy Ion 
Irradiation," 2011. 
[20] M. Allenspach, I. Mouret, J. L. Titus, C. F. Wheatley, Jr., R. L. Pease, J. R. Brews, et al., 
"Single-event gate-rupture in power MOSFETs : prediction of breakdown biases and 
evaluation of oxide thickness dependence," Nuclear Science, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 
42, pp. 1922-1927, 1995. 
[21] Xilinx. Virtex-5 Family Overview (Product Specification) - DS100 (v5.1) [Online]. 
Available : http://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/data_sheets/ds100.pdf 
[22] L. Bozzoli and L. Sterpone, "Self rerouting of dynamically reconfigurable SRAM-based 
FPGAs," in Adaptive Hardware and Systems (AHS), 2017 NASA/ESA Conference on, 
2017, pp. 77-84. 
[23] Virtex-5 Family Overview, DS100 (ver. 5.0) [Online].  
[24] Virtex-5 FPGA User Guide (UG190) ver. 5.4 [Online].  
[25] (March 11). Xilinx Fpga Architecture Innovative On Regarding Excellent In Guest 17. 
Available : http://donatz.info/xilinx-fpga-architecture/xilinx-fpga-architecture-innovative-
on-regarding-excellent-in-guest-17/ 
[26] M. Ebrahimi, A. Evans, M. B. Tahoori, E. Costenaro, D. Alexandrescu, V. Chandra, et 
al., "Comprehensive analysis of sequential and combinational soft errors in an embedded 
processor," IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and 
Systems, vol. 34, pp. 1586-1599, 2015. 
[27] B. J. P. Tomas. Introduction to Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) [Online]. 
Available : 
http://www.ee.unlv.edu/~yingtao/2012_Spring/ECE720/student%20presentations/Introdu
ction_to_Field_Programmable_Gate_Arrays.pptx 
[28] FPGA Editor Guide [Online]. Available : 
http://www.xilinx.com/support/sw_manuals/2_1i/download/fpedit.pdf 
[29] K. Chapman. New Generation Virtex-5 SEU Controller [Online].  
[30] K. C. L. Jones. SEU Strategies for Virtex-5 Devices (XAPP864) [Online].  
[31] F. Brosser and E. Milh, "SEU mitigation techniques for advanced reprogrammable FPGA 
in space," Chalmers University of Technology, 2014. 
135 
 
[32] C. Thibeault, S. Pichette, Y. Audet, Y. Savaria, H. Rufenacht, E. Gloutnay, Y. Blaquière, 
F. Moupfouma, and N. Batani, "On extra combinational delays in SRAM FPGAs due to 
transient ionizing radiations," Nuclear Science, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 59, pp. 2959-
2965, 2012. 
[33] P. Graham, M. Caffrey, J. Zimmerman, P. Sundararajan, and E. Johnson, "Consequences 
and categories of SRAM FPGA configuration SEUs," in In Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices, 2003. 
[34] H. Asadi, M. B. Tahoori, B. Mullins, D. Kaeli, and K. Granlund, "Soft error susceptibility 
analysis of SRAM-based FPGAs in high-performance information systems," IEEE 
Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 54, pp. 2714-2726, 2007. 
[35] Virtex-5 FPGA Configuration User Guide (UG191) [Online].  
[36] F. Z. Tazi, C. Thibeault, Y. Savaria, S. Pichette, and Y. Audet, "On Delay Faults 
Affecting I/O Blocks of an SRAM-Based FPGA Due to Ionizing Radiations," arXiv 
preprint arXiv :1409.0736, 2014. 
[37] C. Z. Thibeault, Larry, "AVIO-403, Radiation Tolerant Embedded Systems : Design, 
Verification and Test Methodologies," École de Technologie Supperieur (ÉTS), Montreal, 
QC, Canada, Technical Report2014. 
[38] D. Munteanu and J. L. Autran, "Modeling and Simulation of Single-Event Effects in 
Digital Devices and ICs," Nuclear Science, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 55, pp. 1854-
1878, 2008. 
[39] M. Khellah, S. Brown, and Z. Vranesic, "Minimizing interconnection delays in array-
based FPGAs," in Custom Integrated Circuits Conference, 1994., Proceedings of the 
IEEE 1994, 1994, pp. 181-184. 
[40] P. E. Dodd and F. W. Sexton, "Critical charge concepts for CMOS SRAMs," Nuclear 
Science, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 42, pp. 1764-1771, 1995. 
[41] International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors [Online]. Available : 
http://public.itrs.net 
[42] Y. Song, K. N. Vu, J. S. Cable, A. A. Witteles, W. A. Kolasinski, R. Koga, et al., 
"Experimental and analytical investigation of single event, multiple bit upsets in poly-
silicon load, 64 K&times;1 NMOS SRAMs," Nuclear Science, IEEE Transactions on, 
vol. 35, pp. 1673-1677, 1988. 
[43] Three-dimensional device simulation program manual [Online].  
[44] J. Sleight, S. Bangsaruntip, A. Majumdar, G. Cohen, Y. Zhang, S. Engelmann, et al., 
"Gate-all-around silicon nanowire MOSFETs and circuits," in Device Research 
Conference (DRC), 2010, 2010, pp. 269-272. 
[45] P. Dodd, F. Sexton, and P. Winokur, "Three-dimensional simulation of charge collection 
and multiple-bit upset in Si devices," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 41, pp. 
2005-2017, 1994. 
[46] P. E. Dodd, "Physics-based simulation of single-event effects," IEEE Transactions on 
Device and Materials Reliability, vol. 5, pp. 343-357, 2005. 
136 
 
[47] P. Roche, J. Palau, G. Bruguier, J. Gasiot, K. Belhaddad, and R. Ecoffet, "SEU response 
of an entire SRAM cell simulated as one contiguous three dimensional device domain," 
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 45, pp. 2534-2543, 1998. 
[48] P. Roche, J. Palau, G. Bruguier, C. Tavernier, R. Ecoffet, and J. Gasiot, "Determination of 
key parameters for SEU occurrence using 3-D full cell SRAM simulations," IEEE 
Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 46, pp. 1354-1362, 1999. 
[49] P. E. Dodd, A. Shaneyfelt, K. Horn, D. Walsh, G. Hash, T. Hill, et al., "SEU-sensitive 
volumes in bulk and SOI SRAMs from first-principles calculations and experiments," 
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 48, pp. 1893-1903, 2001. 
[50] Particle Accelerators Around the World. Available : http://www-elsa.physik.uni-
bonn.de/accelerator_list.html 
[51] E. Normand and L. Dominik, "Cross Comparison Guide for Results of Neutron SEE 
Testing of Microelectronics Applicable to Avionics," in Radiation Effects Data Workshop 
(REDW), 2010 IEEE, 2010, pp. 8-8. 
[52] A. Lesea, S. Drimer, J. J. Fabula, C. Carmichael, and P. Alfke, "The rosetta experiment: 
atmospheric soft error rate testing in differing technology FPGAs," Device and Materials 
Reliability, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 5, pp. 317-328, 2005. 
[53] C. Carmichael, E. Fuller, J. Fabula, and F. Lima, "Proton testing of SEU mitigation 
methods for the Virtex FPGA," Proc. of Military and Aerospace Applications of 
Programmable Logic Devices MAPLD, 2001. 
[54] F. Faure, R. Velazco, and P. Peronnard, "Single-event-upset-like fault injection : a 
comprehensive framework," Nuclear Science, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 52, pp. 2205-
2209, 2005. 
[55] K. A. Clark, A. A. Ross, H. H. Loomis, T. R. Weatherford, D. J. Fouts, S. P. Buchner, et 
al., "Modeling single-event effects in a complex digital device," Nuclear Science, IEEE 
Transactions on, vol. 50, pp. 2069-2080, 2003. 
[56] L. W. Massengill, A. E. Baranski, D. O. Van Nort, J. Meng, and B. L. Bhuva, "Analysis 
of single-event effects in combinational logic-simulation of the AM2901 bitslice 
processor," Nuclear Science, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 47, pp. 2609-2615, 2000. 
[57] R. Velazco, A. Corominas, and P. Ferreyra, "Injecting bit flip faults by means of a purely 
software approach : a case studied," in Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems, 2002. 
DFT 2002. Proceedings. 17th IEEE International Symposium on, 2002, pp. 108-116. 
[58] P. Fouillat, V. Pouget, D. Lewis, S. Buchner, and D. McMorrow, "Investigation of single-
event transients in fast integrated circuits with a pulsed laser," International journal of 
high speed electronics and systems, vol. 14, pp. 327-339, 2004. 
[59] P. Civera, L. Macchiarulo, M. Rebaudengo, M. S. Reorda, and M. Violante, "Exploiting 
circuit emulation for fast hardness evaluation," Nuclear Science, IEEE Transactions on, 
vol. 48, pp. 2210-2216, 2001. 
[60] R. Velazco, S. Rezgui, and R. Ecoffet, "Predicting error rate for microprocessor-based 
digital architectures through C.E.U. (Code Emulating Upsets) injection," Nuclear Science, 
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 47, pp. 2405-2411, 2000. 
137 
 
[61] R. Velazco, S. Rezgui, and H. Ziade, "Assessing the soft error rate of digital architectures 
devoted to operate in radiation environment : a case studied," Journal of Electronic 
Testing, vol. 19, pp. 83-90, 2003. 
[62] V. G. Savani, A. I. Mecwan, and N. P. Gajjar, "Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration of 
FPGA for SEU Mitigation and Area Efficiency," International Journal of Advancements 
in Technology, vol. 2, pp. 285-291, 2011. 
[63] L. Sterpone and M. Violante, "A new reliability-oriented place and route algorithm for 
SRAM-based FPGAs," Computers, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 55, pp. 732-744, 2006. 
[64] S. Nomura, M. D. Sinclair, C.-H. Ho, V. Govindaraju, M. de Kruijf, and K. 
Sankaralingam, "Sampling+ DMR : practical and low-overhead permanent fault 
detection," in ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, 2011, pp. 201-212. 
[65] G. L. Smith and L. de la Torre, "Techniques to enable FPGA based reconfigurable fault 
tolerant space computing," in 2006 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 2006, p. 11 pp. 
[66] F. L. Kastensmidt, G. Neuberger, L. Carro, and R. Reis, "Designing and testing fault-
tolerant techniques for sram-based fpgas," in Proceedings of the 1st conference on 
Computing frontiers, 2004, pp. 419-432. 
[67] K. Kyriakoulakos and D. Pnevmatikatos, "A novel SRAM-based FPGA architecture for 
efficient TMR fault tolerance support," in 2009 International Conference on Field 
Programmable Logic and Applications, 2009, pp. 193-198. 
[68] F. Lima, C. Carmichael, J. Fabula, R. Padovani, and R. Reis, "A fault injection analysis of 
Virtex FPGA TMR design methodology," in Radiation and Its Effects on Components 
and Systems, 2001. 6th European Conference on, 2001, pp. 275-282. 
[69] S. D'Angelo, C. Metra, S. Pastore, A. Pogutz, and G. R. Sechi, "Fault-tolerant voting 
mechanism and recovery scheme for TMR FPGA-based systems," in Defect and Fault 
Tolerance in VLSI Systems, 1998. Proceedings., 1998 IEEE International Symposium on, 
1998, pp. 233-240. 
[70] C. Carmichael and C. W. Tseng. Correcting Single-Event Upsets in Virtex-4 FPGA 
Configuration Memory (XAPP1088) [Online].  
[71] J. Heiner, B. Sellers, M. Wirthlin, and J. Kalb, "FPGA partial reconfiguration via 
configuration scrubbing," in Field Programmable Logic and Applications, 2009. FPL 
2009. International Conference on, 2009, pp. 99-104. 
[72] R. N. Pittman, "Partial Reconfiguration : A Simple Tutorial,"  MSR-TR 2012-19, 2012. 
[73] E. Eto. Difference-Based Partial Reconfiguration, (XAPP290) [Online].  
[74] Partial Reconfiguration User Guide (UG702) [Online].  
[75] D. Koch, Partial Reconfiguration on FPGAs : Architectures, Tools and Applications vol. 
153 : Springer, 2012. 
[76] C. Kao, "Benefits of partial reconfiguration," Xcell journal, vol. 55, pp. 65-67, 2005. 
[77] C. Carmichael, M. Caffrey, and A. Salazar. Correcting Single-Event Upsets Through 
Virtex Partial Configuration ( XAPP216) [Online].  
138 
 
[78] E. Stott, P. Sedcole, and P. Y. Cheung, "Fault tolerant methods for reliability in FPGAs," 
in 2008 International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications, 2008, 
pp. 415-420. 
[79] R. Glein, B. Schmidt, F. Rittner, J. Teich, and D. Ziener, "A Self-Adaptive SEU 
Mitigation System for FPGAs with an Internal Block RAM Radiation Particle Sensor," in 
Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM), 2014 IEEE 22nd Annual 
International Symposium on, 2014, pp. 251-258. 
[80] M. B. Tahoori, "Using satisfiability in application-dependent testing of FPGA 
interconnects," in Proceedings of the 40th annual Design Automation Conference, 2003, 
pp. 678-681. 
[81] M. B. Tahoori and S. Mitra, "Automatic configuration generation for FPGA interconnect 
testing," in VLSI Test Symposium, 2003. Proceedings. 21st, 2003, pp. 134-139. 
[82] M. Abramovici, J. M. Emmert, and C. E. Stroud, "Roving STARs : an integrated 
approach to on-line testing, diagnosis, and fault tolerance for FPGAs in adaptive 
computing systems," in Evolvable Hardware, 2001. Proceedings. The Third NASA/DoD 
Workshop on, 2001, pp. 73-92. 
[83] M. Abramovici and C. E. Stroud, "BIST-based test and diagnosis of FPGA logic blocks," 
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 9, pp. 159-172, 
2001. 
[84] M. Abramovici, C. E. Stroud, and J. M. Emmert, "Online BIST and BIST-based diagnosis 
of FPGA logic blocks," IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) 
Systems, vol. 12, pp. 1284-1294, 2004. 
[85] C.-L. Hsu and T.-H. Chen, "Built-in self-test design for fault detection and fault diagnosis 
in SRAM-based FPGA," IEEE Transactions on instrumentation and measurement, vol. 
58, pp. 2300-2315, 2009. 
[86] A. Benso, S. A. Chiusano, G. Di Natale, P. E. Prinetto, and M. Lobetti Bodoni, "Online 
and offline BIST in IP-core design," IEEE Design & Test of Computers, vol. 18, pp. 92-
99, 2001. 
[87] M. Abramovici, C. Strond, C. Hamilton, S. Wijesuriya, and V. Verma, "Using roving 
STARs for on-line testing and diagnosis of FPGAs in fault-tolerant applications," in Test 
Conference, 1999. Proceedings. International, 1999, pp. 973-982. 
[88] J. Lach, W. H. Mangione-Smith, and M. Potkonjak, "Low overhead fault-tolerant FPGA 
systems," IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 6, pp. 
212-221, 1998. 
[89] M. Abramovici and C. E. Stroud, "BIST-based delay-fault testing in FPGAs," Journal of 
electronic testing, vol. 19, pp. 549-558, 2003. 
[90] C. Stroud, M. Lashinsky, J. Nall, J. Emmert, and M. Abramovici, "On-line BIST and 
diagnosis of FPGA interconnect using roving STARs," in On-Line Testing Workshop, 
2001. Proceedings. Seventh International, 2001, pp. 27-33. 
139 
 
[91] M. Abramovici, C. Stroud, B. Skaggs, and J. Emmert, "Improving on-line BIST-based 
diagnosis for roving STARs," in On-Line Testing Workshop, 2000. Proceedings. 6th 
IEEE International, 2000, pp. 31-39. 
[92] G. Jovanovic and M. Stojcev, "Vernier’s Delay Line Time–to–Digital Converter," A : 
Appl Math Inform Mech, Scientific Publications of the state University of NOVI PAZAR 
SER, vol. 1, pp. 11-20, 2009. 
[93] K. Chmielewski, "Multi-vernier time-to-digital converter implemented in a field-
programmable gate array," Measurement Science and Technology, vol. 22, p. 017001, 
2011. 
[94] J. Kalisz, "Review of methods for time interval measurements with picosecond 
resolution," Metrologia, vol. 41, p. 17, 2004. 
[95] S. Berrima, Y. Blaquière, and Y. Savaria, "A multi-measurements RO-TDC implemented 
in a Xilinx field programmable gate array," in Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), 2017 IEEE 
International Symposium on, 2017, pp. 1-4. 
[96] D. C. Chu, M. S. Allen, and A. S. Foster, "Universal counter resolves picoseconds in time 
interval measurements," Hewlett-Packard J, vol. 29, pp. 2-1, 1978. 
[97] M. Fishburn, L. H. Menninga, C. Favi, and E. Charbon, "A 19.6 ps, FPGA-based TDC 
with multiple channels for open source applications," IEEE transactions on nuclear 
science, vol. 60, pp. 2203-2208, 2013. 
[98] J. Kalisz, M. Pawlowski, and R. Pelka, "Error analysis and design of the Nutt time-
interval digitiser with picosecond resolution," Journal of Physics E : Scientific 
Instruments, vol. 20, p. 1330, 1987. 
[99] E. Bergeron, M. Feeley, M. Daigneault, and J. P. David, "Using dynamic reconfiguration 
to implement high-resolution programmable delays on an FPGA," in Circuits and Systems 
and TAISA Conference, 2008. NEWCAS-TAISA 2008. 2008 Joint 6th International IEEE 
Northeast Workshop on, 2008, pp. 265-268. 
[100] S. Berrima, Y. Blaquière, and Y. Savaria, "Sub-ps resolution programmable delays 
implemented in a Xilinx FPGA," presented at the IEEE 60th International Midwest 
Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS), Boston, MA, USA, 2017. 
[101] J. Kalisz, R. Szplet, J. Pasierbinski, and A. Poniecki, "Field-programmable-gate-array-
based time-to-digital converter with 200-ps resolution," Instrumentation and 
Measurement, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 46, pp. 51-55, 1997. 
[102] D. M. Santos, S. F. Dow, and M. E. Levi, "A CMOS delay locked loop and sub-
nanosecond time-to-digital converter chip," in Nuclear Science Symposium and Medical 
Imaging Conference Record, 1995., 1995 IEEE, 1995, pp. 289-291. 
[103] P. Dudek, S. Szczepanski, and J. V. Hatfield, "A high-resolution CMOS time-to-digital 
converter utilizing a Vernier delay line," Solid-State Circuits, IEEE Journal of, vol. 35, 
pp. 240-247, 2000. 
[104] C.-S. Hwang, P. Chen, and H.-W. Tsao, "A high-precision time-to-digital converter using 
a two-level conversion scheme," Nuclear Science, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 51, pp. 
1349-1352, 2004. 
140 
 
[105] A. H. Chan and G. W. Roberts, "A jitter characterization system using a component-
invariant vernier delay line," Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, IEEE 
Transactions on, vol. 12, pp. 79-95, 2004. 
[106] M.-C. Lin, G.-R. Tsai, C.-Y. Liu, and S.-S. Chu, "FPGA-based high area efficient time-
to-digital IP design," in TENCON 2006. 2006 IEEE Region 10 Conference, 2006, pp. 1-4. 
[107] P. Yen-Lin, K. Ding-Ming, C. Yung-Fa, and W. Cheng-Wen, "Application-Independent 
Testing of 3-D Field Programmable Gate Array Interconnect Faults," Very Large Scale 
Integration (VLSI) Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 22, pp. 207-219, 2014. 
[108] A. Panteloukas, A. Psarras, C. Nicopoulos, and G. Dimitrakopoulos, "Timing-resilient 
Network-on-Chip architectures," in 2015 IEEE 21st International On-Line Testing 
Symposium (IOLTS), 2015, pp. 77-82. 
[109] M. R. Choudhury, V. Chandra, R. C. Aitken, and K. Mohanram, "Time-borrowing circuit 
designs and hardware prototyping for timing error resilience," IEEE transactions on 
Computers, vol. 63, pp. 497-509, 2014. 
[110] M. Nicolaidis, "Time redundancy based soft-error tolerance to rescue nanometer 
technologies," in VLSI Test Symposium, 1999. Proceedings. 17th IEEE, 1999, pp. 86-94. 
[111] T. Austin, D. Blaauw, T. Mudge, and K. Flautner, "Making typical silicon matter with 
razor," Computer, vol. 37, pp. 57-65, 2004. 
[112] D. Ernst, N. S. Kim, S. Das, S. Pant, R. Rao, T. Pham, et al., "Razor : A low-power 
pipeline based on circuit-level timing speculation," in Microarchitecture, 2003. MICRO-
36. Proceedings. 36th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on, 2003, pp. 7-18. 
[113] S. Valadimas, A. Floros, Y. Tsiatouhas, A. Arapoyanni, and X. Kavousianos, "The time 
dilation technique for timing error tolerance," IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 63, 
pp. 1277-1286, 2014. 
[114] M. Sadi, L. Winemberg, and M. Tehranipoor, "A robust digital sensor IP and sensor 
insertion flow for in-situ path timing slack monitoring in SoCs," in 2015 IEEE 33rd VLSI 
Test Symposium (VTS), 2015, pp. 1-6. 
[115] I. Harris and R. Tessier, "Diagnosis of interconnect faults in cluster-based FPGA 
architectures," in Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE/ACM international conference on 
Computer-aided design, 2000, pp. 472-476. 
[116] J. Liu and S. Simmons, "BIST-diagnosis of interconnect fault locations in FPGA's," in 
Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2003. IEEE CCECE 2003. Canadian Conference 
on, 2003, pp. 207-210. 
[117] X. Sun, J. Xu, B. Chan, and P. Trouborst, "Novel technique for built-in self-test of FPGA 
interconnects," in Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE International Test Conference, 2000, p. 
795. 
[118] S. Venkataraman and W. K. Fuchs, "A deductive technique for diagnosis of bridging 
faults," in Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE/ACM international conference on Computer-
aided design, 1997, pp. 562-567. 
141 
 
[119] S.-J. Wang and C.-N. Huang, "Testing and diagnosis of interconnect structures in 
FPGAs," in Test Symposium, 1998. ATS'98. Proceedings. Seventh Asian, 1998, pp. 283-
287. 
[120] S. McCracken and Z. Zilic, "FPGA test time reduction through a novel interconnect 
testing scheme," in Proceedings of the 2002 ACM/SIGDA tenth international symposium 
on Field-programmable gate arrays, 2002, pp. 136-144. 
[121] J. Lach, W. H. Mangione-Smith, and M. Potkonjak, "Runtime Logic and Interconnect 
Fault Recovery on Diverse FPGA Architectures," in Military and Aerospace Applications 
of Programmable Devices and Technologies International Conference, 1999. 
[122] E. S. S. Reddy, V. Chandrasekhar, M. Sashikánth, V. Kamakoti, and N. Vijaykrishnan, 
"Detecting SEU-caused routing errors in SRAM-based FPGAs," in 18th International 
Conference on VLSI Design held jointly with 4th International Conference on Embedded 
Systems Design, 2005, pp. 736-741. 
[123] H. Helstrup, J. Nystrand, S. Martens, B. Skaali, H. Tilsner, J. Wikne, et al., "Irradiation 
tests of the ALTERA SRAM based FPGA and fault tolerant design concepts," 2003. 
[124] P. S. Ostler, M. P. Caffrey, D. S. Gibelyou, P. S. Graham, K. S. Morgan, B. H. Pratt, et 
al., "SRAM FPGA Reliability Analysis for Harsh Radiation Environments," Nuclear 
Science, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 56, pp. 3519-3526, 2009. 
[125] P. Bernardi, M. S. Reorda, L. Sterpone, and M. Violante, "On the evaluation of SEU 
sensitiveness in SRAM-based FPGAs," in On-Line Testing Symposium, 2004. IOLTS 
2004. Proceedings. 10th IEEE International, 2004, pp. 115-120. 
[126] M. Alderighi, F. Casini, S. D’Angelo, A. Gravina, V. Liberali, M. Mancini, et al., "A 
preliminary study about SEU effects on programmable interconnections of SRAM-based 
FPGAs," Journal of electronic testing, vol. 29, pp. 341-350, 2013. 
[127] S. P. Young, K. Chaudhary, and T. J. Bauer, "Interconnect structure for a programmable 
logic device," ed : Google Patents, 2002. 
[128] S. P. Young, T. J. Bauer, M. Chirania, and V. M. Kondapalli, "Programmable logic block 
with dedicated and selectable lookup table outputs coupled to general interconnect 
structure," ed : Google Patents, 2008. 
[129] M. Chirania and V. M. Kondapalli, "Lookup table circuit optionally configurable as two 
or more smaller lookup tables with independent inputs," ed : Google Patents, 2006. 
[130] IBIS Open Forum; ©1995-2014 [Online]. Available : www.vhdl.org/ibis/ 
[131] M. Ceschia, M. Violante, M. S. Reorda, A. Paccagnella, P. Bernardi, M. Rebaudengo, et 
al., "Identification and classification of single-event upsets in the configuration memory 
of SRAM-based FPGAs," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 50, pp. 2088-2094, 
2003. 
[132] M. Wirthlin, E. Johnson, N. Rollins, M. Caffrey, and P. Graham, "The reliability of FPGA 
circuit designs in the presence of radiation induced configuration upsets," in Field-
Programmable Custom Computing Machines, 2003. FCCM 2003. 11th Annual IEEE 
Symposium on, 2003, pp. 133-142. 
142 
 
[133] P. B. Minev and V. S. Kukenska, "The Virtex-5 routing and logic architecture," Annual 
Journal of Electronics, Technical University of Sofia, vol. 3, pp. 107-110, 2009. 
[134] Xilinx. Timing Closure User Guide - UG612 (v14.3) [Online]. Available : 
http://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/sw_manuals/xilinx14_4/ug612.pdf 
[135] Spectre Circuit simulator [Online]. Available : 
www.cadence.com/products/cic/spectre_circuit/pages/default.aspx 
[136] Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Ltd. TSMC 65nm Technology. Available : 
http://www.tsmc.com/english/dedicatedFoundry/technology/65nm.htm 
[137] Xilinx. Virtex-5 FPGA Configuration Users Guide, UG191 (ver. 3.11) [Online].  
[138] Virtex-5 FPGA User Guide (UG190) [Online]. Available : 
www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/user_guides/ug190.pdf 
[139] M. Węgrzyn and J. Sosnowski, "Tracing fault effects in FPGA systems," International 
Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications, vol. 60, pp. 92-97, 2014. 
[140] F. Z. Tazi, C. Thibeault, Y. Savaria, S. Pichette, and Y. Audet, "On extra delays affecting 
I/O blocks of an SRAM-Based FPGA due to ionizing radiation," IEEE Transactions on 
Nuclear Science, vol. 61, pp. 3138-3145, 2014. 
[141] Xilinx. Virtex-5 FPGA Packaging and Pinout Specification, UG195 (ver 4.8.1) [Online].  
[142] R. Giordano, S. Perrella, V. Izzo, G. Milluzzo, and A. Aloisio, "Redundant-Configuration 
Scrubbing of SRAM-Based FPGAs," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 64, pp. 
2497-2504, 2017. 
[143] A. M. Keller, T. A. Whiting, K. B. Sawyer, and M. J. Wirthlin, "Dynamic SEU 
Sensitivity of Designs on Two 28-nm SRAM-based FPGA Architectures," IEEE 
Transactions on Nuclear Science, 2017. 
[144] A. M. Keller and M. J. Wirthlin, "Benefits of Complementary SEU Mitigation for the 
LEON3 Soft Processor on SRAM-Based FPGAs," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear 
Science, vol. 64, pp. 519-528, 2017. 
[145] I. Villalta, U. Bidarte, J. Gomez-Cornejo, J. Lázaro, and A. Astarloa, "Estimating the SEU 
failure rate of designs implemented in FPGAs in presence of MCUs," Microelectronics 
Reliability, vol. 78, pp. 85-92, 2017. 
[146] T. Nidhin, A. Bhattacharyya, R. Behera, T. Jayanthi, and K. Velusamy, "Understanding 
radiation effects in SRAM-based field programmable gate arrays for implementing 
instrumentation and control systems of nuclear power plants," Nuclear Engineering and 
Technology, vol. 49, pp. 1589-1599, 2017. 
[147] M. Caffrey, P. Graham, E. Johnson, M. Wirthlin, and C. Carmichael, "Single-event upsets 
in SRAM FPGAs," in Proc. International Conference on Military and Aerospace 
Programmable Logic Devices, 2002. 
[148] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, Y. Blaquière, C. Thibeault, S. Pichette, and F. Z. Tazi, "Circuit 
level modeling of extra combinational delays in SRAM-based FPGAs due to transient 
ionizing radiation," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 61, pp. 3535-3542, 2014. 
143 
 
[149] S. Huda and J. H. Anderson, "Leveraging Unused Resources for Energy Optimization of 
FPGA Interconnect," IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, 
vol. 25, pp. 2307-2320, 2017. 
[150] F. L. Kastensmidt and L. Carro, "Improving reliability of SRAM-based FPGAs by 
inserting redundant routing," IEEE transactions on nuclear science, vol. 53, pp. 2060-
2068, 2006. 
[151] E. Chmelar, "FPGA Interconnect Delay Fault Testing," in ITC, 2003, pp. 1239-1247. 
[152] A. Panteloukas, A. Psarras, C. Nicopoulos, and G. Dimitrakopoulos, "Timing-resilient 
network-on-chip architectures," in On-Line Testing Symposium (IOLTS), 2015 IEEE 21st 
International, 2015, pp. 77-82. 
[153] D. Gomez-Prado, M. Ciesielski, and R. Tessier, "FPGA latency optimization using 
system-level transformations and DFG restructuring," in Proceedings of the Conference 
on Design, Automation and Test in Europe, 2013, pp. 1553-1558. 
[154] A. Tiwari and K. A. Tomko, "Enhanced reliability of finite-state machines in FPGA 
through efficient fault detection and correction," IEEE Transactions on Reliability, vol. 
54, pp. 459-467, 2005. 
[155] Y. Ichinomiya, S. Tanoue, M. Amagasaki, M. Iida, M. Kuga, and T. Sueyoshi, 
"Improving the robustness of a softcore processor against SEUs by using TMR and partial 
reconfiguration," in Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM), 2010 
18th IEEE Annual International Symposium on, 2010, pp. 47-54. 
[156] M. A. Bajura, Y. Boulghassoul, R. Naseer, S. DasGupta, A. F. Witulski, J. Sondeen, et 
al., "Models and algorithmic limits for an ECC-based approach to hardening sub-100-nm 
SRAMs," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 54, pp. 935-945, 2007. 
[157] L. A. Tambara, "Analyzing the impact of radiation-induced failures in all programmable 
system-on-chip devices," 2017. 
[158] X. Iturbe, D. Keymeulen, E. Ozer, P. Yiu, D. Berisford, K. Hand, et al., "An integrated 
SoC for science data processing in next-generation space flight instruments avionics," in 
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC), 2015 IFIP/IEEE International Conference on, 
2015, pp. 134-141. 
[159] X. Iturbe, D. Keymeulen, P. Yiu, D. Berisford, R. Carlson, K. Hand, et al., "On the use of 
system-on-chip technology in next-generation instruments avionics for space 
exploration," in IFIP/IEEE International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration-
System on a Chip, 2015, pp. 1-22. 
[160] A. Pérez, L. Suriano, A. Otero, and E. de la Torre, "Dynamic reconfiguration under 
RTEMS for fault mitigation and functional adaptation in SRAM-based SoPCs for space 
systems," in Adaptive Hardware and Systems (AHS), 2017 NASA/ESA Conference on, 
2017, pp. 40-47. 
[161] Á. B. de Oliveira, L. A. Tambara, and F. L. Kastensmidt, "Exploring Performance 
Overhead Versus Soft Error Detection in Lockstep Dual-Core ARM Cortex-A9 Processor 
Embedded into Xilinx Zynq APSoC," in International Symposium on Applied 
Reconfigurable Computing, 2017, pp. 189-201. 
144 
 
[162] L. A. Tambara, P. Rech, E. Chielle, J. Tonfat, and F. L. Kastensmidt, "Analyzing the 
impact of radiation-induced failures in programmable SoCs," IEEE Transactions on 
Nuclear Science, vol. 63, pp. 2217-2224, 2016. 
[163] I. Villata, U. Bidarte, U. Kretzschmar, A. Astarloa, and J. Lázaro, "Fast and accurate 
SEU-tolerance characterization method for Zynq SoCs," in Field Programmable Logic 
and Applications (FPL), 2014 24th International Conference on, 2014, pp. 1-4. 
[164] L. A. Tambara, P. Rech, E. Chielle, and F. L. Kastensmidt, "Analyzing the failure impact 
of using hard-and soft-cores in all programmable SoC under neutron-induced upsets," in 
Radiation and Its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS), 2015 15th European 
Conference on, 2015, pp. 1-5. 
[165] L. A. Tambara, A. Akhmetov, D. V. Bobrovsky, and F. L. Kastensmidt, "On the 
Characterization of Embedded Memories of Zynq-7000 All Programmable SoC under 
Single Event Upsets Induced by Heavy Ions and Protons," in Radiation and Its Effects on 
Components and Systems (RADECS), 2015 15th European Conference on, 2015, pp. 1-4. 
[166] D. M. Hiemstra, V. Kirischian, and J. Brelski, "Single Event Upset Characterization of the 
Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Using Proton Irradiation," in 2017 IEEE Radiation Effects 
Data Workshop (REDW), 2017, pp. 1-4. 
[167] M. Caffrey, P. Graham, E. Johnson, M. W. Byu, and M. Wirthlin, "Single-event upsets in 
SRAM FPGAs," in in Proc. International Conference on Military and Aerospace 
Programmable Logic Devices, 2002. 
[168] I. Villalta, U. Bidarte, J. Gómez-Cornejo, J. Jiménez, and J. Lázaro, "SEU emulation in 
industrial SoCs combining microprocessor and FPGA," Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, vol. 170, pp. 53-63, 2018. 
[169] C. Carmichael, E. Fuller, P. Blain, and M. Caffrey, "SEU mitigation techniques for Virtex 
FPGAs in space applications," in Proceeding of the Military and Aerospace 
Programmable Logic Devices International Conference (MAPLD), 1999, p. C2. 
[170] U. Legat, A. Biasizzo, and F. Novak, "SEU recovery mechanism for SRAM-based 
FPGAs," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 59, pp. 2562-2571, 2012. 
[171] T. Polzer, F. Huemer, and A. Steininger, "A Programmable Delay Line for Metastability 
Characterization in FPGAs," in Microelectronics (Austrochip), 2016 Austrochip 
Workshop on, 2016, pp. 51-56. 
[172] P. Chen, Y.-Y. Hsiao, Y.-S. Chung, W. X. Tsai, and J.-M. Lin, "A 2.5-ps Bin Size and 
6.7-ps Resolution FPGA Time-to-Digital Converter Based on Delay Wrapping and 
Averaging," IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 25, 
pp. 114-124, 2017. 
[173] C. Gu, N. Hanley, and M. O'neill, "Improved Reliability of FPGA-Based PUF 
Identification Generator Design," ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and 
Systems (TRETS), vol. 10, p. 20, 2017. 
[174] A. P. Johnson, R. S. Chakraborty, and D. Mukhopadyay, "An Improved DCM-Based 
Tunable True Random Number Generator for Xilinx FPGA," IEEE Transactions on 
Circuits and Systems II : Express Briefs, vol. 64, pp. 452-456, 2017. 
145 
 
[175] M. Barbareschi, G. Di Natale, and L. Torres, "Ring oscillators analysis for security 
purposes in Spartan-6 FPGAs," Microprocessors and Microsystems, vol. 47, pp. 3-10, 
2016. 
[176] S. Gehrer, "Highly Efficient Implementation of Physical Unclonable Functions on 
FPGAs," Ph.D. Thesis, Informatic, Technische Universitat Munchen, Germany, 2017. 
[177] S. Gehrer and G. Sigl, "Reconfigurable PUFs for FPGA-based SoCs," in Integrated 
Circuits (ISIC), 2014 14th International Symposium on, 2014, pp. 140-143. 
[178] F. L. Kastensmidt, J. Tonfat, T. Both, P. Rech, G. Wirth, R. Reis, et al., "Voltage scaling 
and aging effects on soft error rate in SRAM-based FPGAs," Microelectronics Reliability, 
vol. 54, pp. 2344-2348, 2014. 
[179] F. Kodýtek, R. Lórencz, and J. Buček, "Improved ring oscillator PUF on FPGA and its 
properties," Microprocessors and Microsystems, vol. 47, pp. 55-63, 2016. 
[180] C.-A. Lefebvre, L. Rubio, and J. L. Montero, "Digital thermal sensor based on ring-
oscillators in Zynq SoC technology," in Thermal Investigations of ICs and Systems 
(THERMINIC), 2016 22nd International Workshop on, 2016, pp. 276-278. 
[181] Xilinx. 7-Series FPGAs Configurable Logic Block User Guide (UG474) [Online]. 
Available : 
https://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/user_guides/ug474_7Series_CLB.pdf 
[182] B. Taj, "Single Event Upset error detection on routing tracks of Xilinx FPGAs," Master's 
Thesis, Computer and Software Department, McMaster University, Canada, 2013. 
[183] S. Berrima, Y. Blaquière, and Y. Savaria, "Sub-ps resolution programmable delays 
implemented in a Xilinx FPGA," 2017. 
[184] TRIUMF. (2017, Fenruary 09). Neutron Irradiation Facility. Available : 
http://www.triumf.ca/neutron-irradiation-facility 
[185] D. Reynolds, "Gaussian mixture models," Encyclopedia of biometrics, pp. 827-832, 2015. 
[186] L.-T. Wang, C.-W. Wu, and X. Wen, VLSI test principles and architectures : design for 
testability : Academic Press, 2006. 
[187] I. Herrera-Alzu and M. Lopez-Vallejo, "Design techniques for Xilinx Virtex FPGA 
configuration memory scrubbers," IEEE transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 60, pp. 
376-385, 2013. 
[188] Z.-M. Wang, L.-L. Ding, Z.-B. Yao, H.-X. Guo, H. Zhou, and M. Lv, "The reliability and 
availability analysis of SEU mitigation techniques in SRAM-based FPGAs," in Radiation 
and Its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS), 2009 European Conference on, 
2009, pp. 497-503. 
[189] C. Bolchini and C. Sandionigi, "Fault classification for SRAM-Based FPGAs in the space 
environment for fault mitigation," IEEE Embedded Systems Letters, vol. 2, pp. 107-110, 
2010. 
 
 
 
146 
 
APPENDIX A – LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AND AWARDS 
Journal papers 
[J1] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, Y. Blaquière, C. Thibeault, S. Pichette, and F.Z. Tazi, “Circuit Level 
Modeling of Extra Combinational Delays in SRAM-based FPGAs Due to Transient Ionizing 
Radiation,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, 61(6), pp.3535-3542, 2014. 
[J2] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, and Y. Blaquière, “Delay Monitor Circuit and Delay Change 
Measurement due to SEU in SRAM-based FPGA,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, 
vol. 65, pp. 1-8, (Early Access), DOI : 10.1109/TNS.2018.2828785, April 19, 2018. 
[J3] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, Y. Blaquière, C. Thibeault, and S. Pichette, “On the Susceptibility of 
SRAM-based FPGA Routing Network to Delay Changes Induced by Ionizing Radiation,” IEEE 
Transactions on Nuclear Science, March 27, 2018, Submitted. 
 
Conference papers 
[C1] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, Y. Blaquière, C. Thibeault, et al., “Circuit Level Modeling of Extra 
Combinational Delays in SRAM-Based FPGAs Due to Transient Ionizing Radiation,ˮ IEEE 
Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC), July 14-18, 2014, Paris, France. 
[C2] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, and Y. Blaquière, “A Strategy Toward the Detection of Extra 
Combinational Delays in SRAM-Based FPGAs Due to Transient Ionizing Radiation,ˮ 25th 
Annual SEE Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD), 
May 23-26, 2016, La Jolla, CA, USA. 
[C3] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, and Y. Blaquière, “Delay Monitor Circuit for Sensitive Nodes in 
SRAM-Based FPGA,ˮ IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC), July 17-
21, 2017, New Orleans, LA, USA. 
 
Poster Sessions 
[P1] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, and Y. Blaquière, “Monitor Circuit for Detection of Extra 
Combinational Delays in SRAM-Based FPGA Due To Transient Ionizing Radiation,ˮ 12th 
International School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems for Space Applications, 
November 7-10, 2016, Montreal, QC, Canada. 
147 
 
[P2] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, Y. Blaquière, and C. Thibeault, “Characterization of Propagation 
Delays in FPGAs due to Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Mitigation Techniques,ˮ 83e congrès 
de l’Acfas, May29, 2015, Université du Québec à Rimouski (UQAR), Rimouski, QC, Canada. 
[P3] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, and Y. Blaquière, “Characterization, Modeling and Mitigation of 
Propagation Delays in SRAM-Based FPGAs due to Single Event Upsets (SEUs) for Avionic 
Applications,ˮ Journée de l’innovation ReSMiQ, October, 15, 2015, Polytechnique Montréal, 
Montréal, QC, Canada. 
[P3] M. Darvishi, Y. Audet, and Y. Blaquière, “Circuit de détection de délais pour les systèmes 
sur FPGA exposés aux rayons cosmiques dans les applications avioniques et spatiales,ˮ Journée 
de l’innovation ReSMiQ, May, 26, 2017, Polytechnique Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada. 
 
Awards 
[A1] Travel grant for attending IEEE NSREC2014 conference, July 2014. 
[A2] ReSMiQ Docrotal Scholarship Award, January 2015. 
[A3] Travel grant for attending IEEE NSREC2017 conference, July 2017. 
 
 
 
